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Author: Haruka Matsumoto
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Haruka Matsumoto
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Justin E. Burch
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : China
Languages : en
Pages : 282
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"This study examines the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-55 and how the Eisenhower administration handled the imbroglio and attempts to explain why the crisis lasted for such a long period of time. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed that in international relations between adversaries, the number one reason for the start of wars was miscalculation by one side or the other. Yet throughout the fall of 1954 and into the summer of 1955, the presidential administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower made America's position with regards to the Republic of China (ROC) controlled offshore islands anything but clear to Mao, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), or the international community. Eisenhower and the National Security Council (NSC) were consistently caught between two opposing philosophies and political realities in its dealing with the crisis. International pressure from the British and a hostile domestic and global public opinion, kept America from publicly declaring that it would defend the offshore islands. The administrations fear of handing communism what was viewed as another victory in the Cold War and irrevocably damaging Nationalist troop morale on Taiwan kept Dulles and Eisenhower from formulating a publicly clear and unequivocal policy for Formosa, the Pescadores and the nationalist-held islands. This failure extended a confrontation for nearly a year that should have ended in a matter of days or weeks. There has, to this point, never been a monograph written specifically about the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-55. However, the event is well covered by journal articles and chapters in books discussing US foreign Policy, US diplomacy, the Cold War, the Eisenhower administration, US-China relations, Military history, and a variety of other topics. While the Taiwan Straits Crisis is not now a major incident engrained in the American public's conscience, like World War II or the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is a standard case study that is nearly always mentioned in major academic reference works. The first historical accounts of the crisis focused on the belief that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles singlehandedly ran American foreign policy during his tenure. The historiographical interpretation settled on a perception that Dulles and the military pulled Eisenhower to an unnecessary ideological confrontation with Mao Zedong's Peoples Republic of China (PRC). This interpretation was largely dismissed during the 1960s and 1970s as research began to confirm that, although Dulles had a great deal of influence, it was in the end Eisenhower who made the final decisions. As Eisenhower era documents slowly became available to the public, the next generation of historians began to grapple with how the crisis unfolded and in what respect Cold War ideology governed how the White House made decisions. With the publication, in the 1980s, of the Foreign Relations of the United States, covering this period, historians like H.W. Brands interpreted the crisis through the prism of the Dulles and Eisenhower policy of Massive Retaliation and saw the crisis as a test of that policy. The next era of investigation into this Cold War case study came from historians, both from the east and west, who used Chinese documents to tell, for the first time, the PRC side of the crisis, adding to our overall knowledge of the event. This thesis is an attempt to merge all of these schools, along with new original research, to come up with a more complete understanding of why Eisenhower and Dulles made the decisions they did in the 1950s with regards to Taiwan and the Offshore islands. This project concludes that Dulles came into the Eisenhower administration with a clear idea of how to conduct foreign policy. The new secretary of state believed in clarity of design and purpose. If America was straight forward in what it wanted and what it would and would not do, then miscalculation by the enemy, in this case worldwide Communism, would be negated. The best way to avoid a big war in the calculation of Dulles was to avoid misunderstandings between nations. Unfortunately, the dynamics of the Cold War and the realities of the offshore islands in the Taiwan Straits kept Dulles from implementing what should have been a rational, even successful policy. Because the KMT government on Taiwan was wrapping up so much of its prestige into holding all of the territory it still controlled, The US believed it could not allow the offshore islands to fall and result in catastrophic consequences for the morale of the nationalist military and destabilize Jiang's government. If Taiwan fell to the Communists as a result, then it would serve as the first domino of western leaning democracies to crumble. Southeast Asia, Japan, the Philippines could be next and America would