Author: John Skorupski
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199587639
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 558
Book Description
This book is about normativity and reasons. But by the end the subject becomes the relation between self, thought and world. Skorupski argues that the key concepts of epistemology and moral theory are normative concepts, and that what makes them normative is that they depend on reasons. The concept of a reason is fundamental to all thought.
The Domain of Reasons
Author: John Skorupski
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199587639
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 558
Book Description
This book is about normativity and reasons. But by the end the subject becomes the relation between self, thought and world. Skorupski argues that the key concepts of epistemology and moral theory are normative concepts, and that what makes them normative is that they depend on reasons. The concept of a reason is fundamental to all thought.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199587639
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 558
Book Description
This book is about normativity and reasons. But by the end the subject becomes the relation between self, thought and world. Skorupski argues that the key concepts of epistemology and moral theory are normative concepts, and that what makes them normative is that they depend on reasons. The concept of a reason is fundamental to all thought.
The Range of Reasons
Author: Daniel Whiting
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192893955
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 241
Book Description
"Abstract for the book: This book contributes to two debates and it does so by bringing them together. The first is a debate in metaethics concerning normative reasons, the considerations that serve to justify a person's actions and attitudes. The second is a debate in epistemology concerning the norms for belief, the standards that govern a person's beliefs and by reference to which they are assessed. The book starts by developing and defending a new theory of reasons for action, that is, of practical reasons. The theory belongs to a family that analyses reasons by appeal to the normative notion of rightness (fittingness, correctness); it is distinctive in making central appeal to modal notions, specifically, that of a nearby possible world. The result is a comprehensive framework that captures what is common to and distinctive of reasons of various kinds: justifying and demanding; for and against, possessed and unpossessed; objective and subjective. The framework is then generalized to reasons for belief, that is, to epistemic reasons, and combined with a substantive, first-order commitment, namely, that truth is the sole right-maker for belief. The upshot is an account of the various norms governing belief, including knowledge and rationality, and the relations among them. According to it, the standards to which belief is subject are various, but they are unified by an underlying principle. Keywords: practical reasons; epistemic reasons; rightness; possible worlds; norms of belief; rationality; truth; knowledge; possessed reasons; normativity"--
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192893955
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 241
Book Description
"Abstract for the book: This book contributes to two debates and it does so by bringing them together. The first is a debate in metaethics concerning normative reasons, the considerations that serve to justify a person's actions and attitudes. The second is a debate in epistemology concerning the norms for belief, the standards that govern a person's beliefs and by reference to which they are assessed. The book starts by developing and defending a new theory of reasons for action, that is, of practical reasons. The theory belongs to a family that analyses reasons by appeal to the normative notion of rightness (fittingness, correctness); it is distinctive in making central appeal to modal notions, specifically, that of a nearby possible world. The result is a comprehensive framework that captures what is common to and distinctive of reasons of various kinds: justifying and demanding; for and against, possessed and unpossessed; objective and subjective. The framework is then generalized to reasons for belief, that is, to epistemic reasons, and combined with a substantive, first-order commitment, namely, that truth is the sole right-maker for belief. The upshot is an account of the various norms governing belief, including knowledge and rationality, and the relations among them. According to it, the standards to which belief is subject are various, but they are unified by an underlying principle. Keywords: practical reasons; epistemic reasons; rightness; possible worlds; norms of belief; rationality; truth; knowledge; possessed reasons; normativity"--
Semantics for Reasons
Author: Bryan R. Weaver
Publisher:
ISBN: 0198832621
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 175
Book Description
Semantics for Reasons is a book about what we mean when we talk about reasons. It not only brings together the theory of reasons and natural language semantics in original ways but also sketches out a litany of implications for metaethics and the philosophy of normativity. In their account of how the language of reasons works, Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp propose and defend a view called Question Under Discussion (QUD) Reasons Contextualism. They use this view to argue for a series of novel positions on the ontology of reasons, indexical facts, the reasons-to-be-rational debate, moral reasons, and the reasons-first approach.
Publisher:
ISBN: 0198832621
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 175
Book Description
Semantics for Reasons is a book about what we mean when we talk about reasons. It not only brings together the theory of reasons and natural language semantics in original ways but also sketches out a litany of implications for metaethics and the philosophy of normativity. In their account of how the language of reasons works, Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp propose and defend a view called Question Under Discussion (QUD) Reasons Contextualism. They use this view to argue for a series of novel positions on the ontology of reasons, indexical facts, the reasons-to-be-rational debate, moral reasons, and the reasons-first approach.
