The Economics of Contract Choice PDF Download
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Author: Yujiro Hayami
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Agricultural contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 160
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Book Description
Author: Yujiro Hayami
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Agricultural contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 160
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Book Description
Author: Bernard Salanié
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262195259
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 257
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Book Description
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition.
Author: Eric Brousseau
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521893138
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 604
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Book Description
A 2002 survey of economics of contracts appealing to scholars in economics, management and law.
Author: T.V.S.Ramamohan Rao
Publisher: New Age International
ISBN: 9788122415056
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 370
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Book Description
Contracts Are A Major Organizational Arrangement To Conduct Transactions. Economic Theory Has Been Making Attempts To Come To Grips With Four Pertinent Issues. Why Is Contracting Superior To Imperfect Markets And Hierarchical Control In Decentralized Organizations? What Basic Institutional Mechanisms Should Be In Place To Ensure Efficiency Of Contracts? What Determines The Choice Of Contract Forms (In Particular, The Behavioral Responses Of Self-Interest Seeking To Reactions Of Others) And Contract Parameters?Can Contracts Provide A Better Alternative To Regulated Markets? Keeping Information Asymmetry And Asset Specificity As The Focal Points This Book Deals With The Following Mechanisms Of Exchange-Markets (Including Transfer Prices), Contingent Claims Contracts, Incomplete And Incentive Contracts, And Implicit Contracts.The Emphasis Is On The Efficient Structuring Of Such Contracts And The Choice Of Suitable Contract Parameters. One Chapter Is Also Devoted To Trust And Informal Dimensions Of Contracts Since It Is Recognized That Defining And Enforcing Formal Contracts Becomes Difficult As Information Asymmetry And Asset Specificity Reach Their Limits. The Level Of Algebraic Complexity In The Derivations Is Kept To A Minimum To Make The Book Accessible To A Wide Audience.
Author: Oren Bar-Gill
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019966336X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 297
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Book Description
Seduction by Contract explains how consumer contracts emerge from market forces and consumer psychology. Consumers' predictable mistakes - they are short-sighted, optimistic, and imperfectly rational - compel sellers to compete by hiding the true costs of products in complex, misleading contracts. Only better law can overcome the market's failure.
Author: Victor P. Goldberg
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521349208
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 270
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Book Description
This collection brings together some of the main contributions to an important area of this work, the economics of contract law.
Author: W. Bentley MacLeod
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262046873
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
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Book Description
A graduate textbook on microeconomics, covering decision theory, game theory, and the foundations of contract theory, with a unique focus on the empirical. This graduate-level text on microeconomics, covering such topics as decision theory, game theory, bargaining theory, contract theory, trade under asymmetric information, and relational contract theory, is unique in its emphasis on the interplay between theory and evidence. It reviews the microeconomic theory of exchange “from the ground up,” aiming to produce a set of models and hypotheses amenable to empirical exploration, with particular focus on models that are useful for the study of contracts, institutions, and organizations. It explores research that extends price theory to the exchange of commodities when markets are incomplete, discussing recent developments in the field. Topics covered include the relationship between theory and evidence; decision theory as it is used in contract theory and institutional design; game theory; axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory; agency theory and the class of models that are considered to constitute contract theory, with discussions of moral hazard and trade with asymmetric information; and the theory of relational contracts. The final chapter offers a nontechnical review that provides a guide to which model is the most appropriate for a particular application. End-of-chapter exercises help students expand their understanding of the material, and an appendix provides brief introduction to optimization theory and the welfare theorem of general equilibrium theory. Students are assumed to be familiar with general equilibrium theory and basic constrained optimization theory.
Author: Gerdis Marquardt
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Peter Benson
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674237595
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 625
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Book Description
Legal thinkers typically justify contract law on the basis of economics or promissory morality. But Peter Benson takes another approach. He argues that contract is best explained as a transfer of rights governed by a conception of justice. The result is a comprehensive theory of contract law congruent with Rawlsian liberalism.
Author: F. H. Buckley
Publisher: Duke University Press
ISBN: 0822380129
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 479
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Book Description
Declared dead some twenty-five years ago, the idea of freedom of contract has enjoyed a remarkable intellectual revival. In The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract leading scholars in the fields of contract law and law-and-economics analyze the new interest in bargaining freedom. The 1970s was a decade of regulatory triumphalism in North America, marked by a surge in consumer, securities, and environmental regulation. Legal scholars predicted the “death of contract” and its replacement by regulation and reliance-based theories of liability. Instead, we have witnessed the reemergence of free bargaining norms. This revival can be attributed to the rise of law-and-economics, which laid bare the intellectual failure of anticontractarian theories. Scholars in this school note that consumers are not as helpless as they have been made out to be, and that intrusive legal rules meant ostensibly to help them often leave them worse off. Contract law principles have also been very robust in areas far afield from traditional contract law, and the essays in this volume consider how free bargaining rights might reasonably be extended in tort, property, land-use planning, bankruptcy, and divorce and family law. This book will be of particular interest to legal scholars and specialists in contract law. Economics and public policy planners will also be challenged by its novel arguments. Contributors. Gregory S. Alexander, Margaret F. Brinig, F. H. Buckley, Robert Cooter, Steven J. Eagle, Robert C. Ellickson, Richard A. Epstein, William A. Fischel, Michael Klausner, Bruce H. Kobayashi, Geoffrey P. Miller, Timothy J. Muris, Robert H. Nelson, Eric A. Posner, Robert K. Rasmussen, Larry E. Ribstein, Roberta Romano, Paul H. Rubin, Alan Schwartz, Elizabeth S. Scott, Robert E. Scott, Michael J. Trebilcock
