Author: John C. Driscoll
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Sticky Prices, Coordination and Enforcement
Author: John C. Driscoll
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Sticky Prices, Coordination and Enforcement
Author: John Christopher Driscoll
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cartels
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cartels
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Book Description
Sticky Prices, Coordination, and Collusion
Author: John C. Driscoll
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cartels
Languages : en
Pages : 14
Book Description
New Keynesian models of price setting under monopolistic competition involve two kinds of inefficiency: the price level is too high because firms ignore an aggregate demand externality, and when there are costs of changing prices, price stickiness may be an equilibrium response to changes in nominal money even when all agents would be better off if all adjusted prices. This paper models the consequences of allowing firms to coordinate, enforcing the coordination by punishing deviators; this is equivalent to modeling firms as an implicit cartel playing a punishment game. We show that coordination can partially or fully eliminate the first kind of inefficiency, depending on the magnitude of the punishment, but cannot always remove the second. The response of prices to a monetary shock will depend on the magnitude of the punishment, and may be asymmetric. Implications for the welfare cost of fluctuations also differ from the standard monopolistic competition case
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cartels
Languages : en
Pages : 14
Book Description
New Keynesian models of price setting under monopolistic competition involve two kinds of inefficiency: the price level is too high because firms ignore an aggregate demand externality, and when there are costs of changing prices, price stickiness may be an equilibrium response to changes in nominal money even when all agents would be better off if all adjusted prices. This paper models the consequences of allowing firms to coordinate, enforcing the coordination by punishing deviators; this is equivalent to modeling firms as an implicit cartel playing a punishment game. We show that coordination can partially or fully eliminate the first kind of inefficiency, depending on the magnitude of the punishment, but cannot always remove the second. The response of prices to a monetary shock will depend on the magnitude of the punishment, and may be asymmetric. Implications for the welfare cost of fluctuations also differ from the standard monopolistic competition case
Sticky prices as coordination failure
Author: Carlos Balseyro Rodriguez
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : es
Pages : 26
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : es
Pages : 26
Book Description
Sticky prices as coordination failure
Author: Laurence Ball
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Prices
Languages : de
Pages :
Book Description
This paper shows that nominal price rigidity can arise from a failure to coordinate price changes. If a firm's desired price is increasing in others' prices, then the gains to the firm from adjusting its price after a nominal shock are greater if others adjust. This "strategic complementarity" in price adjustment can lead to multiple equilibria in the degree of nominal rigidity. Welfare may be much higher in the equilibria with less rigidity. In addition, with multiple equilibrium degrees of rigidity, the economy may have several short-run equilibria but a unique long-run equilibrium.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Prices
Languages : de
Pages :
Book Description
This paper shows that nominal price rigidity can arise from a failure to coordinate price changes. If a firm's desired price is increasing in others' prices, then the gains to the firm from adjusting its price after a nominal shock are greater if others adjust. This "strategic complementarity" in price adjustment can lead to multiple equilibria in the degree of nominal rigidity. Welfare may be much higher in the equilibria with less rigidity. In addition, with multiple equilibrium degrees of rigidity, the economy may have several short-run equilibria but a unique long-run equilibrium.
Sticky prices, coordination, and colluson
Author: John C. Driscoll
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : es
Pages : 14
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : es
Pages : 14
Book Description
The Role of Policymakers in Business Cycle Fluctuations
Author: Jim Granato
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139450956
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 27
Book Description
This book's central theme is that a policymaker's role is to enhance the public's ability to coordinate their price information, price expectations, and economic activities. This role is fulfilled when policymakers maintain inflation stability. Inflation persists less when an implicit or explicit inflation target is met. Granato and Wong argue that inflation persistence is reduced when the public substitutes the prespecified inflation target for past inflation. A by-product of this co-ordination process is greater economic stability. In particular, inflation stability contributes to greater economic output stability, including the potential for the simultaneous reduction of both inflation and output variability - inflation-output co-stabilization (IOCS). Granato and Wong use historical, formal, and applied statistical analysis of business-cycle performance in the United States for the 1960 to 2000 period. They find that during periods when policymakers emphasize inflation stability, inflation uncertainty and persistence were reduced.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139450956
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 27
Book Description
This book's central theme is that a policymaker's role is to enhance the public's ability to coordinate their price information, price expectations, and economic activities. This role is fulfilled when policymakers maintain inflation stability. Inflation persists less when an implicit or explicit inflation target is met. Granato and Wong argue that inflation persistence is reduced when the public substitutes the prespecified inflation target for past inflation. A by-product of this co-ordination process is greater economic stability. In particular, inflation stability contributes to greater economic output stability, including the potential for the simultaneous reduction of both inflation and output variability - inflation-output co-stabilization (IOCS). Granato and Wong use historical, formal, and applied statistical analysis of business-cycle performance in the United States for the 1960 to 2000 period. They find that during periods when policymakers emphasize inflation stability, inflation uncertainty and persistence were reduced.
Can Rational Expectations Sticky-price Models Explain Inflation Dynamics?
Author: Jeremy Bay Rudd
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Inflation (Finance)
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Inflation (Finance)
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Book Description
Coordination, Fair Treatment and Inflation Persistence
Author: John Christopher Driscoll
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Inflation (Finance)
Languages : en
Pages : 54
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Inflation (Finance)
Languages : en
Pages : 54
Book Description
Inflation Targets, Credibility, and Persistence in a Simple Sticky-price Framework
Author: Jeremy Bay Rudd
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Inflation (Finance)
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Inflation (Finance)
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Book Description