Author: M. J. M. Jansen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 25
Book Description
Stability of equilibrium points of bimatrix games
Author: M. J. M. Jansen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 25
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 25
Book Description
Strongly stable equilibrium points of bimatrix games
Author: M. J. M. Jansen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 11
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 11
Book Description
Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria
Author: Eric van Damme
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 364296978X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 331
Book Description
The last decade has seen a steady increase in the application of concepts from noncooperative game theory to such diverse fields as economics, political science, law, operations research, biology and social psychology. As a byproduct of this increased activity, there has been a growing awareness of the fact that the basic noncooperative solution concept, that of Nash equilibrium, suffers from severe drawbacks. The two main shortcomings of this concept are the following: (i) In extensive form games, a Nash strategy may prescribe off the equilibrium path behavior that is manifestly irrational. (Specifically, Nash equilibria may involve incredible threats), (ii) Nash equilibria need not be robust with respect to small perturbations in the data of the game. Confronted with the growing evidence to the detriment of the Nash concept, game theorists were prompted to search for more refined equilibrium notions with better properties and they have come up with a wide array of alternative solution concepts. This book surveys the most important refinements that have been introduced. Its objectives are fourfold (i) to illustrate desirable properties as well as drawbacks of the various equilibrium notions by means of simple specific examples, (ii) to study the relationships between the various refinements, (iii) to derive simplifying characterizations, and (iv) to discuss the plausibility of the assumptions underlying the concepts.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 364296978X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 331
Book Description
The last decade has seen a steady increase in the application of concepts from noncooperative game theory to such diverse fields as economics, political science, law, operations research, biology and social psychology. As a byproduct of this increased activity, there has been a growing awareness of the fact that the basic noncooperative solution concept, that of Nash equilibrium, suffers from severe drawbacks. The two main shortcomings of this concept are the following: (i) In extensive form games, a Nash strategy may prescribe off the equilibrium path behavior that is manifestly irrational. (Specifically, Nash equilibria may involve incredible threats), (ii) Nash equilibria need not be robust with respect to small perturbations in the data of the game. Confronted with the growing evidence to the detriment of the Nash concept, game theorists were prompted to search for more refined equilibrium notions with better properties and they have come up with a wide array of alternative solution concepts. This book surveys the most important refinements that have been introduced. Its objectives are fourfold (i) to illustrate desirable properties as well as drawbacks of the various equilibrium notions by means of simple specific examples, (ii) to study the relationships between the various refinements, (iii) to derive simplifying characterizations, and (iv) to discuss the plausibility of the assumptions underlying the concepts.
Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games in Pure Strategies
Author: Sherman Xiewei Bai
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 12
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 12
Book Description
Equilibrium points of bimatrix games
Author: Carlton E. Lemke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 11
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 11
Book Description
Strictly Perfect Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
Author: Akira Okada
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 20
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 20
Book Description
Index and Stability in Bimatrix Games
Author: H. Arndt von Schemde
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540291024
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 157
Book Description
The index of an equilibrium in a game gives information about the "stability" of the equilibrium, for example with respect to game dynamics. Unfortunately, index theory is often very technical. This book presents a new geometric construction that visualises the index in an intuitive way. For example, a 3A-n game, for any n, can be represented by a figure in the plane, from which one can read off any equilibrium, and its index as a geometric orientation. With this insight, the index can be characterised in strategic terms alone. Moreover, certain "hyperstable" equilibrium components are seen to have nonzero index. The construction gives an elementary proof that two-player games have a Nash equilibrium, and, in an unusual direction, the powerful fixed point theorem of Brouwer.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540291024
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 157
Book Description
The index of an equilibrium in a game gives information about the "stability" of the equilibrium, for example with respect to game dynamics. Unfortunately, index theory is often very technical. This book presents a new geometric construction that visualises the index in an intuitive way. For example, a 3A-n game, for any n, can be represented by a figure in the plane, from which one can read off any equilibrium, and its index as a geometric orientation. With this insight, the index can be characterised in strategic terms alone. Moreover, certain "hyperstable" equilibrium components are seen to have nonzero index. The construction gives an elementary proof that two-player games have a Nash equilibrium, and, in an unusual direction, the powerful fixed point theorem of Brouwer.
Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Points in Bimatrix Games
Author: Luis G. Quintas
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 8
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 8
Book Description
Computation of Equilibrium Points of a Bimatrix Game
Author: Raymond L. Somers
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Equilibrium points of semi-infinite bimatrix games
Author: M. J. Jansen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 15
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 15
Book Description