Sub-National Credit Risk and Sovereign Bailouts

Sub-National Credit Risk and Sovereign Bailouts PDF Author: Ms.Eva Jenkner
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484398874
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 29

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Book Description
Studies have shown that markets may underprice sub-national governments’ risk on the implicit assumption that these entities would be bailed out by their central government in case of financial difficulties. However, the question of whether sovereigns pay a premium on their own borrowing as a result of (implicitly or explicitly) guaranteeing sub-entities’ debt has been explored only little. We use an event study approach with separate equations for two levels of government to test for a simultaneous increase in sovereign risk premia and decrease in sub-national risk premia—or a de facto transfer of risk from the latter to the former—on the day a sovereign bailout is announced. Using daily financial market data for Spain and its autonomous regions from January 2010 to June 2013, we find support for our risk transfer hypothesis. We estimate that the Spanish sovereign’s spread may have increased by around 70 basis points as a result of the central government’s support for fiscally distressed comunidades autónomas.

Sub-National Credit Risk and Sovereign Bailouts

Sub-National Credit Risk and Sovereign Bailouts PDF Author: Ms.Eva Jenkner
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484398874
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 29

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Book Description
Studies have shown that markets may underprice sub-national governments’ risk on the implicit assumption that these entities would be bailed out by their central government in case of financial difficulties. However, the question of whether sovereigns pay a premium on their own borrowing as a result of (implicitly or explicitly) guaranteeing sub-entities’ debt has been explored only little. We use an event study approach with separate equations for two levels of government to test for a simultaneous increase in sovereign risk premia and decrease in sub-national risk premia—or a de facto transfer of risk from the latter to the former—on the day a sovereign bailout is announced. Using daily financial market data for Spain and its autonomous regions from January 2010 to June 2013, we find support for our risk transfer hypothesis. We estimate that the Spanish sovereign’s spread may have increased by around 70 basis points as a result of the central government’s support for fiscally distressed comunidades autónomas.

Booms, Busts, and Bailouts

Booms, Busts, and Bailouts PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
This dissertation examines the constraints credit markets impose on subnational fiscal policies, focusing on the role and limits of fiscal federal structures in mediating this relationship. The conventional wisdom claims credit markets do not constrain the policies of governments that rely heavily on central transfers. Co-financing is believed to limit market discipline by signalling a national incentive in bailing out fiscally distressed units. I argue that the effects of transfer dependence are overstated and that if anything, dependence hardens market constraints. Dependence not only fails to send compelling bailout signals, but it also harms subnational creditworthiness by restricting governments' autonomy to raise additional revenues during periods of fiscal distress. I find clear links between market participants' bailout expectations and other aspects of the fiscal federal environment, including subnational responsibility for politically sensitive social services, formal national commitments to redistributing risk and wealth across territorial units, and heavy concentrations of national population, output, and debt in a limited number of territorial jurisdictions. However, I caution against overstating the importance of transfer dependence and other fiscal federal factors. Most variation in market constraints is driven by national-level factors in general and investors' relative expectations of sovereign default in particular. Extreme movements in sovereign risk can induce booms and busts in subnational lending, outcomes that intergovernmental institutions only weakly mediate. I substantiate these claims using a range of quantitative and qualitative data and methods, including cross-national statistical analyses of credit ratings and bailout probabilities assigned by major credit rating agencies; case studies of subnational credit conditions in Canada and Germany; and interviews with regional treasurers, underwriters, and investors in regional bonds in these same countries. The findings have implications for the relationship between financial markets and government policy autonomy and the macroeconomic stability of multi-tiered systems of government.