Being Realistic about Reasons
Author: T. M. Scanlon
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199678480
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 143
Book Description
Is what we have reason to do a matter of fact? If so, what kind of truth is involved, how can we know it, and how do reasons motivate and explain action? In this concise and lucid book T.M. Scanlon offers answers, with a qualified defence of normative cognitivism - the view that there are normative truths about reasons for action.
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199678480
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 143
Book Description
Is what we have reason to do a matter of fact? If so, what kind of truth is involved, how can we know it, and how do reasons motivate and explain action? In this concise and lucid book T.M. Scanlon offers answers, with a qualified defence of normative cognitivism - the view that there are normative truths about reasons for action.
Range
Author: David Epstein
Publisher: Penguin
ISBN: 0735214506
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 369
Book Description
The #1 New York Times bestseller that has all America talking—with a new afterword on expanding your range—as seen on CNN's Fareed Zakaria GPS, Morning Joe, CBS This Morning, and more. “The most important business—and parenting—book of the year.” —Forbes “Urgent and important. . . an essential read for bosses, parents, coaches, and anyone who cares about improving performance.” —Daniel H. Pink Shortlisted for the Financial Times/McKinsey Business Book of the Year Award Plenty of experts argue that anyone who wants to develop a skill, play an instrument, or lead their field should start early, focus intensely, and rack up as many hours of deliberate practice as possible. If you dabble or delay, you’ll never catch up to the people who got a head start. But a closer look at research on the world’s top performers, from professional athletes to Nobel laureates, shows that early specialization is the exception, not the rule. David Epstein examined the world’s most successful athletes, artists, musicians, inventors, forecasters and scientists. He discovered that in most fields—especially those that are complex and unpredictable—generalists, not specialists, are primed to excel. Generalists often find their path late, and they juggle many interests rather than focusing on one. They’re also more creative, more agile, and able to make connections their more specialized peers can’t see. Provocative, rigorous, and engrossing, Range makes a compelling case for actively cultivating inefficiency. Failing a test is the best way to learn. Frequent quitters end up with the most fulfilling careers. The most impactful inventors cross domains rather than deepening their knowledge in a single area. As experts silo themselves further while computers master more of the skills once reserved for highly focused humans, people who think broadly and embrace diverse experiences and perspectives will increasingly thrive.
Publisher: Penguin
ISBN: 0735214506
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 369
Book Description
The #1 New York Times bestseller that has all America talking—with a new afterword on expanding your range—as seen on CNN's Fareed Zakaria GPS, Morning Joe, CBS This Morning, and more. “The most important business—and parenting—book of the year.” —Forbes “Urgent and important. . . an essential read for bosses, parents, coaches, and anyone who cares about improving performance.” —Daniel H. Pink Shortlisted for the Financial Times/McKinsey Business Book of the Year Award Plenty of experts argue that anyone who wants to develop a skill, play an instrument, or lead their field should start early, focus intensely, and rack up as many hours of deliberate practice as possible. If you dabble or delay, you’ll never catch up to the people who got a head start. But a closer look at research on the world’s top performers, from professional athletes to Nobel laureates, shows that early specialization is the exception, not the rule. David Epstein examined the world’s most successful athletes, artists, musicians, inventors, forecasters and scientists. He discovered that in most fields—especially those that are complex and unpredictable—generalists, not specialists, are primed to excel. Generalists often find their path late, and they juggle many interests rather than focusing on one. They’re also more creative, more agile, and able to make connections their more specialized peers can’t see. Provocative, rigorous, and engrossing, Range makes a compelling case for actively cultivating inefficiency. Failing a test is the best way to learn. Frequent quitters end up with the most fulfilling careers. The most impactful inventors cross domains rather than deepening their knowledge in a single area. As experts silo themselves further while computers master more of the skills once reserved for highly focused humans, people who think broadly and embrace diverse experiences and perspectives will increasingly thrive.
Reasons as Defaults
Author: John F. Horty
Publisher: OUP USA
ISBN: 0199744076
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 276
Book Description
In this volume, John Horty brings to bear his work in logic to present a framework that allows for answers to key questions about reasons and reasoning, namely: What are reasons, and how do they support actions or conclusions?
Publisher: OUP USA
ISBN: 0199744076
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 276
Book Description
In this volume, John Horty brings to bear his work in logic to present a framework that allows for answers to key questions about reasons and reasoning, namely: What are reasons, and how do they support actions or conclusions?
