Split-Award Procurement Auctions with Uncertain Scale Economies

Split-Award Procurement Auctions with Uncertain Scale Economies PDF Author: James J. Anton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31

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Book Description
In a number of observed procurements, the buyer has employed an auction format that allows for a split-award outcome. We focus on settings where the range of uncertainty regarding scale economies is large and, depending on cost realizations, the efficient allocations include split-award outcomes as well as sole-source outcomes (one active supplier). We examine the price performance and efficiency properties of split-award auctions under asymmetric information. In equilibrium, both award outcomes can occur: the split-award outcome occurs only when it minimizes total costs; sole-source outcomes, however, occur too often from an efficiency viewpoint. With respect to prices, equilibrium bids involve pooling at a common price for the split award, and separation for sole-source awards. The pooling region reduces bidding pressure and allows for relatively high sole-source prices. We provide conditions under which the buyer and suppliers all benefit from a split-award format relative to a winner-take-all unit auction format. We assess the predictions of the model and an extension with data on submitted 'step-ladder' bid prices for a US defense split-award procurement.

Split-Award Procurement Auctions with Uncertain Scale Economies

Split-Award Procurement Auctions with Uncertain Scale Economies PDF Author: James J. Anton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31

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Book Description
In a number of observed procurements, the buyer has employed an auction format that allows for a split-award outcome. We focus on settings where the range of uncertainty regarding scale economies is large and, depending on cost realizations, the efficient allocations include split-award outcomes as well as sole-source outcomes (one active supplier). We examine the price performance and efficiency properties of split-award auctions under asymmetric information. In equilibrium, both award outcomes can occur: the split-award outcome occurs only when it minimizes total costs; sole-source outcomes, however, occur too often from an efficiency viewpoint. With respect to prices, equilibrium bids involve pooling at a common price for the split award, and separation for sole-source awards. The pooling region reduces bidding pressure and allows for relatively high sole-source prices. We provide conditions under which the buyer and suppliers all benefit from a split-award format relative to a winner-take-all unit auction format. We assess the predictions of the model and an extension with data on submitted 'step-ladder' bid prices for a US defense split-award procurement.

Beyond Austerity

Beyond Austerity PDF Author: Costas Meghir
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262035839
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 732

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Book Description
Prominent economists present detailed analyses of the conditions that made Greece vulnerable to economic crisis and offer policy recommendations for comprehensive and radical change. More than eight years after the global financial crisis began, the economy of Greece shows little sign of recovery, and its position in the eurozone seems tenuous. Between 2008 and 2014, incomes in Greece shrank by more than 25 percent, homes lost more than a third of their value, and the unemployment rate reached 27 percent. Most articles on Greece in the media focus on the effects of austerity, repayment of its debt, and its future in the eurozone. In Beyond Austerity: Reforming the Greek Economy, leading Greek economists from institutions both within and outside Greece, take a broader and deeper view of the Greek crisis, examining the pathologies that made Greece vulnerable to the crisis and the implications for the entire eurozone. Each chapter takes on a specific policy area, examining it in terms of Greece's economic reality and offering possible directions for policy. The topics range from macroeconomic issues to markets and their regulation to finance to the public sector. Individual chapters address the costs and benefits of participation in the eurozone, Greece's international competitiveness, taxation, pensions, the labor market, privatization, product markets, finance, education, healthcare, corruption, the justice system, and public administration. The contributors argue that Greek institutions require a deep overhaul rather than quick fixes to enable long-term growth and prosperity.

Issues in Behavioral Psychology: 2011 Edition

Issues in Behavioral Psychology: 2011 Edition PDF Author:
Publisher: ScholarlyEditions
ISBN: 1464964629
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 1913

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Book Description
Issues in Behavioral Psychology / 2011 Edition is a ScholarlyEditions™ eBook that delivers timely, authoritative, and comprehensive information about Behavioral Psychology. The editors have built Issues in Behavioral Psychology: 2011 Edition on the vast information databases of ScholarlyNews.™ You can expect the information about Behavioral Psychology in this eBook to be deeper than what you can access anywhere else, as well as consistently reliable, authoritative, informed, and relevant. The content of Issues in Behavioral Psychology: 2011 Edition has been produced by the world’s leading scientists, engineers, analysts, research institutions, and companies. All of the content is from peer-reviewed sources, and all of it is written, assembled, and edited by the editors at ScholarlyEditions™ and available exclusively from us. You now have a source you can cite with authority, confidence, and credibility. More information is available at http://www.ScholarlyEditions.com/.

Equilibrium Bidding in Ex-Post Split-Award Auctions

Equilibrium Bidding in Ex-Post Split-Award Auctions PDF Author: Gian-Marco Kokott
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783843940061
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description


Sourcing Strategy

Sourcing Strategy PDF Author: Sudhi Seshadri
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 0387251839
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 324

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Book Description
Sourcing Strategy is about sourcing as a long term strategic activity. Myopic purchasing management stops short with describing functional procedures and procedural innovations such as online order processing. The goal of this book is not merely to document sourcing strategy, but to provide the tools to determine it. Therefore, rather than merely describe common sourcing processes, the book takes a normative approach to sourcing strategy. It argues for a rational, complete and integrated process view. It supports its recommendations with logical arguments from an interdisciplinary and analytical approach grounded in microeconomics, law and business strategy. Part 1 of the book explains the economic and business principles that underlie sourcing strategies. It derives policies that guide viable strategies to meet sourcing goals. Part 2 applies these to creative designs for standard sourcing scenarios.

Multiple-Winner Award Rules in Online Procurement Auctions

Multiple-Winner Award Rules in Online Procurement Auctions PDF Author: Qi Wang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
This paper investigates a novel winner-determination mechanism: multiple-winner award rules that are widely used in e-procurement auctions and crowdsourcing sites. We focus on one unique award mechanism in e-procurement auctions, in which the auctioneer (i.e., the buyer) specifies three rules before the auction starts: (1) the size of the finalist set (from which the winner[s] will be chosen), (2) the number of winners, and (3) the proportion of contract volume allocated to each winner. We examine how these three rules affect auction performance using a data set of online procurement auctions across a variety of product categories. We find that all three award rules significantly impact the suppliers' participation decision, which is an important factor determining the economic performance of the auction (i.e., buyer's savings). Most interestingly, these three rules systematically induce opposite effects on auction participation for two types of suppliers: experienced bidders and first-time bidders. For example, enlarging the size of the finalist set or increasing the number of winners encourages experienced but discourages inexperienced suppliers to participate the auction, while raising the disparity in contract allocation among winning bidders (e.g., a 50/50 vs. 90/10 split) deters experienced but motivates inexperienced suppliers to participate. These findings provide useful guidelines for industrial buyers and crowdsourcing hosts on how to effectively make use of the three design levers to affect suppliers' participation when designing procurement auctions and crowdsourcing contests.

Procurement Auctions with Entry and Uncertain Number of Actual Bidders

Procurement Auctions with Entry and Uncertain Number of Actual Bidders PDF Author: Xiaoyong Zheng
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 406

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Book Description


Coordination in Split-award Auctions

Coordination in Split-award Auctions PDF Author: James J. Anton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 66

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Book Description


Putting Auction Theory to Work

Putting Auction Theory to Work PDF Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378

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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

Split Awards, Procurement, and Innovation

Split Awards, Procurement, and Innovation PDF Author: James J. Anton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 38

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Book Description