Sub-National Credit Risk and Sovereign Bailouts

Sub-National Credit Risk and Sovereign Bailouts PDF Author: Ms.Eva Jenkner
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484399137
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 29

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Book Description
Studies have shown that markets may underprice sub-national governments’ risk on the implicit assumption that these entities would be bailed out by their central government in case of financial difficulties. However, the question of whether sovereigns pay a premium on their own borrowing as a result of (implicitly or explicitly) guaranteeing sub-entities’ debt has been explored only little. We use an event study approach with separate equations for two levels of government to test for a simultaneous increase in sovereign risk premia and decrease in sub-national risk premia—or a de facto transfer of risk from the latter to the former—on the day a sovereign bailout is announced. Using daily financial market data for Spain and its autonomous regions from January 2010 to June 2013, we find support for our risk transfer hypothesis. We estimate that the Spanish sovereign’s spread may have increased by around 70 basis points as a result of the central government’s support for fiscally distressed comunidades autónomas.

Managing the Sovereign-Bank Nexus

Managing the Sovereign-Bank Nexus PDF Author: Mr.Giovanni Dell'Ariccia
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484359623
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 54

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Book Description
This paper reviews empirical and theoretical work on the links between banks and their governments (the bank-sovereign nexus). How significant is this nexus? What do we know about it? To what extent is it a source of concern? What is the role of policy intervention? The paper concludes with a review of recent policy proposals.

Monetary Policy, Bank Bailouts and the Sovereign-bank Risk Nexus in the Euro Area

Monetary Policy, Bank Bailouts and the Sovereign-bank Risk Nexus in the Euro Area PDF Author: Marcel Fratzscher
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789279486739
Category : Bailouts (Government policy)
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
The paper analyses the empirical relationship between bank risk and sovereign credit risk in the euro area. Using structural VAR with daily financial markets data for 2003-13, the analysis confirms two-way causality between shocks to sovereign risk and bank risk, with the former being overall more important in explaining bank risk, than vice versa. The paper focuses specifically on the impact of non-standard monetary policy measures by the European Central Bank and on the effects of bank bailout policies by national governments. Testing specific hypotheses formulated in the literature, we find that bank bailout policies have reduced credit risk in the banking sector, but partly at the expense of raising the credit risk of sovereigns. By contrast, monetary policy was in most, but not all cases effective in lowering credit risk among both sovereigns and banks. Finally, we find spillover effects in particular from sovereigns in the euro area periphery to the core countries.

A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk

A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk PDF Author: Viral V. Acharya
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 59

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Book Description
We show that nancial sector bailouts and sovereign credit risk are intimately linked. A bailout benets the economy by ameliorating the under-investment problem of the nancial sector. However, increasing taxation of the non-nancial sector to fund the bailout may be inecient since it weakens its incentive to invest, decreasing growth. Instead, the sovereign may choose to fund the bailout by diluting existing government bondholders, resulting in a deterioration of the sovereign's creditworthiness. This deterioration feeds back to the nancial sector, reducing the value of its guarantees and existing bond holdings as well as increasing its sensitivity to future sovereign shocks. We provide empirical evidence for this two-way feedback between nancial and sovereign credit risk using data on the credit default swaps (CDS) of the Eurozone countries and their banks for 2007-11. We show that the announcement of nancial sector bailouts was associated with an immediate, unprecedented widening of sovereign CDS spreads and narrowing of bank CDS spreads; however, post-bailouts there emerged a signi- cant co-movement between bank CDS and sovereign CDS, even after controlling for banks' equity performance, the latter being consistent with an eect of the quality of sovereign guarantees on bank credit risk.

Until Debt Do Us Part

Until Debt Do Us Part PDF Author: Otaviano Canuto
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 0821397664
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 655

