Author: Robert C. Marshall
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262525941
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 315
Book Description
An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts—fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases—offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entrée to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks.
The Economics of Collusion
Author: Robert C. Marshall
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262525941
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 315
Book Description
An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts—fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases—offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entrée to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262525941
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 315
Book Description
An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts—fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases—offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entrée to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks.
The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy
Author: Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262036932
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 145
Book Description
A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262036932
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 145
Book Description
A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.
Collusion
Author: Nomi Prins
Publisher: Bold Type Books
ISBN: 1568585632
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 456
Book Description
In this searing exposéformer Wall Street insider Nomi Prins shows how the 2007-2008 financial crisis turbo-boosted the influence of central bankers and triggered a massive shift in the world order. Central banks and international institutions like the IMF have overstepped their traditional mandates by directing the flow of epic sums of fabricated money without any checks or balances. Meanwhile, the open door between private and central banking has ensured endless opportunities for market manipulation and asset bubbles -- with government support. Through on-the-ground reporting, Prins reveals how five regions and their central banks reshaped economics and geopolitics. She discloses how Mexico navigated its relationship with the US while striving for independence and how Brazil led the BRICS countries to challenge the US dollar's hegemony. She explains how China's retaliation against the Fed's supremacy is aiding its ongoing ascent as a global superpower and how Japan is negotiating the power shift from the West to the East. And she illustrates how the European response to the financial crisis fueled instability that manifests itself in everything from rising populism to the shocking Brexit vote. Packed with tantalizing details about the elite players orchestrating the world economy -- from Janet Yellen and Mario Draghi to Ben Bernanke and Christine Lagarde -- Collusion takes the reader inside the most discreet conversations at exclusive retreats like Jackson Hole and Davos. A work of meticulous reporting and bracing analysis, Collusion will change the way we understand the new world of international finance.
Publisher: Bold Type Books
ISBN: 1568585632
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 456
Book Description
In this searing exposéformer Wall Street insider Nomi Prins shows how the 2007-2008 financial crisis turbo-boosted the influence of central bankers and triggered a massive shift in the world order. Central banks and international institutions like the IMF have overstepped their traditional mandates by directing the flow of epic sums of fabricated money without any checks or balances. Meanwhile, the open door between private and central banking has ensured endless opportunities for market manipulation and asset bubbles -- with government support. Through on-the-ground reporting, Prins reveals how five regions and their central banks reshaped economics and geopolitics. She discloses how Mexico navigated its relationship with the US while striving for independence and how Brazil led the BRICS countries to challenge the US dollar's hegemony. She explains how China's retaliation against the Fed's supremacy is aiding its ongoing ascent as a global superpower and how Japan is negotiating the power shift from the West to the East. And she illustrates how the European response to the financial crisis fueled instability that manifests itself in everything from rising populism to the shocking Brexit vote. Packed with tantalizing details about the elite players orchestrating the world economy -- from Janet Yellen and Mario Draghi to Ben Bernanke and Christine Lagarde -- Collusion takes the reader inside the most discreet conversations at exclusive retreats like Jackson Hole and Davos. A work of meticulous reporting and bracing analysis, Collusion will change the way we understand the new world of international finance.
Hub-and-Spoke Cartels
Author: Luke Garrod
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262046202
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 303
Book Description
The first comprehensive economic and legal analysis of hub-and-spoke cartels, with detailed case studies. A cartel forms when competitors conspire to limit competition through coordinated actions. Most cartels are composed exclusively of firms that would otherwise be in competition, but in a hub-and-spoke cartel, those competitors (“spokes”) conspire with the assistance of an upstream supplier or a downstream buyer (“hub”). This book provides the first comprehensive economic and legal analysis of hub-and-spoke cartels, explaining their formation and how they operate to create and sustain a collusive environment. Sixteen detailed case studies, including cases brought against toy manufacturer Hasbro and the Apple ebook case, illustrate the economic framework and legal strategies discussed. The authors identify three types of hub-and-spoke cartels: when an upstream firm facilitates downstream firms to coordinate on higher prices; when a downstream intermediary facilitates upstream suppliers to coordinate on higher prices; and when a downstream firm facilitates upstream suppliers to exclude a downstream rival. They devote a chapter to each type, discussing the formation, coordination, enforcement, efficacy, and prosecution of these cartels, and consider general lessons that can be drawn from the case studies. Finally, they present strategies for prosecuting hub-and-spoke collusion. The book is written to be accessible to both economists and lawyers, and is intended for both scholars and practitioners.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262046202
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 303
Book Description
The first comprehensive economic and legal analysis of hub-and-spoke cartels, with detailed case studies. A cartel forms when competitors conspire to limit competition through coordinated actions. Most cartels are composed exclusively of firms that would otherwise be in competition, but in a hub-and-spoke cartel, those competitors (“spokes”) conspire with the assistance of an upstream supplier or a downstream buyer (“hub”). This book provides the first comprehensive economic and legal analysis of hub-and-spoke cartels, explaining their formation and how they operate to create and sustain a collusive environment. Sixteen detailed case studies, including cases brought against toy manufacturer Hasbro and the Apple ebook case, illustrate the economic framework and legal strategies discussed. The authors identify three types of hub-and-spoke cartels: when an upstream firm facilitates downstream firms to coordinate on higher prices; when a downstream intermediary facilitates upstream suppliers to coordinate on higher prices; and when a downstream firm facilitates upstream suppliers to exclude a downstream rival. They devote a chapter to each type, discussing the formation, coordination, enforcement, efficacy, and prosecution of these cartels, and consider general lessons that can be drawn from the case studies. Finally, they present strategies for prosecuting hub-and-spoke collusion. The book is written to be accessible to both economists and lawyers, and is intended for both scholars and practitioners.
