The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction PDF full book. Access full book title The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction by Keith B. Payne. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Keith B. Payne
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
ISBN: 0813148499
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 240
Get Book Here
Book Description
In 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hoped that a policy of appeasement would satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial appetite and structured British policy accordingly. This plan was a failure, chiefly because Hitler was not a statesman who would ultimately conform to familiar norms. Chamberlain's policy was doomed because he had greatly misjudged Hitler's basic beliefs and thus his behavior. U.S. Cold War nuclear deterrence policy was similarly based on the confident but questionable assumption that Soviet leaders would be rational by Washington's standards; they would behave reasonably when presented with nuclear threats. The United States assumed that any sane challenger would be deterred from severe provocations because not to do so would be foolish. Keith B. Payne addresses the question of whether this line of reasoning is adequate for the post-Cold War period. By analyzing past situations and a plausible future scenario, a U.S.-Chinese crisis over Taiwan, he proposes that American policymakers move away from the assumption that all our opponents are comfortably predictable by the standards of our own culture. In order to avoid unexpected and possibly disastrous failures of deterrence, he argues, we should closely examine particular opponents' culture and beliefs in order to better anticipate their likely responses to U.S. deterrence threats.
Author: Keith B. Payne
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
ISBN: 0813148499
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 240
Get Book Here
Book Description
In 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hoped that a policy of appeasement would satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial appetite and structured British policy accordingly. This plan was a failure, chiefly because Hitler was not a statesman who would ultimately conform to familiar norms. Chamberlain's policy was doomed because he had greatly misjudged Hitler's basic beliefs and thus his behavior. U.S. Cold War nuclear deterrence policy was similarly based on the confident but questionable assumption that Soviet leaders would be rational by Washington's standards; they would behave reasonably when presented with nuclear threats. The United States assumed that any sane challenger would be deterred from severe provocations because not to do so would be foolish. Keith B. Payne addresses the question of whether this line of reasoning is adequate for the post-Cold War period. By analyzing past situations and a plausible future scenario, a U.S.-Chinese crisis over Taiwan, he proposes that American policymakers move away from the assumption that all our opponents are comfortably predictable by the standards of our own culture. In order to avoid unexpected and possibly disastrous failures of deterrence, he argues, we should closely examine particular opponents' culture and beliefs in order to better anticipate their likely responses to U.S. deterrence threats.
Author: Keith B. Payne
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
ISBN: 0813160235
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 228
Get Book Here
Book Description
In 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hoped that a policy of appeasement would satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial appetite and structured British policy accordingly. This plan was a failure, chiefly because Hitler was not a statesman who would ultimately conform to familiar norms. Chamberlain's policy was doomed because he had greatly misjudged Hitler's basic beliefs and thus his behavior. U.S. Cold War nuclear deterrence policy was similarly based on the confident but questionable assumption that Soviet leaders would be rational by Washington's standards; they would behave reasonably when presented with nuclear threats. The United States assumed that any sane challenger would be deterred from severe provocations because not to do so would be foolish. Keith B. Payne addresses the question of whether this line of reasoning is adequate for the post-Cold War period. By analyzing past situations and a plausible future scenario, a U.S.-Chinese crisis over Taiwan, he proposes that American policymakers move away from the assumption that all our opponents are comfortably predictable by the standards of our own culture. In order to avoid unexpected and possibly disastrous failures of deterrence, he argues, we should closely examine particular opponents' culture and beliefs in order to better anticipate their likely responses to U.S. deterrence threats.
Author: Keith B. Payne
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780985555320
Category : Deterrence (Strategy)
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
"Shadows on the Wall: Deterrence and Disarmament examines and contrasts the three alternative philosophical positions about the nature of the international system and patterns of human behavior that underlie three competing narratives seen in U.S. public debate regarding nuclear deterrence and disarmament. For over six decades, these three competing narratives, built on contrary philosophical traditions, have been the basis for contending positions regarding U.S. nuclear policy-ranging from advocacy for complete global nuclear disarmament to advocacy for the maintenance of robust U.S. nuclear capabilities for deterrence. Each of these three different narratives is based on different speculative expectations about developments in the international system and future patterns of human behavior. Given the inherent uncertainties about future developments in the international system and human behavior, none of these narratives can be deemed to objectively correct, or certainly wrong. They may, nevertheless, be judged to entail different levels of prudence for U.S. and allied security"--
Author: Colin S. Gray
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
ISBN: 0813147972
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 208
Get Book Here
Book Description
Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since September 11, few issues have been more hotly debated than the United States' role in the world. In this hard-nosed but sophisticated examination, Colin S. Gray argues that America is the indispensable guardian of world order. Gray's constructive critique of recent trends in national security is holistic, rooting defense issues and prospective answers both in U.S. national security policy, broadly defined, and in the emerging international security environment. Colin S. Gray is professor of international politics and strategic studies at the University of Reading, England, and senior fellow at the National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfax, Virginia. He is the author of seventeen books, including Modern Strategy and Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History.
