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Author: Baljit Singh
Publisher: Bombay : Asia Publishing House
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 150
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Book Description
Author: Baljit Singh
Publisher: Bombay : Asia Publishing House
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 150
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Book Description
Author: Mao Tse-tung
Publisher: Courier Corporation
ISBN: 0486119572
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 130
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Book Description
The first documented, systematic study of a truly revolutionary subject, this 1937 text remains the definitive guide to guerrilla warfare. It concisely explains unorthodox strategies that transform disadvantages into benefits.
Author: Sam Charles Sarkesian
Publisher: Transaction Publishers
ISBN: 9780913750056
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 656
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Book Description
âRevolutionâ is a word that causes fear in some, exhilaration in others, and confusion in most. Originally used to describe a restoration, it eventually came to mean a sweeping, sudden attack on an existing order. Human history has borne witness to a variety of national and social revolutionsâpopulation revolution, revolution of ideas, technological revolution, and revolution in education. Simultaneously, there has been a proliferation of literature on revolution, armed struggle, and violence aimed at unseating policies and leadership of governments and societies. Revolutionary struggles are more than simply armed internal conflict; they involve the essence of the political system. The desire to make such phenomena understandable often leads to oversimplification. Attempts to encompass their multi-dimensional nature, on the other hand, can become immersed in complexities, ambiguities, and misinterpretations. The perspective of this classic volume, available in paperback for the first time, is that revolution is here to stay. Guerrilla warfare, according to Sarkesian, is a particularly useful strategy for the weak, the frustrated, the alienated, and seekers of power against existing regimes. The collected works in this volume examine the social roots of revolution, development of strategy and tactics, practice in city and countryside, dilemmas of attackers and defenders. The actors and thinkers collected and analyzed here range from leading political analysts, anthropologists, sociologists, historians, and officials as well as practitioners of guerrilla warfare. This core text with primary sources in the area of war, revolution, and insurgence develops an understanding of revolution, traces the growth of guerilla doctrine, and studies the specifics of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary guerilla warfare.
Author: Walter Laqueur
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 0429716370
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 393
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Book Description
This book deals with guerrilla warfare; it does not aim at presenting a universal theory, for such a theory would be either exceedingly vague or exceedingly wrong. The present volume is the first part of a wider study which, the author believes, has not been attempted before - a critical interpretation of guerrilla and terrorist theory and practice
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 336
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Book Description
Author: Anthony Joes
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
ISBN: 0813172233
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 232
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Book Description
Guerrilla insurgencies continue to rage across the globe, fueled by ethnic and religious conflict and the easy availability of weapons. At the same time, urban population centers in both industrialized and developing nations attract ever-increasing numbers of people, outstripping rural growth rates worldwide. As a consequence of this population shift from the countryside to the cities, guerrilla conflict in urban areas, similar to the violent response to U.S. occupation in Iraq, will become more frequent. Urban Guerrilla Warfare traces the diverse origins of urban conflicts and identifies similarities and differences in the methods of counterinsurgent forces. In this wide-ranging and richly detailed comparative analysis, Anthony James Joes examines eight key examples of urban guerrilla conflict spanning half a century and four continents: Warsaw in 1944, Budapest in 1956, Algiers in 1957, Montevideo and São Paulo in the 1960s, Saigon in 1968, Northern Ireland from 1970 to 1998, and Grozny from 1994 to 1996. Joes demonstrates that urban insurgents violate certain fundamental principles of guerrilla warfare as set forth by renowned military strategists such as Carl von Clausewitz and Mao Tse-tung. Urban guerrillas operate in finite areas, leaving themselves vulnerable to encirclement and ultimate defeat. They also tend to abandon the goal of establishing a secure base or a cross-border sanctuary, making precarious combat even riskier. Typically, urban guerrillas do not solely target soldiers and police; they often attack civilians in an effort to frighten and disorient the local population and discredit the regime. Thus urban guerrilla warfare becomes difficult to distinguish from simple terrorism. Joes argues persuasively against committing U.S. troops in urban counterinsurgencies, but also offers cogent recommendations for the successful conduct of such operations where they must be undertaken.