Reasons and Persons
Author: Derek Parfit
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191622443
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 880
Book Description
This book challenges, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity. The author claims that we have a false view of our own nature; that it is often rational to act against our own best interests; that most of us have moral views that are directly self-defeating; and that, when we consider future generations the conclusions will often be disturbing. He concludes that moral non-religious moral philosophy is a young subject, with a promising but unpredictable future.
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191622443
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 880
Book Description
This book challenges, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity. The author claims that we have a false view of our own nature; that it is often rational to act against our own best interests; that most of us have moral views that are directly self-defeating; and that, when we consider future generations the conclusions will often be disturbing. He concludes that moral non-religious moral philosophy is a young subject, with a promising but unpredictable future.
Reasons and the Good
Author: Roger Crisp
Publisher: Oxford University Press on Demand
ISBN: 0199290334
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 189
Book Description
This work offers answers to some of the questions in moral philosophy, including: What reasons do we have for acting in one way or another? Are there moral reasons? What are reasons anyway? How can we know about them? What makes for a good human life? How should we weigh the well-being of others against our own?
Publisher: Oxford University Press on Demand
ISBN: 0199290334
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 189
Book Description
This work offers answers to some of the questions in moral philosophy, including: What reasons do we have for acting in one way or another? Are there moral reasons? What are reasons anyway? How can we know about them? What makes for a good human life? How should we weigh the well-being of others against our own?
The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity
Author: Daniel Star
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199657882
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 1105
Book Description
'The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity' contains 44 commissioned chapters on a wide range of topics, and will appeal to readers with an interest in ethics or epistemology. A diverse selection of substantive positions are defended by leading proponents of the views in question, and provide broad coverage of the study of reasons and normativity across multiple philosophical subfields. In addition to focusing on reasons as part of the study of ethics and as part of the study of epistemology (as well as focusing on reasons as part of the study of the philosophy of language and as part of the study of the philosophy of mind), the Handbook covers recent developments concerning the nature of normativity in general. A number of the contributions to the Handbook explicitly address such "metanormative" issues, bridging subfields as they do so. --
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199657882
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 1105
Book Description
'The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity' contains 44 commissioned chapters on a wide range of topics, and will appeal to readers with an interest in ethics or epistemology. A diverse selection of substantive positions are defended by leading proponents of the views in question, and provide broad coverage of the study of reasons and normativity across multiple philosophical subfields. In addition to focusing on reasons as part of the study of ethics and as part of the study of epistemology (as well as focusing on reasons as part of the study of the philosophy of language and as part of the study of the philosophy of mind), the Handbook covers recent developments concerning the nature of normativity in general. A number of the contributions to the Handbook explicitly address such "metanormative" issues, bridging subfields as they do so. --
Reasons, Justification, and Defeat
Author: Jessica Brown
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198847203
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 305
Book Description
Traditionally, the notion of defeat has been central to epistemology, practical reasoning, and ethics. Within epistemology, it is standardly assumed that a subject who knows that p, or justifiably believes that p, can lose this knowledge or justified belief by acquiring a so-called 'defeater', whether that is evidence that not-p, evidence that the process that produced her belief is unreliable, or evidence that she has likely misevaluated her own evidence. Within ethics and practical reasoning, it is widely accepted that a subject may initially have a reason to do something although this reason is later defeated by her acquisition of further information. However, the traditional conception of defeat has recently come under attack. Some have argued that the notion of defeat is problematically motivated; others that defeat is hard to accommodate within externalist or naturalistic accounts of knowledge or justification; and still others that the intuitions that support defeat can be explained in other ways. This volume presents new work re-examining the very notion of defeat, and its place in epistemology and in normativity theory at large.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198847203
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 305
Book Description
Traditionally, the notion of defeat has been central to epistemology, practical reasoning, and ethics. Within epistemology, it is standardly assumed that a subject who knows that p, or justifiably believes that p, can lose this knowledge or justified belief by acquiring a so-called 'defeater', whether that is evidence that not-p, evidence that the process that produced her belief is unreliable, or evidence that she has likely misevaluated her own evidence. Within ethics and practical reasoning, it is widely accepted that a subject may initially have a reason to do something although this reason is later defeated by her acquisition of further information. However, the traditional conception of defeat has recently come under attack. Some have argued that the notion of defeat is problematically motivated; others that defeat is hard to accommodate within externalist or naturalistic accounts of knowledge or justification; and still others that the intuitions that support defeat can be explained in other ways. This volume presents new work re-examining the very notion of defeat, and its place in epistemology and in normativity theory at large.