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Author: Henry W. Chappell, Jr.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262262200
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 340
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Book Description
An examination of how the policy preferences of individual members of the Federal Open Market Committee are translated into monetary policy decisions. In many countries, monetary policy decisions are made by committees. In the United States, these decisions are made by the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which consists of the seven members of the Board of Governors and the presidents of the twelve district banks. This book examines the process by which the preferences of the FOMC's individual members are translated into collective policy choices. This focus on the aggregation of individual preferences into group decisions is unique and provides an important perspective on the evolution of monetary policy choices. To study decision making by the FOMC, the authors have used both formal voting records and detailed transcripts and summaries of deliberations contained in the committee's Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts. The latter sources have been used to construct data sets describing individual committee members' policy preferences for the 1970-1978 and 1987-1996 periods when the FOMC was chaired by Arthur Burns and Alan Greenspan, respectively. These data are used to estimate monetary policy reaction functions for individual Committee members and to explore the role of majoritarian pressures, pressures for consensus, and the power of the chairman in collective decision making. The rich anecdotal evidence found in the Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts inspires the narrative approach taken in two chapters, on the influence of political pressure on FOMC deliberations and on the relevance of the time inconsistency problem for the rise of inflation in the 1970s.
Author: Henry W. Chappell, Jr.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262262200
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 340
Get Book Here
Book Description
An examination of how the policy preferences of individual members of the Federal Open Market Committee are translated into monetary policy decisions. In many countries, monetary policy decisions are made by committees. In the United States, these decisions are made by the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which consists of the seven members of the Board of Governors and the presidents of the twelve district banks. This book examines the process by which the preferences of the FOMC's individual members are translated into collective policy choices. This focus on the aggregation of individual preferences into group decisions is unique and provides an important perspective on the evolution of monetary policy choices. To study decision making by the FOMC, the authors have used both formal voting records and detailed transcripts and summaries of deliberations contained in the committee's Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts. The latter sources have been used to construct data sets describing individual committee members' policy preferences for the 1970-1978 and 1987-1996 periods when the FOMC was chaired by Arthur Burns and Alan Greenspan, respectively. These data are used to estimate monetary policy reaction functions for individual Committee members and to explore the role of majoritarian pressures, pressures for consensus, and the power of the chairman in collective decision making. The rich anecdotal evidence found in the Memoranda of Discussion and FOMC Transcripts inspires the narrative approach taken in two chapters, on the influence of political pressure on FOMC deliberations and on the relevance of the time inconsistency problem for the rise of inflation in the 1970s.
Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Treasury Committee
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780102212013
Category : Finance
Languages : en
Pages : 90
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Book Description
The establishment of an operationally independent central bank was the first major policy decision by the Chancellor in 1997. He set out the framework whereby he would set the objectives for monetary policy, in the form of an inflation target, but the Bank of England and the nine-member Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) would have the operational responsibility. This report is divided into four sections. The first assesses the performance of the MPC, whilst the second examines the components of the broader monetary framework. The third part looks at how the Treasury Committee has met its own objectives and the last section looks at the wider aspects of economic policy. They conclude that the record of the MPC is impressive and it has established a high level of credibility but there is a worry that there is a bias to undershooting the inflation target.
Author: Jérôme Vandenbussche
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Book Description
The move from individual decision making to committee decision making is widely seen as a major evolution in contemporary central banking. This paper reviews the relevant economics and social psychology literatures with a view to providing some insights into the question of optimal monetary policy committee design. While the preference aggregation literature points to the effect of committee structure on the extent of the time inconsistency problem and its associated costs, the belief aggregation literature analyzes how different committee structures affect the efficiency of information pooling, the process of social influence, and collective accuracy. In conclusion, we highlight the main tradeoffs that the analysis has brought to light and point to directions for future research.
Author: Anke Weber
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451982631
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 43
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Book Description
This paper considers optimal communication by monetary policy committees in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. The main policy implications are that there may be costs to central bank communication if the public is perpetually learning about the committee's decision-making process and policy preferences. When committee members have heterogeneous policy preferences, welfare is greater under majority voting than under consensus decision-making. Furthermore, central bank communication under majority voting is more likely to be beneficial in this case. It is also shown that a chairman with stable policy preferences who carries significant weight in the monetary policy decision-making process is welfare enhancing.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing. Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Monetary policy
Languages : en
Pages : 256
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Book Description
Author: Stephen L. Neal
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economic indicators
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Book Description
Author: Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Treasury Committee
Publisher: The Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780215036070
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 24
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Book Description
Vol. 1 was published as HCP 569-I, session 2006-07 (ISBN 9780215034885)
Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Treasury Committee
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780105562986
Category : Finance
Languages : en
Pages : 99
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Book Description
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing. Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Federal Reserve banks
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Book Description
Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Treasury Committee
Publisher: The Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780215029089
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 24
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Book Description
The Treasury Committee has established a practice of holding hearings with persons appointed to the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England and reporting on those hearings. This practice enhances the transparency of the appointment process and increases the level of information available to the public and to Parliament about the functioning of the MPC. The Committee has held a hearing with Professor David Blanchflower about his appointment to the MPC, and is satisfied that Professor Blanchflower meets the criteria for appointment.
