The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games PDF full book. Access full book title The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games by Partha Dasgupta. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Partha Dasgupta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Guilherme Carmona
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814390666
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 153
Get Book Here
Book Description
The book aims at describing the recent developments in the existence and stability of Nash equilibrium. The two topics are central to game theory and economics and have been extensively researched. Recent results on existence and stability of Nash equilibrium are scattered and the relationship between them has not been explained clearly. The book will make these results easily accessible and understandable to researchers in the field.
Author: Mindia E. Salukvadze
Publisher: Birkhäuser
ISBN: 9783030255480
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 272
Get Book Here
Book Description
The goal of this book is to elaborate on the main principles of the theory of the Berge equilibrium by answering the following two questions: What are the basic properties of the Berge equilibrium? Does the Berge equilibrium exist, and how can it be calculated? The Golden Rule of ethics, which appears in Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism and other world religions, states the following: “Behave towards others as you would like them to behave towards you." In any game, each party of conflict seeks to maximize some payoff. Therefore, for each player, the Golden Rule is implemented through the maximization of his/her payoff by all other players, which matches well with the concept of the Berge equilibrium. The approach presented here will be of particular interest to researchers (including undergraduates and graduates) and economists focused on decision-making under complex conflict conditions. The peaceful resolution of conflicts is the cornerstone of the approach: as a matter of fact, the Golden Rule precludes military clashes and violence. In turn, the new approach requires new methods; in particular, the existence problems are reduced to saddle point design for the Germeier convolution of payoff functions, with further transition to mixed strategies in accordance with the standard procedure employed by E. Borel, J. von Neumann, J. Nash, and their followers. Moreover, this new approach has proven to be efficient and fruitful with regard to a range of other important problems in mathematical game theory, which are considered in the Appendix.
Author: Partha Dasgupta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: London School of Economics and Political Science
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 570
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Partha Dasgupta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Jacob K. Goeree
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400880920
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 328
Get Book Here
Book Description
Quantal Response Equilibrium presents a stochastic theory of games that unites probabilistic choice models developed in psychology and statistics with the Nash equilibrium approach of classical game theory. Nash equilibrium assumes precise and perfect decision making in games, but human behavior is inherently stochastic and people realize that the behavior of others is not perfectly predictable. In contrast, QRE models choice behavior as probabilistic and extends classical game theory into a more realistic and useful framework with broad applications for economics, political science, management, and other social sciences. Quantal Response Equilibrium spans the range from basic theoretical foundations to examples of how the principles yield useful predictions and insights in strategic settings, including voting, bargaining, auctions, public goods provision, and more. The approach provides a natural framework for estimating the effects of behavioral factors like altruism, reciprocity, risk aversion, judgment fallacies, and impatience. New theoretical results push the frontiers of models that include heterogeneity, learning, and well-specified behavioral modifications of rational choice and rational expectations. The empirical relevance of the theory is enhanced by discussion of data from controlled laboratory experiments, along with a detailed users' guide for estimation techniques. Quantal Response Equilibrium makes pioneering game-theoretic methods and interdisciplinary applications available to a wide audience.
Author: Partha Dasgupta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Ngo Van Long
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 981446595X
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 290
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book provides readers with a comprehensive survey of models of dynamic games in economics, including an extensive coverage of numerous fields of applications. It will also discuss and explain main concepts and techniques used in dynamic games, and inform readers of its major developments while equipping them with tools and ideas that will aid in the formulation of solutions for problems. A Survey of Dynamic Games in Economics will interest those who wish to study more about the conceptions, approaches and models that are applied in the domain of dynamic games.
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814470821
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