Capital and Collusion
Author: Hilton L. Root
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691171181
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 345
Book Description
Why does capital formation often fail to occur in developing countries? Capital and Collusion explores the political incentives that either foster growth or steal nations' growth prospects. Hilton Root examines the frontier between risk and uncertainty, analyzing the forces driving development in both developed and undeveloped regions. In the former, he argues, institutions reduce everyday economic risks to levels low enough to make people receptive to opportunities for profit, stimulating developments in technology and science. Not so in developing countries. There, institutions that specialize in sharing risk are scarce. Money hides under mattresses and in teapots, creating a gap between a poor nation's savings and its investment. As a consequence, the developing world faces a growing disconnect between the value of its resources and the availability of finance. What are the remedies for eliminating this disparity? Root shows us how to close the growing wealth gap among nations by building institutions that convert uncertainty into risk. Comparing China to India, Latin America to East Asia, and contemporary to historical cases, he offers lessons that can help the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to tackle the political incentives that are the source of poor governance in developing nations.
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691171181
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 345
Book Description
Why does capital formation often fail to occur in developing countries? Capital and Collusion explores the political incentives that either foster growth or steal nations' growth prospects. Hilton Root examines the frontier between risk and uncertainty, analyzing the forces driving development in both developed and undeveloped regions. In the former, he argues, institutions reduce everyday economic risks to levels low enough to make people receptive to opportunities for profit, stimulating developments in technology and science. Not so in developing countries. There, institutions that specialize in sharing risk are scarce. Money hides under mattresses and in teapots, creating a gap between a poor nation's savings and its investment. As a consequence, the developing world faces a growing disconnect between the value of its resources and the availability of finance. What are the remedies for eliminating this disparity? Root shows us how to close the growing wealth gap among nations by building institutions that convert uncertainty into risk. Comparing China to India, Latin America to East Asia, and contemporary to historical cases, he offers lessons that can help the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to tackle the political incentives that are the source of poor governance in developing nations.
New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure
Author: International Economic Association
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262690935
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 588
Book Description
These contributions discuss a number of important developments over the past decade in a newly established and important field of economics that have led to notable changes in views on governmental competition policies. They focus on the nature and role of competition and other determinants of market structures, such as numbers of firms and barriers to entry; other factors which determine the effective degree of competition in the market; the influence of major firms (especially when these pursue objectives other than profit maximization); and decentralization and coordination under control relationships other than markets and hierarchies.ContributorsJoseph E. Stiglitz, G. C. Archibald, B. C. Eaton, R. G. Lipsey, David Enaoua, Paul Geroski, Alexis Jacquemin, Richard J. Gilbert, Reinhard Selten, Oliver E. Williamson, Jerry R. Green, G. Frank Mathewson, R. A. Winter, C. d'Aspremont, J. Jaskold Gabszewicz, Steven Salop, Branko Horvat, Z. Roman, W. J. Baumol, J. C. Panzar, R. D. Willig, Richard Schmalensee, Richard Nelson, Michael Scence, and Partha Dasgupta
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262690935
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 588
Book Description
These contributions discuss a number of important developments over the past decade in a newly established and important field of economics that have led to notable changes in views on governmental competition policies. They focus on the nature and role of competition and other determinants of market structures, such as numbers of firms and barriers to entry; other factors which determine the effective degree of competition in the market; the influence of major firms (especially when these pursue objectives other than profit maximization); and decentralization and coordination under control relationships other than markets and hierarchies.ContributorsJoseph E. Stiglitz, G. C. Archibald, B. C. Eaton, R. G. Lipsey, David Enaoua, Paul Geroski, Alexis Jacquemin, Richard J. Gilbert, Reinhard Selten, Oliver E. Williamson, Jerry R. Green, G. Frank Mathewson, R. A. Winter, C. d'Aspremont, J. Jaskold Gabszewicz, Steven Salop, Branko Horvat, Z. Roman, W. J. Baumol, J. C. Panzar, R. D. Willig, Richard Schmalensee, Richard Nelson, Michael Scence, and Partha Dasgupta
Economics of Regulation and Antitrust
Author: W. Kip Viscusi
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 026222075X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 955
Book Description
