Author: Michael Tye
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190278013
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 257
Book Description
What is it like 'on the inside' for nonhuman animals? Do they feel anything? Most people happily accept that dogs, for example, share many experiences and feelings with us. But what about simpler creatures? Fish? Honeybees? Crabs? Turning to the artificial realm, what about robots? This book presents answers to these questions.
Tense Bees and Shell-shocked Crabs
Tense Bees and Shell-shocked Crabs
Author: Michael Tye
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780190278045
Category : PHILOSOPHY
Languages : en
Pages : 231
Book Description
What is it like 'on the inside' for nonhuman animals? Do they feel anything? Most people happily accept that dogs, for example, share many experiences and feelings with us. But what about simpler creatures? Fish? Honeybees? Crabs? Turning to the artificial realm, what about robots? This work presents answers to these questions.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780190278045
Category : PHILOSOPHY
Languages : en
Pages : 231
Book Description
What is it like 'on the inside' for nonhuman animals? Do they feel anything? Most people happily accept that dogs, for example, share many experiences and feelings with us. But what about simpler creatures? Fish? Honeybees? Crabs? Turning to the artificial realm, what about robots? This work presents answers to these questions.
The Web of Meaning
Author: Jeremy Lent
Publisher: New Society Publishers
ISBN: 1550927477
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 530
Book Description
A compelling foundation for a new story of interconnectedness, showing how, as our civilization unravels, another world is possible. Award-winning author, Jeremy Lent, investigates humanity's age-old questions—Who am I? Why am I? How should I live?—from a fresh perspective, weaving together findings from modern systems thinking, evolutionary biology, and cognitive neuroscience with insights from Buddhism, Taoism, and Indigenous wisdom. The result is a breathtaking accomplishment: a rich, coherent worldview based on a deep recognition of connectedness within ourselves, between each other, and with the entire natural world. As our civilization careens toward a precipice of climate breakdown, ecological destruction, and gaping inequality, people are losing their existential moorings. Our dominant worldview of disconnection—which tells us we are split between mind and body, separate from each other, and at odds with the natural world—has passed its expiration date. Yet another world is possible. The Web of Meaning offers a compelling foundation for the new story that could enable humanity to thrive sustainably on a flourishing Earth. It's a book for everyone looking for deep and coherent answers to the crisis of civilization.
Publisher: New Society Publishers
ISBN: 1550927477
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 530
Book Description
A compelling foundation for a new story of interconnectedness, showing how, as our civilization unravels, another world is possible. Award-winning author, Jeremy Lent, investigates humanity's age-old questions—Who am I? Why am I? How should I live?—from a fresh perspective, weaving together findings from modern systems thinking, evolutionary biology, and cognitive neuroscience with insights from Buddhism, Taoism, and Indigenous wisdom. The result is a breathtaking accomplishment: a rich, coherent worldview based on a deep recognition of connectedness within ourselves, between each other, and with the entire natural world. As our civilization careens toward a precipice of climate breakdown, ecological destruction, and gaping inequality, people are losing their existential moorings. Our dominant worldview of disconnection—which tells us we are split between mind and body, separate from each other, and at odds with the natural world—has passed its expiration date. Yet another world is possible. The Web of Meaning offers a compelling foundation for the new story that could enable humanity to thrive sustainably on a flourishing Earth. It's a book for everyone looking for deep and coherent answers to the crisis of civilization.