be endanger of losing the Cold War altogether. However, American allies like Great Britain would not support a war over the offshore islands and American public opinion was decidedly against another conflict in Asia so soon after the conclusion of the deeply unpopular Korean War. The Eisenhower administration had painted itself into an ideological corner that created longstanding tensions and crisis after crisis all because it could not make a clear decision on the status of Quemoy, Matsu, and the other ROC holdings along the mainland Chinese coast. As a result of these findings, this study focuses on the offshore islands and why the Eisenhower administration was unable to make a final decision on their status and thereby giving the world a clear understanding of where the United States stood. In addition this project also investigates the US-Mutual Defense Treaty signed in 1954 and how it impacted this event more clearly than in previous works. For the first time, this endeavor takes the word of Eisenhower, Dulles, and the National Security Council when they stated that they could not allow the offshore islands to fall to the communists because it would damage the morale of ROC troops and the government of Jiang Jieshi. Furthermore, this thesis puts a new focus on the impact of British and international opposition to the United States position with regards to Quemoy and Matsu and explains how this opposition along with a lack of American domestic support, moderated the Eisenhower administration's actions and kept the US from going to war with the PRC. There are many opportunities for further research on this topic. One avenue would be to delve more thoroughly than this study does into the relationship between the White House and Congress and how House and Senate members affected the decision making process. The one major set of documents that remains classified, are National Security Administration documents that could have a wealth of information on what the intelligence was telling the administration with regards to the PRC. Also, along those lines an investigation into American support for raiding operations conducted by the ROC on the PRC could be of great value. Finally a project describing primarily the Joint Chiefs internal discussions and ultimate recommendations to the president would be a fascinating expose. Army Joint Chief General Mathew Ridgway was often at odds with the other chiefs on a variety of issues, the Taiwan Straits Crisis only being one of them."--Abstract.
Author: Bruce A. Elleman
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 0810888904
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 254
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In Taiwan Straits: Crisis in Asia and the Role of the U.S. Navy, historian Bruce Elleman surveys the situation that has led to the current tensions between China and Taiwan. Starting in 1949, the final phase of the civil war in China, which ended with Communist rule of the mainland and nationalist control of Taiwan, this work explores how the 100-mile wide passage of water, known as the Taiwan Strait has served as the geographic flashpoint between the two nations. Even though U.S. Navy destroyers have patrolled this body of water from 1950 to 1979, it has seen four crises—1954-55, 1958, 1962, and, after the withdrawal of the U.S. Navy, 1995-96—that threatened to push Taiwan and China to the brink of war. Notwithstanding the role of the United States in defusing cross-strait tensions for some three decades and the cold peace that has settled in since then, the Taiwan Strait continues to be a major source of anxiety for the region and the world. Taiwan Straits: Crisis in Asia and the Role of the U.S. Navy traces the evolution of this tension between the two nations, details the history of the crises between them, and brings this story forward into the present by considering continuing sources of conflict, present diplomatic efforts by the aggrieved nations, and other key interests—from the United States and Europe to other regional powers—and future possible outcomes in the ongoing struggle between China and Taiwan relations. Simply written and cogently argued, it is the ideal source for military personnel, diplomats, and scholars and student of the modern Far East.
Author: Bruce A. Elleman
Publisher: Anthem Press
ISBN: 1839980923
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 232
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Following the Nationalist defeat on the mainland in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers retreated to Taiwan, forming the Republic of China (ROC). Tensions with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) focused on control over a number of offshore islands, especially Quemoy (Jinmen) and Matsu (Mazu). Twice in the 1950s tensions peaked, during the first (1954–55) and second (1958) Taiwan Strait crises. This small body of water—often compared to the English Channel—separates the PRC and Taiwan, and has been the location for periodic military tensions, some threatening to end in war. Today, relations between the ROC and PRC depend on quelling tensions over the Taiwan Strait. This work provides a short, but highly relevant, history of the Taiwan Strait, and its significance today.