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Book Description
With decentralization and urbanization, the debts of state and local governments and of quasi-public agencies have grown in importance. Rapid urbanization in developing countries requires large-scale infrastructure financing to help absorb influxes of rural populations. Borrowing enables state and local governments to capture the benefits of major capital investments immediately and to finance infrastructure more equitably across multiple generations of service users. With debt comes the risk of insolvency. Subnational debt crises have reoccurred in both developed and developing countries. Restructuring debt and ensuring its sustainability confront moral hazard and fiscal incentives in a multilevel government system; individual subnational governments might free-ride common resources, and public officials at all levels might shift the cost of excessive borrowing to future generations. This book brings together the reform experiences of emerging economies and developed countries. Written by leading practitioners and experts in public finance in the context of multilevel government systems, the book examines the interaction of markets, regulators, subnational borrowers, creditors, national governments, taxpayers, ex-ante rules, and ex-post insolvency systems in the quest for subnational fiscal discipline. Such a quest is intertwined with a country’s historical, political, and economic context. The formal legal framework interacts with political reality to influence the dynamics of and incentives for reform. Often, the resolution of a subnational debt crisis unfolds in the context of macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms. The book includes reforms that have not been covered by previous literature, such as those of China, Colombia, France, Hungary, Mexico, and South Africa. The book also presents a comprehensive review of how the United States developed its debt market for state and local governments, through a series of reforms that are path dependent, including the reforms and lessons learned following state defaults in the 1840s and the debates that shaped the enactment of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1937. Looking forward, pressures on subnational finance are likely to continue—from the fragility of global recovery, the potentially higher cost of capital, refinancing risks, and sovereign risks. This book is essential reading for anyone wanting to know the challenges and reform options in debt restructuring, insolvency frameworks, and public debt market development.

The Dynamics of Sovereign Debt Crises and Bailouts

The Dynamics of Sovereign Debt Crises and Bailouts PDF Author: Mr.Francisco Roch
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1475581025
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 46

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Book Description
Motivated by the recent European debt crisis, this paper investigates the scope for a bailout guarantee in a sovereign debt crisis. Defaults may arise from negative income shocks, government impatience or a "sunspot"-coordinated buyers strike. We introduce a bailout agency, and characterize the minimal actuarially fair intervention that guarantees the no-buyers-strike fundamental equilibrium, relying on the market for residual financing. The intervention makes it cheaper for governments to borrow, inducing them borrow more, leaving default probabilities possibly rather unchanged. The maximal backstop will be pulled precisely when fundamentals worsen.

A?Pyrrhic Victory? - Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk

A?Pyrrhic Victory? - Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk PDF Author: Viral V. Acharya
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
Abstract: We show that financial sector bailouts and sovereign credit risk are intimately linked. A bailout benefits the economy by ameliorating the under-investment problem of the financial sector. However, increasing taxation of the non-financial sector to fund the bailout may be inefficient since it weakens its incentive to invest, decreasing growth. Instead, the sovereign may choose to fund the bailout by diluting existing government bondholders, resulting in a deterioration of the sovereign's creditworthiness. This deterioration feeds back onto the financial sector, reducing the value of its guarantees and existing bond holdings and increasing its sensitivity to future sovereign shocks. We provide empirical evidence for this two-way feedback between financial and sovereign credit risk using data on the credit default swaps (CDS) of the Eurozone countries for 2007-10. We show that the announcement of financial sector bailouts was associated with an immediate, unprecedented widening of sovereign CDS spreads and narrowing of bank CDS spreads; however, post-bailouts there emerged a significant co-movement between bank CDS and sovereign CDS, even after controlling for banks' equity performance, the latter being consistent with an effect of the quality of sovereign guarantees on bank credit risk.

Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010

Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010 PDF Author: Mr.Udaibir S. Das
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1475505531
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 128

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Book Description
This paper provides a comprehensive survey of pertinent issues on sovereign debt restructurings, based on a newly constructed database. This is the first complete dataset of sovereign restructuring cases, covering the six decades from 1950–2010; it includes 186 debt exchanges with foreign banks and bondholders, and 447 bilateral debt agreements with the Paris Club. We present new stylized facts on the outcome and process of debt restructurings, including on the size of haircuts, creditor participation, and legal aspects. In addition, the paper summarizes the relevant empirical literature, analyzes recent restructuring episodes, and discusses ongoing debates on crisis resolution mechanisms, credit default swaps, and the role of collective action clauses.