Sentience
Author: Nicholas Humphrey
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262373823
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 257
Book Description
The story of a quest to uncover the evolutionary history of consciousness from one of the world's leading theoretical psychologists. We feel, therefore we are. Conscious sensations ground our sense of self. They are crucial to our idea of ourselves as psychic beings: present, existent, and mattering. But is it only humans who feel this way? Do other animals? Will future machines? Weaving together intellectual adventure and cutting-edge science, Nicholas Humphrey describes in Sentience his quest for answers: from his discovery of blindsight in monkeys and his pioneering work on social intelligence to breakthroughs in the philosophy of mind. The goal is to solve the hard problem: to explain the wondrous, eerie fact of “phenomenal consciousness”—the redness of a poppy, the sweetness of honey, the pain of a bee sting. What does this magical dimension of experience amount to? What is it for? And why has it evolved? Humphrey presents here his new solution. He proposes that phenomenal consciousness, far from being primitive, is a relatively late and sophisticated evolutionary development. The implications for the existence of sentience in nonhuman animals are startling and provocative.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262373823
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 257
Book Description
The story of a quest to uncover the evolutionary history of consciousness from one of the world's leading theoretical psychologists. We feel, therefore we are. Conscious sensations ground our sense of self. They are crucial to our idea of ourselves as psychic beings: present, existent, and mattering. But is it only humans who feel this way? Do other animals? Will future machines? Weaving together intellectual adventure and cutting-edge science, Nicholas Humphrey describes in Sentience his quest for answers: from his discovery of blindsight in monkeys and his pioneering work on social intelligence to breakthroughs in the philosophy of mind. The goal is to solve the hard problem: to explain the wondrous, eerie fact of “phenomenal consciousness”—the redness of a poppy, the sweetness of honey, the pain of a bee sting. What does this magical dimension of experience amount to? What is it for? And why has it evolved? Humphrey presents here his new solution. He proposes that phenomenal consciousness, far from being primitive, is a relatively late and sophisticated evolutionary development. The implications for the existence of sentience in nonhuman animals are startling and provocative.
Flowers and Honeybees
Author: Christopher Ketcham
Publisher: BRILL
ISBN: 9004428542
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 243
Book Description
Can we discover morality in nature? Flowers and Honeybees extends the considerable scientific knowledge of flowers and honeybees through a philosophical discussion of the origins of morality in nature. Flowering plants and honeybees form a social group where each requires the other. They do not intentionally harm each other, both reason, and they do not compete for commonly required resources. They also could not be more different. Flowering plants are rooted in the ground and have no brains. Mobile honeybees can communicate the location of flower resources to other workers. We can learn from a million-year-old social relationship how morality can be constructed and maintained over time.
Publisher: BRILL
ISBN: 9004428542
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 243
Book Description
Can we discover morality in nature? Flowers and Honeybees extends the considerable scientific knowledge of flowers and honeybees through a philosophical discussion of the origins of morality in nature. Flowering plants and honeybees form a social group where each requires the other. They do not intentionally harm each other, both reason, and they do not compete for commonly required resources. They also could not be more different. Flowering plants are rooted in the ground and have no brains. Mobile honeybees can communicate the location of flower resources to other workers. We can learn from a million-year-old social relationship how morality can be constructed and maintained over time.
Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion
Author: Christoph Demmerling
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 0429850069
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 284
Book Description
In recent years, the idea of a concept has become increasingly central to different areas of philosophy. This collection of original essays presents philosophical perspectives on the link between concepts and language, concepts and experience, concepts and know-how, and concepts and emotion. The essays span a variety of interrelated philosophical domains ranging from epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and the philosophy of emotions. Among the central questions addressed by the contributors are: What are concepts? What is nonconceptual content? Does perceptual experience have conceptual content? Is conceptual thought language dependent? How do we form new concepts? Does practical knowledge have propositional content? Is practical understanding conceptual (without being propositional)? Do emotions have a representational content and if so, is the representational content conceptual? Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion advances current debates about concepts and will interest scholars across a broad range of philosophical disciplines.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 0429850069
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 284
Book Description
In recent years, the idea of a concept has become increasingly central to different areas of philosophy. This collection of original essays presents philosophical perspectives on the link between concepts and language, concepts and experience, concepts and know-how, and concepts and emotion. The essays span a variety of interrelated philosophical domains ranging from epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and the philosophy of emotions. Among the central questions addressed by the contributors are: What are concepts? What is nonconceptual content? Does perceptual experience have conceptual content? Is conceptual thought language dependent? How do we form new concepts? Does practical knowledge have propositional content? Is practical understanding conceptual (without being propositional)? Do emotions have a representational content and if so, is the representational content conceptual? Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion advances current debates about concepts and will interest scholars across a broad range of philosophical disciplines.
