Author: W. Leinfellner
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401716544
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 476
Book Description
When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discover ies is not over. The recent advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory.
Decision Theory and Decision Behaviour
Author: Anatol Rapoport
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401578400
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 439
Book Description
This book presents the content of a year's course in decision processes for third and fourth year students given at the University of Toronto. A principal theme of the book is the relationship between normative and descriptive decision theory. The distinction between the two approaches is not clear to everyone, yet it is of great importance. Normative decision theory addresses itself to the question of how people ought to make decisions in various types of situations, if they wish to be regarded (or to regard themselves) as 'rational'. Descriptive decision theory purports to describe how people actually make decisions in a variety of situations. Normative decision theory is much more formalized than descriptive theory. Especially in its advanced branches, normative theory makes use of mathematicallanguage, mode of discourse, and concepts. For this reason, the definitions of terms encountered in normative decision theory are precise, and its deductions are rigorous. Like the terms and assertions of other branches of mathematics, those of mathematically formalized decision theory need not refer to anything in the 'real', i. e. the observable, world. The terms and assertions can be interpreted in the context of models of real li fe situations, but the verisimilitude of the models is not important. They are meant to capture only the essentials of adecision situation, which in reallife may be obscured by complex details and ambiguities. It is these details and ambiguities, however, that may be crucial in determining the outcomes of the decisions.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401578400
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 439
Book Description
This book presents the content of a year's course in decision processes for third and fourth year students given at the University of Toronto. A principal theme of the book is the relationship between normative and descriptive decision theory. The distinction between the two approaches is not clear to everyone, yet it is of great importance. Normative decision theory addresses itself to the question of how people ought to make decisions in various types of situations, if they wish to be regarded (or to regard themselves) as 'rational'. Descriptive decision theory purports to describe how people actually make decisions in a variety of situations. Normative decision theory is much more formalized than descriptive theory. Especially in its advanced branches, normative theory makes use of mathematicallanguage, mode of discourse, and concepts. For this reason, the definitions of terms encountered in normative decision theory are precise, and its deductions are rigorous. Like the terms and assertions of other branches of mathematics, those of mathematically formalized decision theory need not refer to anything in the 'real', i. e. the observable, world. The terms and assertions can be interpreted in the context of models of real li fe situations, but the verisimilitude of the models is not important. They are meant to capture only the essentials of adecision situation, which in reallife may be obscured by complex details and ambiguities. It is these details and ambiguities, however, that may be crucial in determining the outcomes of the decisions.
Preference Change
Author: Till Grüne-Yanoff
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9048125936
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 273
Book Description
Changing preferencesis a phenomenonoften invoked but rarely properlyaccounted for. Throughout the history of the social sciences, researchers have come against the possibility that their subjects’ preferenceswere affected by the phenomenato be explainedor by otherfactorsnot taken into accountin the explanation.Sporadically, attempts have been made to systematically investigate these in uences, but none of these seems to have had a lasting impact. Today we are still not much further with respect to preference change than we were at the middle of the last century. This anthology hopes to provide a new impulse for research into this important subject. In particular, we have chosen two routes to amplify this impulse. First, we stress the use of modellingtechniquesfamiliar from economicsand decision theory. Instead of constructing complex, all-encompassing theories of preference change, the authors of this volume start with very simple, formal accounts of some possible and hopefully plausible mechanism of preference change. Eventually, these models may nd their way into larger, empirically adequate theories, but at this stage, we think that the most importantwork lies in building structure.Secondly,we stress the importance of interdisciplinary exchange. Only by drawing together experts from different elds can the complex empirical and theoretical issues in the modelling of preference change be adequately investigated.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9048125936
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 273
Book Description
Changing preferencesis a phenomenonoften invoked but rarely properlyaccounted for. Throughout the history of the social sciences, researchers have come against the possibility that their subjects’ preferenceswere affected by the phenomenato be explainedor by otherfactorsnot taken into accountin the explanation.Sporadically, attempts have been made to systematically investigate these in uences, but none of these seems to have had a lasting impact. Today we are still not much further with respect to preference change than we were at the middle of the last century. This anthology hopes to provide a new impulse for research into this important subject. In particular, we have chosen two routes to amplify this impulse. First, we stress the use of modellingtechniquesfamiliar from economicsand decision theory. Instead of constructing complex, all-encompassing theories of preference change, the authors of this volume start with very simple, formal accounts of some possible and hopefully plausible mechanism of preference change. Eventually, these models may nd their way into larger, empirically adequate theories, but at this stage, we think that the most importantwork lies in building structure.Secondly,we stress the importance of interdisciplinary exchange. Only by drawing together experts from different elds can the complex empirical and theoretical issues in the modelling of preference change be adequately investigated.