Author: Keith B. Payne
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317980298
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 171
Get Book Here
Book Description
For decades, the rational actor model served as the preferred guide for U.S. deterrence policy. It has been a convenient and comforting guide because it requires little detailed knowledge of an opponent’s unique decision-making process and yet typically provides confident generalizations about how deterrence works. The model tends to postulate common decision-making parameters across the globe to reach generalizations about how deterrence will function and the types of forces that will be "stabilizing" or "destabilizing." Yet a broad spectrum of unique factors can influence an opponent’s perceptions and his calculations, and these are not easily captured by the rational actor model. The absence of uniformity means there can be very few deterrence generalizations generated by the use of the rational actor model that are applicable to the entire range of opponents. Understanding Deterrence considers how factors such as psychology, history, religion, ideology, geography, political structure, culture, proliferation and geopolitics can shape a leadership’s decision-making process, in ways that are specific and unique to each opponent. Understanding Deterrence demonstrates how using a multidisciplinary approach to deterrence analysis can better identify and assess factors that influence an opponent’s decision-making process. This identification and assessment process can facilitate the tailoring of deterrence strategies to specific purposes and result in a higher likelihood of success than strategies guided by the generalizations about opponent decision-making typically contained in the rational actor model. This book was published as a special issue of Comparative Strategy.
Author: Barry R. Schneider
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780974740386
Category : Arms control
Languages : en
Pages : 466
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: James Johnson
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192858181
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 291
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book provides a coherent, innovative, and multidisciplinary examination of the potential effects of AI technology on nuclear strategy and escalation risk. Its findings have significant theoretical and policy ramifications, as well as contributing to the literature on the impact of military force and technological change.
Author: Anne I. Harrington
Publisher: University of Georgia Press
ISBN: 082035564X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 231
Get Book Here
Book Description
Recent discoveries in psychology and neuroscience have improved our understanding of why our decision making processes fail to match standard social science assumptions about rationality. As researchers such as Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Richard Thaler have shown, people often depart in systematic ways from the predictions of the rational actor model of classic economic thought because of the influence of emotions, cognitive biases, an aversion to loss, and other strong motivations and values. These findings about the limits of rationality have formed the basis of behavioral economics, an approach that has attracted enormous attention in recent years. This collection of essays applies the insights of behavioral economics to the study of nuclear weapons policy. Behavioral economics gives us a more accurate picture of how people think and, as a consequence, of how they make decisions about whether to acquire or use nuclear arms. Such decisions are made in real-world circumstances in which rational calculations about cost and benefit are intertwined with complicated emotions and subject to human limitations. Strategies for pursuing nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation should therefore, argue the contributors, account for these dynamics in a systematic way. The contributors to this collection examine how a behavioral approach might inform our understanding of topics such as deterrence, economic sanctions, the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and U.S. domestic debates about ballistic missile defense. The essays also take note of the limitations of a behavioral approach for dealing with situations in which even a single deviation from the predictions of any model can have dire consequences.
Author: Stephen J. Cimbala
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 113599045X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 145
Get Book Here
Book Description
Nuclear weapons, once thought to have been marginalized by the end of the Cold War, have returned with a vengeance to the centre of US security concerns and to a world bereft of the old certainties of deterrence. This is a major analysis of these new strategic realities. The George W. Bush administration, having deposed the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, now points to a new nuclear "Axis of Evil": Iran and North Korea. These nations and other rogue states, as well as terrorists, may pose key threats because they are "beyond deterrence", which was based on the credible fear of retaliation after attack. This new study places these and other developments, such as the clear potential for a new nuclear arms race in Asia, within the context of evolving US security policy. Detailing the important milestones in the development of US nuclear strategy and considering the present and future security dilemmas related to nuclear weapons this is a major new contribution to our understanding of the present international climate and the future. Individual chapters are devoted to the key issues of missile defenses, nuclear proliferation and Israel’s nuclear deterrent. This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars of strategic studies, international relations and US foreign policy.
Author: Elinor C. Sloan
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317578775
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 382
Get Book Here
Book Description
This textbook provides a comprehensive introduction to post-Cold War military theory for students of strategic studies. This second edition has been fully revised and updated, including a new chapter on peacekeeping, and examines contemporary strategic thought on the conduct of war in the sea, land, air, nuclear, space and cyber domains, as well as irregular warfare. Each chapter identifies contemporary strategic thinkers in a particular area, examines strategic thought through the lens of identifiable themes, and discusses the ideas of classical strategists to provide historical context. Examples of the link between the use of military force and the pursuit of political objectives are presented, such as airpower against ISIS and in Libya, counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, counter-piracy operations off the coast of Africa, and the Stuxnet virus in Iran. The chapters identify trends, statements and principles that indicate how military power can best be employed to effect political ends, while the conclusion paints an overall picture of the relationship between classic and contemporary strategic thinking within each warfare domain. This book will be essential reading for students of strategic studies, war studies and military history, and is highly recommended for students of security studies and international relations in general.
