Author: John A. Gentry
Publisher: Georgetown University Press
ISBN: 1626166552
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 289
Book Description
John A. Gentry and Joseph S. Gordon update our understanding of strategic warning intelligence analysis for the twenty-first century. Strategic warning—the process of long-range analysis to alert senior leaders to trending threats and opportunities that require action—is a critical intelligence function. It also is frequently misunderstood and underappreciated. Gentry and Gordon draw on both their practitioner and academic backgrounds to present a history of the strategic warning function in the US intelligence community. In doing so, they outline the capabilities of analytic methods, explain why strategic warning analysis is so hard, and discuss the special challenges strategic warning encounters from senior decision-makers. They also compare how strategic warning functions in other countries, evaluate why the United States has in recent years emphasized current intelligence instead of strategic warning, and recommend warning-related structural and procedural improvements in the US intelligence community. The authors examine historical case studies, including postmortems of warning failures, to provide examples of the analytic points they make. Strategic Warning Intelligence will interest scholars and practitioners and will be an ideal teaching text for intermediate and advanced students.
Strategic Warning Intelligence
Author: John A. Gentry
Publisher: Georgetown University Press
ISBN: 1626166552
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 289
Book Description
John A. Gentry and Joseph S. Gordon update our understanding of strategic warning intelligence analysis for the twenty-first century. Strategic warning—the process of long-range analysis to alert senior leaders to trending threats and opportunities that require action—is a critical intelligence function. It also is frequently misunderstood and underappreciated. Gentry and Gordon draw on both their practitioner and academic backgrounds to present a history of the strategic warning function in the US intelligence community. In doing so, they outline the capabilities of analytic methods, explain why strategic warning analysis is so hard, and discuss the special challenges strategic warning encounters from senior decision-makers. They also compare how strategic warning functions in other countries, evaluate why the United States has in recent years emphasized current intelligence instead of strategic warning, and recommend warning-related structural and procedural improvements in the US intelligence community. The authors examine historical case studies, including postmortems of warning failures, to provide examples of the analytic points they make. Strategic Warning Intelligence will interest scholars and practitioners and will be an ideal teaching text for intermediate and advanced students.
Publisher: Georgetown University Press
ISBN: 1626166552
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 289
Book Description
John A. Gentry and Joseph S. Gordon update our understanding of strategic warning intelligence analysis for the twenty-first century. Strategic warning—the process of long-range analysis to alert senior leaders to trending threats and opportunities that require action—is a critical intelligence function. It also is frequently misunderstood and underappreciated. Gentry and Gordon draw on both their practitioner and academic backgrounds to present a history of the strategic warning function in the US intelligence community. In doing so, they outline the capabilities of analytic methods, explain why strategic warning analysis is so hard, and discuss the special challenges strategic warning encounters from senior decision-makers. They also compare how strategic warning functions in other countries, evaluate why the United States has in recent years emphasized current intelligence instead of strategic warning, and recommend warning-related structural and procedural improvements in the US intelligence community. The authors examine historical case studies, including postmortems of warning failures, to provide examples of the analytic points they make. Strategic Warning Intelligence will interest scholars and practitioners and will be an ideal teaching text for intermediate and advanced students.
Anticipating Surprise
Author: Cynthia M. Grabo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Deception
Languages : en
Pages : 192
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Deception
Languages : en
Pages : 192
Book Description
Handbook of Warning Intelligence
Author: Cynthia M. Grabo
Publisher: Security and Professional Intelligence Education Series
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 338
Book Description
Handbook of Warning Intelligence: Assessing the Threat to National Security was written during the Cold War and classified for 40 years, this manual is now available to scholars and practitioners interested in both history and intelligence. Cynthia Grabo, author of the abridged version, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, goes into detail on the fundamentals of intelligence analysis and forecasting. The book discusses the problems of military analysis, problems of understanding specific problems of political, civil and economic analysis and assessing what it means for analysts to have "warning judgment."
Publisher: Security and Professional Intelligence Education Series
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 338
Book Description
Handbook of Warning Intelligence: Assessing the Threat to National Security was written during the Cold War and classified for 40 years, this manual is now available to scholars and practitioners interested in both history and intelligence. Cynthia Grabo, author of the abridged version, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, goes into detail on the fundamentals of intelligence analysis and forecasting. The book discusses the problems of military analysis, problems of understanding specific problems of political, civil and economic analysis and assessing what it means for analysts to have "warning judgment."