Author: Pang Yang Huei
Publisher: Hong Kong University Press
ISBN: 9888208306
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 337
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The two Taiwan Strait crises took place during a particularly tense period of the Cold War. Although each incident was relatively brief, their consequences loom large. Based on analyses of newly available documents from Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, Pang Yang Huei challenges conventional wisdom that claims Sino-US misperceptions of each other’s strategic concerns were critical in the 1950s. He underscores the fact that Washington, Taipei, and Beijing were actually aware of one another’s strategic intentions during the crises. He also demonstrates conclusively that both “crises” can be understood as a transformation from tacit communication to tacit accommodation. An important contribution of this study is a better understanding of the role of ritual, symbols, and gestures in international relations. While it is true that these two crises resulted in a stalemate, the fact that all parties were able to cultivate talks and negotiations brought relations, especially between the US and China, to a new and more stable level. Simply averting the threat of war was a major achievement. Strait Rituals is an important micro-history of a significant moment during the Cold War and a rich interpretation of the theoretical use of multiple points of view in writing history. It sets a new standard for understanding China’s place in the world. “Strait Rituals is a solidly detailed and thoroughly footnoted excursion into a critical stage of Cold War history. Dr. Pang’s exhaustive archival work sets a real standard in the amalgamation of different sources to reevaluate the Taiwan Strait crises in the 1950s, the repercussions of which can still be felt today.” —Hsiao-ting Lin, Hoover Institution, Stanford University “An excellent book for those interested in the Taiwan Strait crises in the context of the overall history of international affairs in the Asia-Pacific region. The book will prove to be of great value to those interested in the history of the region that is bound to increase in importance in the years to come.” —Akira Iriye, Harvard University “Dispassionate, balanced, rigorous in the presentation of facts, much drawn from Chinese archival sources, Pang Yang Huei’s work will be indispensable for anyone seeking to understand the issues surrounding this Cold War hangover that continues to trouble contemporary politics across the Taiwan Strait.” —Geoffrey C. Gunn, Journal of Contemporary Asia
Author: Yi Lin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Chin-men hsien (Taiwan)
Languages : en
Pages : 132
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Author: Nancy Bernkopf Tucker
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674261720
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 409
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Relations among the United States, Taiwan, and China challenge policymakers, international relations specialists, and a concerned public to examine their assumptions about security, sovereignty, and peace. Only a Taiwan Straits conflict could plunge Americans into war with a nuclear-armed great power. In a timely and deeply informed book, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker traces the thorny relationship between the United States and Taiwan as both watch China’s power grow. Although Taiwan–U.S. security has been intertwined since the 1950s, neither Taipei nor Washington ever fully embraced the other. Differences in priorities and perspectives repeatedly raised questions about the wisdom of the alignment. Tucker discusses the nature of U.S. commitments to Taiwan; the intricacies of policy decisions; the intentions of critical actors; the impact of Taiwan’s democratization; the role of lobbying; and the accelerating difficulty of balancing Taiwan against China. In particular, she examines the destructive mistrust that undermines U.S. cooperation with Taiwan, stymieing efforts to resolve cross-Strait tensions. Strait Talk offers valuable historical context for understanding U.S.–Taiwan ties and is essential reading for anyone interested in international relations and security issues today.
Author: Bruce A. Elleman
Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 9781884733956
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 192
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it ensured that friction over the Taiwan Strait did not escalate into a full-blown war. In fact, the Taiwan Patrol Force did its job so well that virtually nothing has been written about it. U.S. Navy ships acted both as a buffer between the two antagonists and as a trip wire in case of aggression. The force fulfilled the latter function twice in the 1950s -- during the first (1954-55) and second (1958) Taiwan Strait crises --
Author: Shirley A. Kan
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437988083
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 86
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Despite apparently consistent statements in 4 decades, the U.S. ¿one China¿ policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the ¿one China¿ policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. Contents of this report: (1) U.S. Policy on ¿One China¿: Has U.S. Policy Changed?; Overview of Policy Issues; (2) Highlights of Key Statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei: Statements During the Admin. of Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, Clinton, and Obama. A print on demand report.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 110
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