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Author: Sebastian A. Wagner
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3640896467
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 16
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Book Description
Essay from the year 2008 in the subject Psychology - General, grade: 1,7, University of Derby (Institut für Psychologie), course: Cognitive Psychology, language: English, abstract: In Psychology, many theories and models use process charts resembling circuit diagrams of technical devices. In this account, human behaviour and experience appears to be the result of processes taking place in the ‘black box’ named cognition. In this context, “computationalism is the view that computation [...] can offer an explanatory basis for cognition” (Davenport, 2008, p.1). The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) has developed on this foundation, attempting to reveal what is inside this ‘black box’. In contrast, human consciousness being a part of cognition (Harnad, 1994) seems to be beyond any scientific explanation. This essay will critically discuss the extent to which consciousness poses a problem for the CTM – regarding issues surrounding consciousness as an area of scientific study, the extent to which consciousness is explicable in computational terms, explanations of consciousness, and Dennett’s (1991) different account to consciousness. It will be argued that consciousness does pose a major problem for the CTM, especially when it is conceptualised as subjective experience. It will conclude that Cognitive Science should presently focus only on certain aspects of consciousness, called the easy problems.
Author: Sebastian A. Wagner
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3640896467
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 16
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Book Description
Essay from the year 2008 in the subject Psychology - General, grade: 1,7, University of Derby (Institut für Psychologie), course: Cognitive Psychology, language: English, abstract: In Psychology, many theories and models use process charts resembling circuit diagrams of technical devices. In this account, human behaviour and experience appears to be the result of processes taking place in the ‘black box’ named cognition. In this context, “computationalism is the view that computation [...] can offer an explanatory basis for cognition” (Davenport, 2008, p.1). The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) has developed on this foundation, attempting to reveal what is inside this ‘black box’. In contrast, human consciousness being a part of cognition (Harnad, 1994) seems to be beyond any scientific explanation. This essay will critically discuss the extent to which consciousness poses a problem for the CTM – regarding issues surrounding consciousness as an area of scientific study, the extent to which consciousness is explicable in computational terms, explanations of consciousness, and Dennett’s (1991) different account to consciousness. It will be argued that consciousness does pose a major problem for the CTM, especially when it is conceptualised as subjective experience. It will conclude that Cognitive Science should presently focus only on certain aspects of consciousness, called the easy problems.
Author: Sebastian A. Wagner
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3640896572
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 29
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Book Description
Essay from the year 2008 in the subject Psychology - General, grade: 1,7, University of Derby (Institut für Psychologie), course: Cognitive Psychology, language: English, abstract: In Psychology, many theories and models use process charts resembling circuit diagrams of technical devices. In this account, human behaviour and experience appears to be the result of processes taking place in the 'black box' named cognition. In this context, "computationalism is the view that computation [...] can offer an explanatory basis for cognition" (Davenport, 2008, p.1). The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) has developed on this foundation, attempting to reveal what is inside this 'black box'. In contrast, human consciousness being a part of cognition (Harnad, 1994) seems to be beyond any scientific explanation. This essay will critically discuss the extent to which consciousness poses a problem for the CTM - regarding issues surrounding consciousness as an area of scientific study, the extent to which consciousness is explicable in computational terms, explanations of consciousness, and Dennett's (1991) different account to consciousness. It will be argued that consciousness does pose a major problem for the CTM, especially when it is conceptualised as subjective experience. It will conclude that Cognitive Science should presently focus only on certain aspects of consciousness, called the easy problems.
Author: Tim Crane
Publisher: Presbyterian Publishing Corp
ISBN: 0203426312
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 272
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Book Description
A fascinating exploration of the theories and arguments surrounding the notions of thought and representation. Now in its 2nd edition, Cranes's classic text has introduced thousands to some of the most important ideas in philosophy of mind.
Author: John R. Searle
Publisher: New York Review of Books
ISBN: 9780940322066
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 244
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Book Description
It has long been one of the most fundamental problems of philosophy, and it is now, John Searle writes, "the most important problem in the biological sciences": What is consciousness? Is my inner awareness of myself something separate from my body? In what began as a series of essays in The New York Review of Books, John Searle evaluates the positions on consciousness of such well-known scientists and philosophers as Francis Crick, Gerald Edelman, Roger Penrose, Daniel Dennett, David Chalmers, and Israel Rosenfield. He challenges claims that the mind works like a computer, and that brain functions can be reproduced by computer programs. With a sharp eye for confusion and contradiction, he points out which avenues of current research are most likely to come up with a biological examination of how conscious states are caused by the brain. Only when we understand how the brain works will we solve the mystery of consciousness, and only then will we begin to understand issues ranging from artificial intelligence to our very nature as human beings.