Handbook of Warning Intelligence
Author: Cynthia Grabo
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 1442248149
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 455
Book Description
This new and final edition is a follow-up to the author’s first book, Anticipating Surprise (University Press of America, 2002) and the Handbook of Warning Intelligence (Scarecrow Press, 2010). The first book was an abridged version of Grabo’s 1972 manuscript, of which only 200 pages were allowed to be published by the government. The second book was published after it was agreed that the last 10 chapters would remain classified. These final 10 chapters have recently been released by the government and complete the manuscript as it was originally intended to be published by the author in 1972. The Handbook of Warning Intelligence was written during the cold war and was classified for 40 years. Originally written as a manual for training intelligence analysts, it explains the fundamentals of intelligence analysis and forecasting, discusses military analysis, as well as the difficulties in understanding political, civil, and economic analysis and assessing what it means for analysts to have "warning judgment." Much of what Grabo wrote in her book seems to appear in many of the numerous commission reports that emerged after the 9/11 attacks. However, her book was written in response to the "surprise attack" of the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. According to the author, that event was no surprise. And while analysts have to take some of the blame for their failure to strenuously present their case that the threat was real and imminent, what occurred was a failure by policymakers to listen to the warning intelligence reports that were written at the time. In these last chapters, Grabo discusses scenarios where the United States will need to take action, especially describing Soviet indicators of such action. She also talks on how to influence policymakers to take, or not take, action based on intelligence. After the Soviet Union fell, the government was hesitant to release this information—especially considering what's going on with Putin today.
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 1442248149
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 455
Book Description
This new and final edition is a follow-up to the author’s first book, Anticipating Surprise (University Press of America, 2002) and the Handbook of Warning Intelligence (Scarecrow Press, 2010). The first book was an abridged version of Grabo’s 1972 manuscript, of which only 200 pages were allowed to be published by the government. The second book was published after it was agreed that the last 10 chapters would remain classified. These final 10 chapters have recently been released by the government and complete the manuscript as it was originally intended to be published by the author in 1972. The Handbook of Warning Intelligence was written during the cold war and was classified for 40 years. Originally written as a manual for training intelligence analysts, it explains the fundamentals of intelligence analysis and forecasting, discusses military analysis, as well as the difficulties in understanding political, civil, and economic analysis and assessing what it means for analysts to have "warning judgment." Much of what Grabo wrote in her book seems to appear in many of the numerous commission reports that emerged after the 9/11 attacks. However, her book was written in response to the "surprise attack" of the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. According to the author, that event was no surprise. And while analysts have to take some of the blame for their failure to strenuously present their case that the threat was real and imminent, what occurred was a failure by policymakers to listen to the warning intelligence reports that were written at the time. In these last chapters, Grabo discusses scenarios where the United States will need to take action, especially describing Soviet indicators of such action. She also talks on how to influence policymakers to take, or not take, action based on intelligence. After the Soviet Union fell, the government was hesitant to release this information—especially considering what's going on with Putin today.
Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence
Author: Richard K. Betts
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1135759650
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 236
Book Description
Part of a three part collection in honour of the teachings of Michael I. Handel, one of the foremost strategists of the late 20th century, this collection explores the paradoxes of intelligence analysis, surprise and deception from both historical and theoretical perspectives.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1135759650
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 236
Book Description
Part of a three part collection in honour of the teachings of Michael I. Handel, one of the foremost strategists of the late 20th century, this collection explores the paradoxes of intelligence analysis, surprise and deception from both historical and theoretical perspectives.
Understanding Intelligence Failure
Author: James J. Wirtz
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317375726
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 271
Book Description
This collection, comprising key works by James J. Wirtz, explains how different threat perceptions can lead to strategic surprise attack, intelligence failure and the failure of deterrence. This volume adopts a strategist’s view of the issue of surprise and intelligence failure by placing these phenomena in the context of conflict between strong and weak actors in world affairs. A two-level theory explains the incentives and perceptions of both parties when significant imbalances of military power exist between potential combatants, and how this situation sets the stage for strategic surprise and intelligence failure to occur. The volume illustrates this theory by applying it to the Kargil Crisis, attacks launched by non-state actors, and by offering a comparison of Pearl Harbor and the September 11, 2001 attacks. It explores the phenomenon of deterrence failure; specifically, how weaker parties in an enduring or nascent conflict come to believe that deterrent threats posed by militarily stronger antagonists will be undermined by various constraints, increasing the attractiveness of utilising surprise attack to achieve their objectives. This work also offers strategies that could mitigate the occurrence of intelligence failure, strategic surprise and the failure of deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317375726
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 271
Book Description
This collection, comprising key works by James J. Wirtz, explains how different threat perceptions can lead to strategic surprise attack, intelligence failure and the failure of deterrence. This volume adopts a strategist’s view of the issue of surprise and intelligence failure by placing these phenomena in the context of conflict between strong and weak actors in world affairs. A two-level theory explains the incentives and perceptions of both parties when significant imbalances of military power exist between potential combatants, and how this situation sets the stage for strategic surprise and intelligence failure to occur. The volume illustrates this theory by applying it to the Kargil Crisis, attacks launched by non-state actors, and by offering a comparison of Pearl Harbor and the September 11, 2001 attacks. It explores the phenomenon of deterrence failure; specifically, how weaker parties in an enduring or nascent conflict come to believe that deterrent threats posed by militarily stronger antagonists will be undermined by various constraints, increasing the attractiveness of utilising surprise attack to achieve their objectives. This work also offers strategies that could mitigate the occurrence of intelligence failure, strategic surprise and the failure of deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.