Author: John A. Nagl
Publisher: Penguin
ISBN: 0698176359
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 260
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Book Description
From one of the most important army officers of his generation, a memoir of the revolution in warfare he helped lead, in combat and in Washington When John Nagl was an army tank commander in the first Gulf War of 1991, fresh out of West Point and Oxford, he could already see that America’s military superiority meant that the age of conventional combat was nearing an end. Nagl was an early convert to the view that America’s greatest future threats would come from asymmetric warfare—guerrillas, terrorists, and insurgents. But that made him an outsider within the army; and as if to double down on his dissidence, he scorned the conventional path to a general’s stars and got the military to send him back to Oxford to study the history of counterinsurgency in earnest, searching for guideposts for America. The result would become the bible of the counterinsurgency movement, a book called Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. But it would take the events of 9/11 and the botched aftermath of the Iraq invasion to give counterinsurgency urgent contemporary relevance. John Nagl’s ideas finally met their war. But even as his book began ricocheting around the Pentagon, Nagl, now operations officer of a tank battalion of the 1st Infantry Division, deployed to a particularly unsettled quadrant of Iraq. Here theory met practice, violently. No one knew how messy even the most successful counterinsurgency campaign is better than Nagl, and his experience in Anbar Province cemented his view. After a year’s hard fighting, Nagl was sent to the Pentagon to work for Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, where he was tapped by General David Petraeus to coauthor the new army and marine counterinsurgency field manual, rewriting core army doctrine in the middle of two bloody land wars and helping the new ideas win acceptance in one of the planet’s most conservative bureaucracies. That doctrine changed the course of two wars and the thinking of an army. Nagl is not blind to the costs or consequences of counterinsurgency, a policy he compared to “eating soup with a knife.” The men who died under his command in Iraq will haunt him to his grave. When it comes to war, there are only bad choices; the question is only which ones are better and which worse. Nagl’s memoir is a profound education in modern war—in theory, in practice, and in the often tortured relationship between the two. It is essential reading for anyone who cares about the fate of America’s soldiers and the purposes for which their lives are put at risk.
Author: John Nagl
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 0313077037
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 273
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Book Description
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.
Author: Christopher Bellamy
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317419596
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 387
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Book Description
Extensively illustrated with 52 detailed campaign and battle maps and diagrams, this book, originally published in 1990, surveys the evolution of warfare in Europe from Napoleon to the end of the twentieth century and in Asia from the Middle Ages. It considers the interaction of technology and warfare. With wide-ranging examples, the book includes two in depth case studies, one on the Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group and its predecessors in the Russian Imperial Army, the other on the history of land warfare, including guerilla warfare, in Asia. In this book the author demonstrates that military history can be of immense practical help to the modern military analyst and professional. Now updated with a new introduction to take into account changes since 1990, this book remains of essential value to students, teachers & professionals in political & social history, international relations, defence, war & peace studies.
Author: Beatrice Heuser
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317376579
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 230
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Book Description
In early modern times, warfare in Europe took on many diverse and overlapping forms. Our modern notions of ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ warfare, of ‘major war’ and ‘small war’, have their roots in much greater diversity than such binary notions allow for. While insurgencies go back to time immemorial, they have become conceptually fused with ‘small wars’. This is a term first used to denote special operations, often carried out by military companies formed from special ethnic groups and then recruited into larger armies. In its Spanish form, guerrilla, the term ‘small war’ came to stand for an ideologically-motivated insurgency against the state authorities or occupying forces of another power. There is much overlap between the phenomena of irregular warfare in the sense of special operations alongside regular operations, and irregular warfare of insurgents against the regular forces of a state. This book demonstrates how long the two phenomena were in flux and fed on each other, from the raiding operations of the 16th century to the ‘small wars’ or special operations conducted by special units in the 19th century, which existed alongside and could merge with a popular insurgency. This book is based on a special issue of the journal Small Wars & Insurgencies.