Author: Thomas Metzinger
Publisher: Imprint Academic
ISBN: 9780907845058
Category : Consciousness
Languages : en
Pages : 580
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Book Description
The contributions to this book are original articles, representing a cross-section of current philosophical work on consciousness and thereby allowing students and readers from other disciplines to acquaint themselves with the very latest debate, so that they can then pursue their own research interests more effectively. The volume includes a bibliography on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science and brain research, covering the last 25 years and consisting of over 1000 entries in 18 thematic sections, compiled by David Chalmers and Thomas Metzinger.
Author: Galen Strawson
Publisher: Andrews UK Limited
ISBN: 1788361237
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 511
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Book Description
Panpsychism is the philosophical view that consciousness, mentality, or 'mindedness' in some form is fundamental in the universe. The idea has existed for centuries, but only recently has it had a serious resurgence. Galen Strawson has been on the front line of the battlefield on the topic of panpsychism since the 1990s. His paper on ‘realistic monism’, contained in this volume and originally published in 2006, is now considered something of a classic and a catalyst for panpsychism’s recent revival. This long overdue new edition of the book gives the original commentators, where they feel they have something more to add, an opportunity to update their thinking on the topic of panpsychism in general and Strawson’s realistic monism in particular. Seven new postscripts are included, which aim to enhance the original collection and push the discussion onwards. Eighteen years have passed since the first edition of this groundbreaking volume, and Strawson remains a distinctive and important voice in the field — the new edition is a must-read for all who are interested in consciousness studies.
Author: Robert M. Harnish
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
ISBN: 9780631212607
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 468
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Book Description
Minds, Brains, Computers serves as both an historical and interdisciplinary introduction to the foundations of cognitive science.
Author: Steven Horst
Publisher: Steven Horst
ISBN: 0984017631
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 452
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Book Description
Author: Gordon Globus
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1468421964
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 364
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Book Description
The relationship of consciousness to brain, which Schopenhauer grandly referred to as the "world knot," remains an unsolved problem within both philosophy and science. The central focus in what follows is the relevance of science---from psychoanalysis to neurophysiology and quantum physics-to the mind-brain puzzle. Many would argue that we have advanced little since the age of the Greek philosophers, and that the extraordinary accumulation of neuroscientific knowledge in this century has helped not at all. Increas ingly, philosophers and scientists have tended to go their separate ways in considering the issues, since they tend to differ in the questions that they ask, the data and ideas which are provided for consideration, their methods for answering these questions, and criteria for judging the acceptability of an answer. But it is our conviction that philosophers and scientists can usefully interchange, at least to the extent that they provide co~straints upon each other's preferred strategies, and it may prove possible for more substantive progress to be made. Philosophers have said some rather naive things by ignoring the extraordinary advances in the neurosciences in the twentieth century. The skull is not filled with green cheese! On the other hand, the arrogance of many scientists toward philosophy and their faith in the scientific method is equally naive. Scientists clearly have much to learn from philosophy as an intellectual discipline.
Author: Rajakishore Nath
Publisher: Universal-Publishers
ISBN: 1599429055
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 190
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Book Description
This book deals with the major philosophical issues in the theoretical framework of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in particular and cognitive science in general. The researchers in AI are concerned with the issues of consciousness, human subjectivity, creativity, etc. Cognitive Science and AI argue that consciousness can be artificially created and comprehended in the function of robots. The robotic activities explain the mechanism involved in computation, language processing, sensing the information, etc. Contrary to this thesis, the philosophical study tries to show that human consciousness, thinking, imagination, etc. are much larger concepts and need to be delved into in the broad theoretical framework. This book is a critique of the mechanistic theory of mind. It shows the basic foundation of AI and its limitations in explaining the activities of the human mental life. Machine-functionalism fails to account for the subjective nature of consciousness and the creativity involved in the conscious acts. There are two aspects of this thesis-- the epistemological and the metaphysical. Epistemologically, the subject of consciousness intimately knows the raw feelings or the qualia. Metaphysically speaking, however, the raw feelings are real in the sense that they are part of the furniture of the mental world. Therefore, we can hardly deny that the mental world is real.