Neuroethics and Nonhuman Animals
Author: L. Syd M Johnson
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030310116
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 314
Book Description
This edited volume represents a unique addition to the available literature on animal ethics, animal studies, and neuroethics. Its goal is to expand discussions on animal ethics and neuroethics by weaving together different threads: philosophy of mind and animal minds, neuroscientific study of animal minds, and animal ethics. Neuroethical questions concerning animals’ moral status, animal minds and consciousness, animal pain, and the adequacy of animal models for neuropsychiatric disease have long been topics of debate in philosophy and ethics, and more recently also in neuroscientific research. The book presents a transdisciplinary blend of voices, underscoring different perspectives on the broad questions of how neuroscience can contribute to our understanding of nonhuman minds, and on debates over the moral status of nonhuman animals. All chapters were written by outstanding scholars in philosophy, neuroscience, animal behavior, biology, neuroethics, and bioethics, and cover a range of issues and species/taxa. Given its scope, the book will appeal to scientists and students interested in the debate on animal ethics, while also offering an important resource for future researchers. Chapter 13 is available open access under a CC BY 4.0 license at link.springer.com.
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030310116
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 314
Book Description
This edited volume represents a unique addition to the available literature on animal ethics, animal studies, and neuroethics. Its goal is to expand discussions on animal ethics and neuroethics by weaving together different threads: philosophy of mind and animal minds, neuroscientific study of animal minds, and animal ethics. Neuroethical questions concerning animals’ moral status, animal minds and consciousness, animal pain, and the adequacy of animal models for neuropsychiatric disease have long been topics of debate in philosophy and ethics, and more recently also in neuroscientific research. The book presents a transdisciplinary blend of voices, underscoring different perspectives on the broad questions of how neuroscience can contribute to our understanding of nonhuman minds, and on debates over the moral status of nonhuman animals. All chapters were written by outstanding scholars in philosophy, neuroscience, animal behavior, biology, neuroethics, and bioethics, and cover a range of issues and species/taxa. Given its scope, the book will appeal to scientists and students interested in the debate on animal ethics, while also offering an important resource for future researchers. Chapter 13 is available open access under a CC BY 4.0 license at link.springer.com.
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association
Author: American Philosophical Association
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 340
Book Description
List of members in v. 1-
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 340
Book Description
List of members in v. 1-
Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness
Author: Michael Tye
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192637061
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 144
Book Description
When Alice stepped through the looking-glass, she encountered a peculiar world where she meets animated chess pieces, characters from nursery rhymes, and talking animals. Everything there is inside out and upside down: so it is with consciousness. Reflecting on the inception of consciousness, it is natural to suppose that there are just two alternatives. Either consciousness appeared in living beings suddenly, like a light switch turning on, or it appeared gradually, like the biological development of life itself, through borderline cases which became the collective experience over time. For the former theory, consciousness is an on/off matter, but once it was there it became richer over time, like a beam of light becoming brighter and broader in its sweep. For the latter theory this is not the case, and there are shades of grey in how consciousness develops. Unfortunately, both alternatives face deep problems. The solution to these problems lies in the realization, strange as it may be, that a key element of consciousness itself was always here, as a fundamental feature of micro-reality. Varying conscious states were not, however: they appeared gradually. In Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness, Michael Tye addresses the questions that this raises. Where in the brain is consciousness located? How can consciousness be casually efficacious with respect to behaviour? What is the extent of consciousness in the animal world? How can all of this be so?
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192637061
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 144
Book Description
When Alice stepped through the looking-glass, she encountered a peculiar world where she meets animated chess pieces, characters from nursery rhymes, and talking animals. Everything there is inside out and upside down: so it is with consciousness. Reflecting on the inception of consciousness, it is natural to suppose that there are just two alternatives. Either consciousness appeared in living beings suddenly, like a light switch turning on, or it appeared gradually, like the biological development of life itself, through borderline cases which became the collective experience over time. For the former theory, consciousness is an on/off matter, but once it was there it became richer over time, like a beam of light becoming brighter and broader in its sweep. For the latter theory this is not the case, and there are shades of grey in how consciousness develops. Unfortunately, both alternatives face deep problems. The solution to these problems lies in the realization, strange as it may be, that a key element of consciousness itself was always here, as a fundamental feature of micro-reality. Varying conscious states were not, however: they appeared gradually. In Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness, Michael Tye addresses the questions that this raises. Where in the brain is consciousness located? How can consciousness be casually efficacious with respect to behaviour? What is the extent of consciousness in the animal world? How can all of this be so?
Self-Consciousness and "Split" Brains
Author: Elizabeth Schechter
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192537512
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 482
Book Description
Could a single human being ever have multiple conscious minds? Some human beings do. The corpus callosum is a large pathway connecting the two hemispheres of the brain. In the second half of the twentieth century a number of people had this pathway cut through as a treatment for epilepsy. They became colloquially known as split-brain subjects. After the two hemispheres of the brain are cortically separated in this way, they begin to operate unusually independently of each other in the realm of thought, action, and conscious experience, almost as if each hemisphere now had a mind of its own. Philosophical discussion of the split-brain cases has overwhelmingly focused on questions of psychological identity in split-brain subjects, questions like: how many subjects of experience is a split-brain subject? How many intentional agents? How many persons? On the one hand, under experimental conditions, split-brain subjects often act in ways difficult to understand except in terms of each of them having two distinct streams or centers of consciousness. Split-brain subjects thus evoke the duality intuition: that a single split-brain human being is somehow composed of two thinking, experiencing, and acting things. On the other hand, a split-brain subject nonetheless seems like one of us, at the end of the day, rather than like two people sharing one body. In other words, split-brain subjects also evoke the unity intuition: that a split-brain subject is one person. Elizabeth Schechter argues that there are in fact two minds, subjects of experience, and intentional agents inside each split-brain human being: right and left. On the other hand, each split-brain subject is nonetheless one of us. The key to reconciling these two claims is to understand the ways in which each of us is transformed by self-consciousness.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192537512
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 482
Book Description
Could a single human being ever have multiple conscious minds? Some human beings do. The corpus callosum is a large pathway connecting the two hemispheres of the brain. In the second half of the twentieth century a number of people had this pathway cut through as a treatment for epilepsy. They became colloquially known as split-brain subjects. After the two hemispheres of the brain are cortically separated in this way, they begin to operate unusually independently of each other in the realm of thought, action, and conscious experience, almost as if each hemisphere now had a mind of its own. Philosophical discussion of the split-brain cases has overwhelmingly focused on questions of psychological identity in split-brain subjects, questions like: how many subjects of experience is a split-brain subject? How many intentional agents? How many persons? On the one hand, under experimental conditions, split-brain subjects often act in ways difficult to understand except in terms of each of them having two distinct streams or centers of consciousness. Split-brain subjects thus evoke the duality intuition: that a single split-brain human being is somehow composed of two thinking, experiencing, and acting things. On the other hand, a split-brain subject nonetheless seems like one of us, at the end of the day, rather than like two people sharing one body. In other words, split-brain subjects also evoke the unity intuition: that a split-brain subject is one person. Elizabeth Schechter argues that there are in fact two minds, subjects of experience, and intentional agents inside each split-brain human being: right and left. On the other hand, each split-brain subject is nonetheless one of us. The key to reconciling these two claims is to understand the ways in which each of us is transformed by self-consciousness.