Mathematics of Data Fusion
Author: I.R. Goodman
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9780792346746
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 538
Book Description
Data fusion or information fusion are names which have been primarily assigned to military-oriented problems. In military applications, typical data fusion problems are: multisensor, multitarget detection, object identification, tracking, threat assessment, mission assessment and mission planning, among many others. However, it is clear that the basic underlying concepts underlying such fusion procedures can often be used in nonmilitary applications as well. The purpose of this book is twofold: First, to point out present gaps in the way data fusion problems are conceptually treated. Second, to address this issue by exhibiting mathematical tools which treat combination of evidence in the presence of uncertainty in a more systematic and comprehensive way. These techniques are based essentially on two novel ideas relating to probability theory: the newly developed fields of random set theory and conditional and relational event algebra. This volume is intended to be both an update on research progress on data fusion and an introduction to potentially powerful new techniques: fuzzy logic, random set theory, and conditional and relational event algebra. Audience: This volume can be used as a reference book for researchers and practitioners in data fusion or expert systems theory, or for graduate students as text for a research seminar or graduate level course.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9780792346746
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 538
Book Description
Data fusion or information fusion are names which have been primarily assigned to military-oriented problems. In military applications, typical data fusion problems are: multisensor, multitarget detection, object identification, tracking, threat assessment, mission assessment and mission planning, among many others. However, it is clear that the basic underlying concepts underlying such fusion procedures can often be used in nonmilitary applications as well. The purpose of this book is twofold: First, to point out present gaps in the way data fusion problems are conceptually treated. Second, to address this issue by exhibiting mathematical tools which treat combination of evidence in the presence of uncertainty in a more systematic and comprehensive way. These techniques are based essentially on two novel ideas relating to probability theory: the newly developed fields of random set theory and conditional and relational event algebra. This volume is intended to be both an update on research progress on data fusion and an introduction to potentially powerful new techniques: fuzzy logic, random set theory, and conditional and relational event algebra. Audience: This volume can be used as a reference book for researchers and practitioners in data fusion or expert systems theory, or for graduate students as text for a research seminar or graduate level course.
Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research
Author: T. Parthasarathy
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1475726406
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 304
Book Description
Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research deals with various aspects of game theory and their applications to Economics and OR related problems. It brings together the contributions of a wide spectrum of disciplines such as Statistics, Mathematics, Mathematical Economics and OR. The contributions include decision theory, stochastic games, cooperative and noncooperative games. The papers in the volume are classified under five different sections. The first four sections are devoted to the theory of two-person games, linear complimentarity problems and game theory, cooperative and noncooperative games. The fifth section contains diverse applications of these various theories. Taken together they exhibit a rich versatility of these theories and lively interaction between the mathematical theory of games and significant economic problems.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1475726406
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 304
Book Description
Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research deals with various aspects of game theory and their applications to Economics and OR related problems. It brings together the contributions of a wide spectrum of disciplines such as Statistics, Mathematics, Mathematical Economics and OR. The contributions include decision theory, stochastic games, cooperative and noncooperative games. The papers in the volume are classified under five different sections. The first four sections are devoted to the theory of two-person games, linear complimentarity problems and game theory, cooperative and noncooperative games. The fifth section contains diverse applications of these various theories. Taken together they exhibit a rich versatility of these theories and lively interaction between the mathematical theory of games and significant economic problems.