Intelligence and Surprise Attack
Author: Erik J. Dahl
Publisher: Georgetown University Press
ISBN: 1589019989
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 289
Book Description
How can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure, which holds that attacks succeed because important warnings get lost amid noise or because intelligence officials lack the imagination and collaboration to “connect the dots” of available information. Comparing cases of intelligence failure with intelligence success, Dahl finds that the key to success is not more imagination or better analysis, but better acquisition of precise, tactical-level intelligence combined with the presence of decision makers who are willing to listen to and act on the warnings they receive from their intelligence staff. The book offers a new understanding of classic cases of conventional and terrorist attacks such as Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The book also presents a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence picture before the 9/11 attacks, making use of new information available since the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report and challenging some of that report’s findings.
Publisher: Georgetown University Press
ISBN: 1589019989
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 289
Book Description
How can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure, which holds that attacks succeed because important warnings get lost amid noise or because intelligence officials lack the imagination and collaboration to “connect the dots” of available information. Comparing cases of intelligence failure with intelligence success, Dahl finds that the key to success is not more imagination or better analysis, but better acquisition of precise, tactical-level intelligence combined with the presence of decision makers who are willing to listen to and act on the warnings they receive from their intelligence staff. The book offers a new understanding of classic cases of conventional and terrorist attacks such as Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The book also presents a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence picture before the 9/11 attacks, making use of new information available since the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report and challenging some of that report’s findings.
Weak Signals for Strategic Intelligence
Author: Humbert Lesca
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1118602811
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 147
Book Description
The expression: "We did not see it coming!" has often been heard in recent years from decision makers at the highest levels of responsibility in the private and public sectors. Yet there were actually early (warning) signals, but they were often ignored or not used due to a lack of appropriate methodology. To avoid such blind spots, this book provides answers to the question "how to anticipate". The concept of a "weak signal" is at the heart of the proposed methods. After presenting examples of this concept, the authors provide original and validated answers to questions of feasibility: How to recognize a weak signal? How to exploit it? Numerous applications are presented.
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1118602811
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 147
Book Description
The expression: "We did not see it coming!" has often been heard in recent years from decision makers at the highest levels of responsibility in the private and public sectors. Yet there were actually early (warning) signals, but they were often ignored or not used due to a lack of appropriate methodology. To avoid such blind spots, this book provides answers to the question "how to anticipate". The concept of a "weak signal" is at the heart of the proposed methods. After presenting examples of this concept, the authors provide original and validated answers to questions of feasibility: How to recognize a weak signal? How to exploit it? Numerous applications are presented.
Early Warning
Author: Benjamin Gilad
Publisher: AMACOM Div American Mgmt Assn
ISBN: 0814432069
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 289
Book Description
Surprise is rarely a good thing in business. Unexpected developments range in their effects from inconvenient to disastrous. With strong opinions and wry humor, world-recognized expert Gilad reveals how to anticipate and react to early signs of trouble.
Publisher: AMACOM Div American Mgmt Assn
ISBN: 0814432069
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 289
Book Description
Surprise is rarely a good thing in business. Unexpected developments range in their effects from inconvenient to disastrous. With strong opinions and wry humor, world-recognized expert Gilad reveals how to anticipate and react to early signs of trouble.
Strategic Intelligence
Author: Don McDowell
Publisher: Scarecrow Press
ISBN: 0810862859
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 287
Book Description
The revised edition of Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practitioners, Managers, and Users is a primer for analysts involved in conducting strategic intelligence research. Author Don McDowell begins with an overview of what strategic intelligence and analysis is, the functions it performs, and outcomes it delivers. McDowell then outlines a proven methodological approach to planning and implementing a strategic research project useful in any setting whatsoever. Strategic Intelligence explains in detail the steps involved in doing strategic analysis and includes examples, guidelines, and standards to further illustrate the process. Each step in the process corresponds with a chapter in the book, describing the doctrine and/or theory appropriate, as well as applications of the theory and practical hints on its implementation. Additionally, holistic and creative thinking about the problem issues being tackled is stressed in order to avoid narrow, biased analysis.
Publisher: Scarecrow Press
ISBN: 0810862859
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 287
Book Description
The revised edition of Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practitioners, Managers, and Users is a primer for analysts involved in conducting strategic intelligence research. Author Don McDowell begins with an overview of what strategic intelligence and analysis is, the functions it performs, and outcomes it delivers. McDowell then outlines a proven methodological approach to planning and implementing a strategic research project useful in any setting whatsoever. Strategic Intelligence explains in detail the steps involved in doing strategic analysis and includes examples, guidelines, and standards to further illustrate the process. Each step in the process corresponds with a chapter in the book, describing the doctrine and/or theory appropriate, as well as applications of the theory and practical hints on its implementation. Additionally, holistic and creative thinking about the problem issues being tackled is stressed in order to avoid narrow, biased analysis.