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Author: Milton Leitenberg
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674065263
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 956
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Book Description
This is the first attempt to understand the full scope of the USSR’s offensive biological weapons research, from inception in the 1920s. Gorbachev tried to end the program, but the U.S. and U.K. never obtained clear evidence that he succeeded, raising the question whether the means for waging biological warfare could be present in Russia today.
Author: Milton Leitenberg
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674065263
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 956
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Book Description
This is the first attempt to understand the full scope of the USSR’s offensive biological weapons research, from inception in the 1920s. Gorbachev tried to end the program, but the U.S. and U.K. never obtained clear evidence that he succeeded, raising the question whether the means for waging biological warfare could be present in Russia today.
Author: Raymond A. Zilinskas
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781542917452
Category : Biological arms control
Languages : en
Pages : 68
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Book Description
In its first Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Case Study, the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CSWMD) at the National Defense University examined President Richard M. Nixon's decision, on November 25, 1969, to terminate the U.S. offensive biological weapons program. This occasional paper seeks to explain why the Soviet government, at approximately the same time, decided to do essentially the opposite, namely, to establish a large biological warfare (BW) program that would be driven by newly discovered and powerful biotechnologies. By introducing the innovation of recombinant DNA technology - commonly referred to as genetic engineering - the Soviets were attempting to create bacterial and viral strains that were more useful for military purposes than were strains found in nature. In historical terms, the Soviet BW program had two so-called "generations," defined as distinct periods of time during which types of weapons were developed from earlier types. The first generation of the Soviet BW program commenced about 1928 and was based on naturally occurring pathogens that had caused devastating epidemics during World War I and the subsequent Russian Civil War. The second generation began approximately in 1972 when the decision was made at the highest political level to institute a research and development (R&D) system that utilized newly discovered techniques of genetic engineering to create novel or enhanced bacterial and viral strains that were better adapted for BW purposes than strains found in nature. President Boris Yeltsin ordered the cessation of the offensive BW program some months after the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991 and in 1992 publically stated that it had conducted an offensive BW program in violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. However, after Vladimir Putin was elected president, high-level Russian officials have lied about the Soviet BW program, stating that it was strictly a defensive program that had not broken international law. As is discussed later in this paper, elements of the Soviet offensive BW program continue in Russia and may provide the basis for a third-generation BW program supported by the current leadership. The first section of this paper describes the Soviet BW program's first generation, including its establishment, work plan and operations, and accomplishments. The second section focuses on "establishing the conditions" for the Soviet decision that was made sometime during 1969-1971 to establish and operate the second generation BW program. Conditions that are considered include the geopolitical challenges as perceived by the Soviet government, the decision making process for military acquisitions, and the inferior state of the biosciences in the Soviet Union at that time, which stimulated Soviet bioscientists to "play the military card" in order to introduce genetic engineering into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (USSR's) bioscience establishment. The final section has two sub-sections. The first summarizes the key factors that drove Soviet decisionmaking in the early 1970s to institute a huge offensive BW program. The second informs readers that even before Vladimir Putin was elected president for the second time, he openly stated that new weapons were to be developed using high technologies including "genetics." Based on this promise, and considering the secrecy that still keeps the military biological institutes and anti-plague institutes closed to outsiders, the paper discusses the possibility that the Putin administration may institute a third generation BW program. The appendix consists of a short biography of the Soviet general Yefim Ivanovich Smirnov who was for many years in charge of the Soviet BW program.
Author: Ken Alibek
Publisher: Random House
ISBN: 1407010727
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 344
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Book Description
'We thought we had lived through the terror of a nuclear war, but something far more ominous was brewing in the Soviet Union - a biological Armageddon from which no one would escape. Dr Alibek has emerged from the world's deadliest labs to tell a story that is as important as it is chilling. Sometimes the truth is far worse than fiction. No one can afford not to read this book.' Robin Cook 'As the top scientist in the Soviet Union's biowarfare program and the inventor of the world's most powerful anthrax, Dr Ken Alibek has stunned the highest levels of the U.S. government with his revelations. Now, in a calm, compelling, utterly convincing voice, he tells the world what he knows. Modern biology is producing weapons that in killing power may exceed the hydrogen bomb. Ken Alibek describes them with the intimate knowledge of a top weaponeer.' Richard Preston, author of The Hot Zone
Author: W. Seth Carus
Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 9780160941481
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 80
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Book Description
This publication gives a history of biological warfare (BW) from the prehistoric period through the present, with a section on the future of BW. The publication relies on works by historians who used primary sources dealing with BW. In-depth definitions of biological agents, biological weapons, and biological warfare (BW) are included, as well as an appendix of further reading on the subject. Related items: Arms & Weapons publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/arms-weapons Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT & CBRNE) publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/hazardous-materials-hazmat-cbrne
Author: Anthony Rimmington
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0190928859
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 278
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Book Description
A chilling reassessment of the Soviet Union's advances in biological warfare, and the West's inadvertent contributions.
Author: National Research Council
Publisher: National Academies Press
ISBN: 0309174783
Category : Nature
Languages : en
Pages : 386
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Book Description
During the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. Army conducted atmospheric dispersion tests in many American cities using fluorescent particles of zinc cadmium sulfide (ZnCdS) to develop and verify meteorological models to estimate the dispersal of aerosols. Upon learning of the tests, many citizens and some public health officials in the affected cities raised concerns about the health consequences of the tests. This book assesses the public health effects of the Army's tests, including the toxicity of ZnCdS, the toxicity of surrogate cadmium compounds, the environmental fate of ZnCdS, the extent of public exposures from the dispersion tests, and the risks of such exposures.