A substantially revised and updated new edition of the leading text on business and government, with new material reflecting recent theoretical and methodological advances; includes further coverage of the Microsoft antitrust case, the deregulation of telecommunications and electric power, and new environmental regulations. This new edition of the leading text on business and government focuses on the insights economic reasoning can provide in analyzing regulatory and antitrust issues. Departing from the traditional emphasis on institutions, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust asks how economic theory and empirical analyses can illuminate the character of market operation and the role for government action and brings new developments in theory and empirical methodology to bear on these questions. The fourth edition has been substantially revised and updated throughout, with new material added and extended discussion of many topics. Part I, on antitrust, has been given a major revision to reflect advances in economic theory and recent antitrust cases, including the case against Microsoft and the Supreme Court's Kodak decision. Part II, on economic regulation, updates its treatment of the restructuring and deregulation of the telecommunications and electric power industries, and includes an analysis of what went wrong in the California energy market in 2000 and 2001. Part III, on social regulation, now includes increased discussion of risk-risk analysis and extensive changes to its discussion of environmental regulation. The many case studies included provide students not only pertinent insights for today but also the economic tools to analyze the implications of regulations and antitrust policies in the future.The book is suitable for use in a wide range of courses in business, law, and public policy, for undergraduates as well at the graduate level. The structure of the book allows instructors to combine the chapters in various ways according to their needs. Presentation of more advanced material is self-contained. Each chapter concludes with questions and problems.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 026222075X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 955
Book Description
A substantially revised and updated new edition of the leading text on business and government, with new material reflecting recent theoretical and methodological advances; includes further coverage of the Microsoft antitrust case, the deregulation of telecommunications and electric power, and new environmental regulations. This new edition of the leading text on business and government focuses on the insights economic reasoning can provide in analyzing regulatory and antitrust issues. Departing from the traditional emphasis on institutions, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust asks how economic theory and empirical analyses can illuminate the character of market operation and the role for government action and brings new developments in theory and empirical methodology to bear on these questions. The fourth edition has been substantially revised and updated throughout, with new material added and extended discussion of many topics. Part I, on antitrust, has been given a major revision to reflect advances in economic theory and recent antitrust cases, including the case against Microsoft and the Supreme Court's Kodak decision. Part II, on economic regulation, updates its treatment of the restructuring and deregulation of the telecommunications and electric power industries, and includes an analysis of what went wrong in the California energy market in 2000 and 2001. Part III, on social regulation, now includes increased discussion of risk-risk analysis and extensive changes to its discussion of environmental regulation. The many case studies included provide students not only pertinent insights for today but also the economic tools to analyze the implications of regulations and antitrust policies in the future.The book is suitable for use in a wide range of courses in business, law, and public policy, for undergraduates as well at the graduate level. The structure of the book allows instructors to combine the chapters in various ways according to their needs. Presentation of more advanced material is self-contained. Each chapter concludes with questions and problems.
Collective Dominance and Collusion
Author: Marilena Filippelli
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1781956057
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 363
Book Description
By examining the issue of collusion in EU and US competition law, this book suggests possible strategies for improving the antitrust enforcement against parallelism, by exploiting the most advanced achievements of economic analysis. The book contains a suggested approach to collusion, in ex ante and ex post perspectives. By moving from the analysis of the state of art, in terms of law, case law, and scholarship, Marilena Filippelli analyses inconsistencies and failures in the current antitrust enforcement toward collusion and develops a workable parameter for the issue of collective dominance. The most innovative part of this work goes beyond the analysis itself of collective dominance and involves the interference of arts. 101 and 102. The conclusion is a re-definition of the relationship between those rulesÑfrom dichotomy to redundancy. Finally, the book highlights the antitrust significance of semi-collusion, as a strategy made of collusion and competition. The author considers economic models equaling, as for the effects, collusion and semi-collusion and the case law supporting the qualification of semi-collusion as a species of collusion. The analysis involves both US and EU systems, under the highly topical economic-oriented approach. It also contains an original view of European antitrust prohibitions. Because of its contents and its approach, this book will be attractive to every academic interested in antitrust law. Moreover, the well-documented research on parallelism, involving law, case law and scholarship, makes this book interesting also for competition authorities and antitrust lawyers.