Non-Bayesian Decision Theory
Author: Martin Peterson
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1402086997
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 176
Book Description
For quite some time, philosophers, economists, and statisticians have endorsed a view on rational choice known as Bayesianism. The work on this book has grown out of a feeling that the Bayesian view has come to dominate the academic com- nitytosuchanextentthatalternative,non-Bayesianpositionsareseldomextensively researched. Needless to say, I think this is a pity. Non-Bayesian positions deserve to be examined with much greater care, and the present work is an attempt to defend what I believe to be a coherent and reasonably detailed non-Bayesian account of decision theory. The main thesis I defend can be summarised as follows. Rational agents m- imise subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, ut- ity and subjective probability should not be de?ned in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. On the contrary, rational decision makers need only consider preferences over certain outcomes. It will be shown that utility and probability fu- tions derived in a non-Bayesian manner can be used for generating preferences over uncertain prospects, that support the principle of maximising subjective expected utility. To some extent, this non-Bayesian view gives an account of what modern - cision theory could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, de Finetti, Savage, and others. I will not discuss all previous non-Bayesian positions presented in the literature.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1402086997
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 176
Book Description
For quite some time, philosophers, economists, and statisticians have endorsed a view on rational choice known as Bayesianism. The work on this book has grown out of a feeling that the Bayesian view has come to dominate the academic com- nitytosuchanextentthatalternative,non-Bayesianpositionsareseldomextensively researched. Needless to say, I think this is a pity. Non-Bayesian positions deserve to be examined with much greater care, and the present work is an attempt to defend what I believe to be a coherent and reasonably detailed non-Bayesian account of decision theory. The main thesis I defend can be summarised as follows. Rational agents m- imise subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, ut- ity and subjective probability should not be de?ned in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. On the contrary, rational decision makers need only consider preferences over certain outcomes. It will be shown that utility and probability fu- tions derived in a non-Bayesian manner can be used for generating preferences over uncertain prospects, that support the principle of maximising subjective expected utility. To some extent, this non-Bayesian view gives an account of what modern - cision theory could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, de Finetti, Savage, and others. I will not discuss all previous non-Bayesian positions presented in the literature.
Non-Additive Measure and Integral
Author: D. Denneberg
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401724342
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 182
Book Description
Non-Additive Measure and Integral is the first systematic approach to the subject. Much of the additive theory (convergence theorems, Lebesgue spaces, representation theorems) is generalized, at least for submodular measures which are characterized by having a subadditive integral. The theory is of interest for applications to economic decision theory (decisions under risk and uncertainty), to statistics (including belief functions, fuzzy measures) to cooperative game theory, artificial intelligence, insurance, etc. Non-Additive Measure and Integral collects the results of scattered and often isolated approaches to non-additive measures and their integrals which originate in pure mathematics, potential theory, statistics, game theory, economic decision theory and other fields of application. It unifies, simplifies and generalizes known results and supplements the theory with new results, thus providing a sound basis for applications and further research in this growing field of increasing interest. It also contains fundamental results of sigma-additive and finitely additive measure and integration theory and sheds new light on additive theory. Non-Additive Measure and Integral employs distribution functions and quantile functions as basis tools, thus remaining close to the familiar language of probability theory. In addition to serving as an important reference, the book can be used as a mathematics textbook for graduate courses or seminars, containing many exercises to support or supplement the text.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401724342
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 182
Book Description
Non-Additive Measure and Integral is the first systematic approach to the subject. Much of the additive theory (convergence theorems, Lebesgue spaces, representation theorems) is generalized, at least for submodular measures which are characterized by having a subadditive integral. The theory is of interest for applications to economic decision theory (decisions under risk and uncertainty), to statistics (including belief functions, fuzzy measures) to cooperative game theory, artificial intelligence, insurance, etc. Non-Additive Measure and Integral collects the results of scattered and often isolated approaches to non-additive measures and their integrals which originate in pure mathematics, potential theory, statistics, game theory, economic decision theory and other fields of application. It unifies, simplifies and generalizes known results and supplements the theory with new results, thus providing a sound basis for applications and further research in this growing field of increasing interest. It also contains fundamental results of sigma-additive and finitely additive measure and integration theory and sheds new light on additive theory. Non-Additive Measure and Integral employs distribution functions and quantile functions as basis tools, thus remaining close to the familiar language of probability theory. In addition to serving as an important reference, the book can be used as a mathematics textbook for graduate courses or seminars, containing many exercises to support or supplement the text.