Author: Gregory D. Koblentz
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 0801457661
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 273
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Book Description
"Biological weapons are widely feared, yet rarely used. Biological weapons were the first weapon prohibited by an international treaty, yet the proliferation of these weapons increased after they were banned in 1972. Biological weapons are frequently called 'the poor man's atomic bomb,' yet they cannot provide the same deterrent capability as nuclear weapons. One of my goals in this book is to explain the underlying principles of these apparent paradoxes."—from Living Weapons Biological weapons are the least well understood of the so-called weapons of mass destruction. Unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are composed of, or derived from, living organisms. In Living Weapons, Gregory D. Koblentz provides a comprehensive analysis of the unique challenges that biological weapons pose for international security. At a time when the United States enjoys overwhelming conventional military superiority, biological weapons have emerged as an attractive means for less powerful states and terrorist groups to wage asymmetric warfare. Koblentz also warns that advances in the life sciences have the potential to heighten the lethality and variety of biological weapons. The considerable overlap between the equipment, materials and knowledge required to develop biological weapons, conduct civilian biomedical research, and develop biological defenses creates a multiuse dilemma that limits the effectiveness of verification, hinders civilian oversight, and complicates threat assessments. Living Weapons draws on the American, Soviet, Russian, South African, and Iraqi biological weapons programs to enhance our understanding of the special challenges posed by these weapons for arms control, deterrence, civilian-military relations, and intelligence. Koblentz also examines the aspirations of terrorist groups to develop these weapons and the obstacles they have faced. Biological weapons, Koblentz argues, will continue to threaten international security until defenses against such weapons are improved, governments can reliably detect biological weapon activities, the proliferation of materials and expertise is limited, and international norms against the possession and use of biological weapons are strengthened.
Author: Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 0801471923
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 237
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Book Description
In both the popular imagination and among lawmakers and national security experts, there exists the belief that with sufficient motivation and material resources, states or terrorist groups can produce bioweapons easily, cheaply, and successfully. In Barriers to Bioweapons, Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley challenges this perception by showing that bioweapons development is a difficult, protracted, and expensive endeavor, rarely achieving the expected results whatever the magnitude of investment. Her findings are based on extensive interviews she conducted with former U.S. and Soviet-era bioweapons scientists and on careful analysis of archival data and other historical documents related to various state and terrorist bioweapons programs.Bioweapons development relies on living organisms that are sensitive to their environment and handling conditions, and therefore behave unpredictably. These features place a greater premium on specialized knowledge. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley posits that lack of access to such intellectual capital constitutes the greatest barrier to the making of bioweapons. She integrates theories drawn from economics, the sociology of science, organization, and management with her empirical research. The resulting theoretical framework rests on the idea that the pace and success of a bioweapons development program can be measured by its ability to ensure the creation and transfer of scientific and technical knowledge. The specific organizational, managerial, social, political, and economic conditions necessary for success are difficult to achieve, particularly in covert programs where the need to prevent detection imposes managerial and organizational conditions that conflict with knowledge production.
Author: National Research Council
Publisher: National Academies Press
ISBN: 0309179513
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 120
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Book Description
This Congressionally-mandated report identifies areas for further cooperation with Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program of the Department of Defense in the specific area of prevention of proliferation of biological weapons. The report reviews relevant U.S. government programs, and particularly the CTR program, and identifies approaches for overcoming obstacles to cooperation and for increasing the long-term impact of the program. It recommends strong support for continuation of the CTR program.
Author: Igor V. Domaradskij
Publisher: Prometheus Books
ISBN: 1615926259
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 341
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Book Description
This extraordinary memoir by a leading Russian scientist who worked for decades at the nerve center of the top-secret Biopreparat offers a chilling look into the biological weapons program of the former Soviet Union, vestiges of which still exist today in the Russian Federal Republic. Igor Domaradskij calls himself an inconvenient man: a dedicated scientist but a nonconformist who was often in conflict with government and military apparatchiks. In this book he reveals the deadly nature of the research he participated in for almost fifteen years.From 1950 till 1973, Domaradskij played an increasingly important role as a specialist in the area of epidemic bacterial infections. He was largely responsible for an effective system of plague control within the former USSR, which prevented mass outbreaks of rodent-born diseases. But after twenty-three years of making significant scientific contributions, his work was suddenly redirected.Under pressure from the Soviet military he helped design, create, and direct Biopreparat, the goal of which was to develop new types of biological weapons. From the inception of this highly secret venture Domaradskij openly expressed his skepticism and criticized it as a risky gamble and a serious error by the government. Eventually his critical attitude forced him out of the communist party, and finally cost him the opportunity of continuing his scientific work.Domaradskij goes into great detail about the secrecy, intrigue, and the bureaucratic maze that enveloped the Biopreparat scientists, making them feel like helpless pawns. What stands out in his account is the hasty, patchwork nature of the Soviet effort in bioweaponry. Far from being a smooth-running, terrifying monolith, this was an enterprise cobbled together out of the conflicts and contretemps of squabbling party bureaucrats, military know-nothings, and restless, ambitious scientists. In some ways the inefficiency and lack of accountability in this system make it all the more frightening as a worldwide threat. For today its dimensions are still not fully known, nor is it certain that any one group is completely in control of the proliferation of this lethal weaponry.Biowarrior is disturbing but necessary reading for anyone wishing to understand the nature and dimensions of the biological threat in an era of international terrorism.Igor V. Domaradskij (Moscow, Russia) is chief research fellow of the Moscow Gabrichevsky G. N. Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology; a member of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences and the Academy of Natural Sciences of Russia; and the author of fourteen books on microbiology, biochemistry, and immunology. Wendy Orent (Atlanta, GA) is a freelance writer and ethnologist.