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1781956057
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 363
Book Description
By examining the issue of collusion in EU and US competition law, this book suggests possible strategies for improving the antitrust enforcement against parallelism, by exploiting the most advanced achievements of economic analysis. The book contains a suggested approach to collusion, in ex ante and ex post perspectives. By moving from the analysis of the state of art, in terms of law, case law, and scholarship, Marilena Filippelli analyses inconsistencies and failures in the current antitrust enforcement toward collusion and develops a workable parameter for the issue of collective dominance. The most innovative part of this work goes beyond the analysis itself of collective dominance and involves the interference of arts. 101 and 102. The conclusion is a re-definition of the relationship between those rulesÑfrom dichotomy to redundancy. Finally, the book highlights the antitrust significance of semi-collusion, as a strategy made of collusion and competition. The author considers economic models equaling, as for the effects, collusion and semi-collusion and the case law supporting the qualification of semi-collusion as a species of collusion. The analysis involves both US and EU systems, under the highly topical economic-oriented approach. It also contains an original view of European antitrust prohibitions. Because of its contents and its approach, this book will be attractive to every academic interested in antitrust law. Moreover, the well-documented research on parallelism, involving law, case law and scholarship, makes this book interesting also for competition authorities and antitrust lawyers.
Cartels and Economic Collusion
Author: Michael A. Utton
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 184980771X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 191
Book Description
Adam Smith warned of the prevalence of corporate conspiracies more than two hundred years ago. Since then, interest in cartels has sometimes intensified (during the Great Depression, for example) and sometimes diminished, but the need for control has always remained on the antitrust agenda. This well-documented book reviews the economic case against corporate collusion, as well as the arguments made for a more permissive attitude. A survey of recent empirical research reveals not only the prevalence of a wide range of international cartels but also the size of the inefficiencies and costs that they impose on customers and consumers. The antitrust reaction has therefore intensified with greatly increased fines being imposed by the US, the EU and other authorities. At the same time, they have developed sophisticated leniency polices with the aim of destabilizing the illegal conspiracies. After reviewing these measures, the author concludes with the hope that this toughened approach is not modified or reversed during periods of recession.
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 184980771X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 191
Book Description
Adam Smith warned of the prevalence of corporate conspiracies more than two hundred years ago. Since then, interest in cartels has sometimes intensified (during the Great Depression, for example) and sometimes diminished, but the need for control has always remained on the antitrust agenda. This well-documented book reviews the economic case against corporate collusion, as well as the arguments made for a more permissive attitude. A survey of recent empirical research reveals not only the prevalence of a wide range of international cartels but also the size of the inefficiencies and costs that they impose on customers and consumers. The antitrust reaction has therefore intensified with greatly increased fines being imposed by the US, the EU and other authorities. At the same time, they have developed sophisticated leniency polices with the aim of destabilizing the illegal conspiracies. After reviewing these measures, the author concludes with the hope that this toughened approach is not modified or reversed during periods of recession.
How Cartels Endure and how They Fail
Author: Peter Z. Grossman
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781781956373
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 334
Book Description
Why do some cartels fail and others succeed? This question has intrigued economists for a hundred years, and they have created an extensive body of theory to help explain cartel behaviour. This book looks at the experience of actual cartels and challenges their portrayal as found in the existing literature. The eleven chapters by leading researchers of industrial organization study real examples of industrial collusion. The authors investigate the formation, behaviour, activity and purpose of cartels, and illustrate the intricacies of collusive relationships. In the process they question the existing economic theory surrounding the operation of cartels, which in practice do not always adhere to the textbook models or to complex game theoretic rules. Although much economic research suggests that cartels are doomed to failure, the authors find that there are many examples of industries where cartels have succeeded in controlling prices and output over a prolonged period of time. The book is a groundbreaking attempt to study empirically a range of cartels throughout the world, providing both historical and contemporary examples of collusion to enrich the arguments. This book is written for academics, policymakers, lawyers and economists working in the fields of industrial organization and competition policy.
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781781956373
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 334
Book Description
Why do some cartels fail and others succeed? This question has intrigued economists for a hundred years, and they have created an extensive body of theory to help explain cartel behaviour. This book looks at the experience of actual cartels and challenges their portrayal as found in the existing literature. The eleven chapters by leading researchers of industrial organization study real examples of industrial collusion. The authors investigate the formation, behaviour, activity and purpose of cartels, and illustrate the intricacies of collusive relationships. In the process they question the existing economic theory surrounding the operation of cartels, which in practice do not always adhere to the textbook models or to complex game theoretic rules. Although much economic research suggests that cartels are doomed to failure, the authors find that there are many examples of industries where cartels have succeeded in controlling prices and output over a prolonged period of time. The book is a groundbreaking attempt to study empirically a range of cartels throughout the world, providing both historical and contemporary examples of collusion to enrich the arguments. This book is written for academics, policymakers, lawyers and economists working in the fields of industrial organization and competition policy.