Collective Decision-Making:
Author: Norman Schofield
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401587671
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 430
Book Description
In the last decade the techniques of social choice theory, game theory and positive political theory have been combined in interesting ways so as to pro vide a common framework for analyzing the behavior of a developed political economy. Social choice theory itself grew out of the innovative attempts by Ken neth Arrow (1951) and Duncan Black (1948, 1958) to extend the range of economic theory in order to deal with collective decision-making over public goods. Later work, by William Baumol (1952), and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), focussed on providing an "economic" interpretation of democratic institutions. In the same period Anthony Downs (1957) sought to model representative democracy and elections while William Riker (1962) made use of work in cooperative game theory (by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, 1944) to study coalition behavior. In my view, these "rational choice" analyses of collective decision-making have their antecedents in the arguments of Adam Smith (1759, 1776), James Madison (1787) and the Marquis de Condorcet (1785) about the "design" of political institutions. In the introductory chapter to this volume I briefly describe how some of the current normative and positive aspects of social choice date back to these earlier writers.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401587671
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 430
Book Description
In the last decade the techniques of social choice theory, game theory and positive political theory have been combined in interesting ways so as to pro vide a common framework for analyzing the behavior of a developed political economy. Social choice theory itself grew out of the innovative attempts by Ken neth Arrow (1951) and Duncan Black (1948, 1958) to extend the range of economic theory in order to deal with collective decision-making over public goods. Later work, by William Baumol (1952), and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), focussed on providing an "economic" interpretation of democratic institutions. In the same period Anthony Downs (1957) sought to model representative democracy and elections while William Riker (1962) made use of work in cooperative game theory (by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, 1944) to study coalition behavior. In my view, these "rational choice" analyses of collective decision-making have their antecedents in the arguments of Adam Smith (1759, 1776), James Madison (1787) and the Marquis de Condorcet (1785) about the "design" of political institutions. In the introductory chapter to this volume I briefly describe how some of the current normative and positive aspects of social choice date back to these earlier writers.
Uncertainty and Quality in Science for Policy
Author: S.O. Funtowicz
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9400906218
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 254
Book Description
This book explains the notational system NUSAP (Numeral, Unit, Spread, Assessment, Pedigree) and applies it to several examples from the environmental sciences. The authors are now making further extensions of NUSAP, including an algorithm for the propagation of quality-grades through models used in risk and safety studies. They are also developing the concept of `Post-normal Science', in which quality assurance of information requires the participation of `extended peer-communities' lying outside the traditional expertise.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9400906218
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 254
Book Description
This book explains the notational system NUSAP (Numeral, Unit, Spread, Assessment, Pedigree) and applies it to several examples from the environmental sciences. The authors are now making further extensions of NUSAP, including an algorithm for the propagation of quality-grades through models used in risk and safety studies. They are also developing the concept of `Post-normal Science', in which quality assurance of information requires the participation of `extended peer-communities' lying outside the traditional expertise.
Semiorders
Author: Marc Pirlot
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 940158883X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 197
Book Description
Semiorder is probably one of the most frequently ordered structures in science. It naturally appears in fields like psychometrics, economics, decision sciences, linguistics and archaeology. It explicitly takes into account the inevitable imprecisions of scientific instruments by allowing the replacement of precise numbers by intervals. The purpose of this book is to dissect this structure and to study its fundamental properties. The main subjects treated are the numerical representations of semiorders, the generalizations of the concept to valued relations, the aggregation of semiorders and their basic role in a general theoretical framework for multicriteria decision-aid methods. Audience: This volume is intended for students and researchers in the fields of decision analysis, management science, operations research, discrete mathematics, classification, social choice theory, and order theory, as well as for practitioners in the design of decision tools.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 940158883X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 197
Book Description
Semiorder is probably one of the most frequently ordered structures in science. It naturally appears in fields like psychometrics, economics, decision sciences, linguistics and archaeology. It explicitly takes into account the inevitable imprecisions of scientific instruments by allowing the replacement of precise numbers by intervals. The purpose of this book is to dissect this structure and to study its fundamental properties. The main subjects treated are the numerical representations of semiorders, the generalizations of the concept to valued relations, the aggregation of semiorders and their basic role in a general theoretical framework for multicriteria decision-aid methods. Audience: This volume is intended for students and researchers in the fields of decision analysis, management science, operations research, discrete mathematics, classification, social choice theory, and order theory, as well as for practitioners in the design of decision tools.
Game Theory, Experience, Rationality
Author: W. Leinfellner
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401716544
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 476
Book Description
When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discover ies is not over. The recent advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401716544
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 476
Book Description
When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discover ies is not over. The recent advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory.