Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages : 210
Book Description
Submission of the Vietnam Conflict to the United Nations
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages : 210
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages : 210
Book Description
Submission of the Vietnam Conflict to the United Nations
Author: États-Unis. Senate. Committee on foreign relations
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 220
Book Description
Considers S. Con. Res. 44 and similar S. Res. 180, to urge the President to request an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, or failing that, of the General Assembly, to consider how to end the Vietnam Conflict.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 220
Book Description
Considers S. Con. Res. 44 and similar S. Res. 180, to urge the President to request an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, or failing that, of the General Assembly, to consider how to end the Vietnam Conflict.
Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968
Author: United States. Department of State
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 648
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 648
Book Description
United Nations Participants in the Korean War
Author: Paul M. Edwards
Publisher: McFarland
ISBN: 1476602662
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 226
Book Description
When in 1950 the United Nations called upon its members to provide aid to South Korea, more than forty nations responded. Some of these sent troops which fought under the United Nations Command, some sent commodities and medical supplies. Some nations offered moral and political support but for a variety of reasons were not able to send aid. This book looks at the nations involved, what was behind their willingness to provide troops or aid, or what prevented them from doing so. The military contribution of the nations involved is discussed. The combination of troops, and their individual needs, made the logistics of this enterprise difficult, but in the end troops from 17 nations fought together to defend the freedom of South Korea.
Publisher: McFarland
ISBN: 1476602662
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 226
Book Description
When in 1950 the United Nations called upon its members to provide aid to South Korea, more than forty nations responded. Some of these sent troops which fought under the United Nations Command, some sent commodities and medical supplies. Some nations offered moral and political support but for a variety of reasons were not able to send aid. This book looks at the nations involved, what was behind their willingness to provide troops or aid, or what prevented them from doing so. The military contribution of the nations involved is discussed. The combination of troops, and their individual needs, made the logistics of this enterprise difficult, but in the end troops from 17 nations fought together to defend the freedom of South Korea.
United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967
Author: United States Department of Defense
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 652
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 652
Book Description
United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 1030
Book Description
Printed for the use of the House Committee on Armed Services.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 1030
Book Description
Printed for the use of the House Committee on Armed Services.
Anatomy of Victory
Author: John D. Caldwell
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 153811478X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 569
Book Description
This groundbreaking book provides the first systematic comparison of America’s modern wars and why they were won or lost. John D. Caldwell uses the World War II victory as the historical benchmark for evaluating the success and failure of later conflicts. Unlike WWII, the Korean, Vietnam, and Iraqi Wars were limited, but they required enormous national commitments, produced no lasting victories, and generated bitter political controversies. Caldwell comprehensively examines these four wars through the lens of a strategic architecture to explain how and why their outcomes were so dramatically different. He defines a strategic architecture as an interlinked set of continually evolving policies, strategies, and operations by which combatant states work toward a desired end. Policy defines the high-level goals a nation seeks to achieve once it initiates a conflict or finds itself drawn into one. Policy makers direct a broad course of action and strive to control the initiative. When they make decisions, they have to respond to unforeseen conditions to guide and determine future decisions. Effective leaders are skilled at organizing constituencies they need to succeed and communicating to them convincingly. Strategy means employing whatever resources are available to achieve policy goals in situations that are dynamic as conflicts change quickly over time. Operations are the actions that occur when politicians, soldiers, and diplomats execute plans. A strategic architecture, Caldwell argues, is thus not a static blueprint but a dynamic vision of how a state can succeed or fail in a conflict.
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 153811478X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 569
Book Description
This groundbreaking book provides the first systematic comparison of America’s modern wars and why they were won or lost. John D. Caldwell uses the World War II victory as the historical benchmark for evaluating the success and failure of later conflicts. Unlike WWII, the Korean, Vietnam, and Iraqi Wars were limited, but they required enormous national commitments, produced no lasting victories, and generated bitter political controversies. Caldwell comprehensively examines these four wars through the lens of a strategic architecture to explain how and why their outcomes were so dramatically different. He defines a strategic architecture as an interlinked set of continually evolving policies, strategies, and operations by which combatant states work toward a desired end. Policy defines the high-level goals a nation seeks to achieve once it initiates a conflict or finds itself drawn into one. Policy makers direct a broad course of action and strive to control the initiative. When they make decisions, they have to respond to unforeseen conditions to guide and determine future decisions. Effective leaders are skilled at organizing constituencies they need to succeed and communicating to them convincingly. Strategy means employing whatever resources are available to achieve policy goals in situations that are dynamic as conflicts change quickly over time. Operations are the actions that occur when politicians, soldiers, and diplomats execute plans. A strategic architecture, Caldwell argues, is thus not a static blueprint but a dynamic vision of how a state can succeed or fail in a conflict.
Congressional Record
Author: United States. Congress
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 1484
Book Description
The Congressional Record is the official record of the proceedings and debates of the United States Congress. It is published daily when Congress is in session. The Congressional Record began publication in 1873. Debates for sessions prior to 1873 are recorded in The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (1789-1824), the Register of Debates in Congress (1824-1837), and the Congressional Globe (1833-1873)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 1484
Book Description
The Congressional Record is the official record of the proceedings and debates of the United States Congress. It is published daily when Congress is in session. The Congressional Record began publication in 1873. Debates for sessions prior to 1873 are recorded in The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (1789-1824), the Register of Debates in Congress (1824-1837), and the Congressional Globe (1833-1873)
Marigold
Author: James Hershberg
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 0804783888
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 936
Book Description
Marigold presents the first rigorously documented, in-depth story of one of the Vietnam War's last great mysteries: the secret peace initiative, codenamed "Marigold," that sought to end the war in 1966. The initiative failed, the war dragged on for another seven years, and this episode sank into history as an unresolved controversy. Antiwar critics claimed President Johnson had bungled (or, worse, deliberately sabotaged) a breakthrough by bombing Hanoi on the eve of a planned secret U.S.-North Vietnamese encounter in Poland. Yet, LBJ and top aides angrily insisted that Poland never had authority to arrange direct talks and Hanoi was not ready to negotiate. This book uses new evidence from long hidden communist sources to show that, in fact, Poland was authorized by Hanoi to open direct contacts and that Hanoi had committed to entering talks with Washington. It reveals LBJ's personal role in bombing Hanoi as he utterly disregarded the pleas of both the Polish and his own senior advisors. The historical implications of missing this opportunity are immense: Marigold might have ended the war years earlier, saving thousands of lives, and dramatically changed U.S. political history.
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 0804783888
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 936
Book Description
Marigold presents the first rigorously documented, in-depth story of one of the Vietnam War's last great mysteries: the secret peace initiative, codenamed "Marigold," that sought to end the war in 1966. The initiative failed, the war dragged on for another seven years, and this episode sank into history as an unresolved controversy. Antiwar critics claimed President Johnson had bungled (or, worse, deliberately sabotaged) a breakthrough by bombing Hanoi on the eve of a planned secret U.S.-North Vietnamese encounter in Poland. Yet, LBJ and top aides angrily insisted that Poland never had authority to arrange direct talks and Hanoi was not ready to negotiate. This book uses new evidence from long hidden communist sources to show that, in fact, Poland was authorized by Hanoi to open direct contacts and that Hanoi had committed to entering talks with Washington. It reveals LBJ's personal role in bombing Hanoi as he utterly disregarded the pleas of both the Polish and his own senior advisors. The historical implications of missing this opportunity are immense: Marigold might have ended the war years earlier, saving thousands of lives, and dramatically changed U.S. political history.
Confronting Vietnam
Author: Ilya V. Gaiduk
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 9780804747127
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 328
Book Description
Based on extensive research in the Russian archives, this book examines the Soviet approach to the Vietnam conflict between the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina and late 1963, when the overthrow of the South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem and the assassination of John F. Kennedy radically transformed the conflict. The author finds that the USSR attributed no geostrategic importance to Indochina and did not want the crisis there to disrupt détente. The Russians had high hopes that the Geneva accords would bring years of peace in the region. Gradually disillusioned, they tried to strengthen North Vietnam, but would not support unification of North and South. By the early 1960s, however, they felt obliged to counter the American embrace of an aggressively anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam and the hostility of its former ally, the People's Republic of China. Finally, Moscow decided to disengage from Vietnam, disappointed that its efforts to avert an international crisis there had failed.
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 9780804747127
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 328
Book Description
Based on extensive research in the Russian archives, this book examines the Soviet approach to the Vietnam conflict between the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina and late 1963, when the overthrow of the South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem and the assassination of John F. Kennedy radically transformed the conflict. The author finds that the USSR attributed no geostrategic importance to Indochina and did not want the crisis there to disrupt détente. The Russians had high hopes that the Geneva accords would bring years of peace in the region. Gradually disillusioned, they tried to strengthen North Vietnam, but would not support unification of North and South. By the early 1960s, however, they felt obliged to counter the American embrace of an aggressively anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam and the hostility of its former ally, the People's Republic of China. Finally, Moscow decided to disengage from Vietnam, disappointed that its efforts to avert an international crisis there had failed.