The Simple Economics of Optimal Bundling PDF Download
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Author: Frank Yang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We study optimal bundling when consumers differ in one dimension. We introduce a partial order on the set of bundles defined by (i) set inclusion and (ii) sales volumes (if sold alone and priced optimally). We show that if the undominated bundles with respect to this partial order are nested, then nested bundling (tiered pricing) is optimal. We characterize which nested menu is optimal: Selling a given menu of nested bundles is optimal if a smaller bundle in (out of) the menu sells more (less) than a bigger bundle in the menu. We apply these insights to connect optimal bundling and quality design to price elasticities and cost structures: (i) when price elasticities are quasi-convex on the set of bundles, nested bundling is always optimal and the optimal mechanism simply creates nests in the order of price elasticities; (ii) when consumers' preferences are multiplicative, the optimal quality design can be characterized by the lower monotone envelope of the average cost curve.
Author: Frank Yang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We study optimal bundling when consumers differ in one dimension. We introduce a partial order on the set of bundles defined by (i) set inclusion and (ii) sales volumes (if sold alone and priced optimally). We show that if the undominated bundles with respect to this partial order are nested, then nested bundling (tiered pricing) is optimal. We characterize which nested menu is optimal: Selling a given menu of nested bundles is optimal if a smaller bundle in (out of) the menu sells more (less) than a bigger bundle in the menu. We apply these insights to connect optimal bundling and quality design to price elasticities and cost structures: (i) when price elasticities are quasi-convex on the set of bundles, nested bundling is always optimal and the optimal mechanism simply creates nests in the order of price elasticities; (ii) when consumers' preferences are multiplicative, the optimal quality design can be characterized by the lower monotone envelope of the average cost curve.
Author: Ralph Fuerderer
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3662091194
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 221
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Book Description
Scientific knowledge and practical advice are combined in this book. Leading scientists present their latest research results in the area of product and price bundling, with respect to optimization as well as to behavioral bundling approaches. In addition the reader will learn how to implement bundling strategies and how to set up a bundling concept. He will find a thorough explanation of the value that bundling has for improving a company`s profit and sales.
Author: Soheil Ghili
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Rustam Ibragimov
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Maria Serna
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3642339964
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 271
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Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2012, held in Barcelona, Spain, in October 2012. The 22 revised full papers presented together with 2 invited lectures were carefully reviewed and selected from 65 submissions. The papers present original research at the intersection of Algorithms and Game Theory and address various current topics such as solution concepts in game theory; efficiency of equilibria and price of anarchy; complexity classes in game theory; computational aspects of equilibria; computational aspects of fixed-point theorems; repeated games; evolution and learning in games; convergence of dynamics; coalitions, coordination and collective action; reputation, recommendation and trust systems; graph-theoretic aspects of social networks; network games; cost-sharing algorithms and analysis; computing with incentives; algorithmic mechanism design; computational social choice; decision theory, and pricing; auction algorithms and analysis; economic aspects of distributed computing; internet economics and computational advertising.
Author: Patrick M. Emerson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Alexander Grigoriev
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 20
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Book Description
Author: Martin J. Osborne
Publisher: Open Book Publishers
ISBN: 180511123X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 382
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Book Description
Models in Microeconomic Theory covers basic models in current microeconomic theory. Part I (Chapters 1-7) presents models of an economic agent, discussing abstract models of preferences, choice, and decision making under uncertainty, before turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and monopoly. Part II (Chapters 8-14) introduces the concept of equilibrium, beginning, unconventionally, with the models of the jungle and an economy with indivisible goods, and continuing with models of an exchange economy, equilibrium with rational expectations, and an economy with asymmetric information. Part III (Chapters 15-16) provides an introduction to game theory, covering strategic and extensive games and the concepts of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV (Chapters 17-20) gives a taste of the topics of mechanism design, matching, the axiomatic analysis of economic systems, and social choice. The book focuses on the concepts of model and equilibrium. It states models and results precisely, and provides proofs for all results. It uses only elementary mathematics (with almost no calculus), although many of the proofs involve sustained logical arguments. It includes about 150 exercises. With its formal but accessible style, this textbook is designed for undergraduate students of microeconomics at intermediate and advanced levels.
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Vijay Krishna
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 0080922937
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 337
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Book Description
Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points
