The Behavior of Inexperienced Bidders in Internet Auctions PDF Download
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Author: Jeffrey A. Livingston
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
In Internet auctions, bidders alter their strategies as they gain market experience. While inexperienced bidders bid the same high amounts regardless of the seller's reputation, experienced bidders bid substantially less if the seller has yet to establish a reputation and raise their bids as reports are filed that the seller has treated bidders well in the past. Experienced bidders also wait until much closer to the end of the auction to place their bids, although it takes very little experience to learn that waiting to submit one's bid is a superior strategy.
Author: Jeffrey A. Livingston
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
In Internet auctions, bidders alter their strategies as they gain market experience. While inexperienced bidders bid the same high amounts regardless of the seller's reputation, experienced bidders bid substantially less if the seller has yet to establish a reputation and raise their bids as reports are filed that the seller has treated bidders well in the past. Experienced bidders also wait until much closer to the end of the auction to place their bids, although it takes very little experience to learn that waiting to submit one's bid is a superior strategy.
Author: John H. Kagel
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691218951
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 419
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Book Description
An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
Author: Ken Steiglitz
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691127131
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 300
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Author: Radovan Vadovic
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 180
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Book Description
In this dissertation I study bidding behavior in Internet Auction Markets. I focus on practice called"multiple bidding" which occurs when a single bidder places numerous bids throughout the same auction. Multiple bidding appears frequently in the data but the incentives that motivate it are not well understood. In the first chapter I develop a theoretical model in which multiple bidding is an equilibrium behavior by rational bidders. The model has a dynamic auction with two bidders who can search for outside prices while bidding in the auction. Each bidder has a search cost which is her private information. When outside prices are private (independently drawn and identically distributed), then, there is an equilibrium in which bidders with the lower search costs bid only late and always search, while the bidders with higher search costs bid both early and late and search as if they coordinated their search decisions, i.e., the bidder with the lower search cost searches and the other bidder does not. This equilibrium by itself provides an explanation of two frequently occurring bidding patterns (late and multiple bidding). In the second chapter I study experimentally the effect of early bids in dynamic auctions on how bidders search for outside prices. The design has two bidders participating in an ascending clock-auction during which any one of the bidders can pause the auction clock. This I interpret as placing an early bid. Once the auction is paused both bidders can simultaneously search for an alternative outside price. Results indicate that pausing decisions by subjects impact their subsequent searching for outside prices, i.e., whether a subject decides to search or not depends on whether she has paused the auction or not. Subjects behave as if they coordinated their searching decisions: the bidder who pauses the auction also searches with high frequency and the other bidder does not. Because this type of behavior increases both the efficiency and the profitability of the auction we favor the use of policies that promote early bidding inpractice, such as, longer auctions and lower public reserve prices.
Author: Kesra Nermend
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319284193
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 380
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Book Description
The aim of this volume is to provide deep insights and the latest scientific developments and trends in experimental economics. Derived from the 2015 Computational Methods in Experimental Economics (CMEE) conference, this book features papers containing research and analysis of economic experiments concerning research in such areas as management science, decision theory, game theory, marketing and political science. The goal is to present possibilities for using various computer methods in the scope of experimental economics to further provide researchers with a wide variety of tools. The field of experimental economics is rapidly evolving. Modern use of experimental economics requires the integration of knowledge in the domains of economic sciences, computer science, psychology, and neuroscience. Recent research includes experiments conducted both in the laboratory and in the field, and the results are used for testing and a better understanding of economic theories. Researchers working in this field use mainly a set of well-established methods and computer tools that support the experiments. Methods such as artificial intelligence, computer simulation and computer graphics, however, are not represented enough in experimental economics studies and most experimenters do not consider their usage. The goal of the conference and the enclosed papers is to allow for an exchange of experiences and to promote joint initiatives to insight change in this trend.
Author: Wolfgang Jank
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1118031865
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 321
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Book Description
Explore cutting-edge statistical methodologies for collecting, analyzing, and modeling online auction data Online auctions are an increasingly important marketplace, as the new mechanisms and formats underlying these auctions have enabled the capturing and recording of large amounts of bidding data that are used to make important business decisions. As a result, new statistical ideas and innovation are needed to understand bidders, sellers, and prices. Combining methodologies from the fields of statistics, data mining, information systems, and economics, Modeling Online Auctions introduces a new approach to identifying obstacles and asking new questions using online auction data. The authors draw upon their extensive experience to introduce the latest methods for extracting new knowledge from online auction data. Rather than approach the topic from the traditional game-theoretic perspective, the book treats the online auction mechanism as a data generator, outlining methods to collect, explore, model, and forecast data. Topics covered include: Data collection methods for online auctions and related issues that arise in drawing data samples from a Web site Models for bidder and bid arrivals, treating the different approaches for exploring bidder-seller networks Data exploration, such as integration of time series and cross-sectional information; curve clustering; semi-continuous data structures; and data hierarchies The use of functional regression as well as functional differential equation models, spatial models, and stochastic models for capturing relationships in auction data Specialized methods and models for forecasting auction prices and their applications in automated bidding decision rule systems Throughout the book, R and MATLAB software are used for illustrating the discussed techniques. In addition, a related Web site features many of the book's datasets and R and MATLAB code that allow readers to replicate the analyses and learn new methods to apply to their own research. Modeling Online Auctions is a valuable book for graduate-level courses on data mining and applied regression analysis. It is also a one-of-a-kind reference for researchers in the fields of statistics, information systems, business, and marketing who work with electronic data and are looking for new approaches for understanding online auctions and processes. Visit this book's companion website by clicking here
Author: Yim Tonia Chu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 110
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Author: Barbora Máková
Publisher: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing
ISBN: 9783659399855
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 112
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Book Description
This book presents an empirical analysis of price determinants and bidders' behavior in online auctions eBay.de and Aukro.cz. We focus on the effect of sellers' feedback rating score and the phenomenon of sniping. Buyers in online auctions cannot personally inspect the quality of the product, so they have to rely on seller's honesty. In this setting, seller's rating may significantly contribute to the final price formation. Sniping is a bidding strategy, whereby a bidder waits until the last moment of the bidding period to place her bid. The impact of sniping on the final price and parameters affecting the probability of sniping are examined in this paper. The empirical results for both auction web sites show that seller's feedback rating score has significant impact on the final price. The tests regarding sniping provided significant results only for the eBay auction. The effect of sniping on final price is not clear since we obtain different results for different specifications, but we found out that the experience of a bidder increases the probability of placing snipe bid. The study should be especially useful to all users of internet auction portals.
Author: Gino Cattani
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN: 1801179999
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 391
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Book Description
Setting an agenda for a more holistic theory on the emergence, evaluation, and legitimation of novelty, this volume showcases how novelty emergence and novelty recognition correspond to two distinct phases of the journey of novelty, from the moment it is generated to the moment it takes root and propagates.
Author: Jens-Martin Bramsen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 114
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