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Author: Sergiu Hart
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814390704
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 335
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Book Description
This volume collects almost two decades of joint work of Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell on game dynamics and equilibria. The starting point was the introduction of the adaptive strategy called regret-matching, which on the one hand is simple and natural, and on the other is shown to lead to correlated equilibria. This initial finding OCo boundedly rational behavior that yields fully rational outcomes in the long run OCo generated a large body of work on the dynamics of simple adaptive strategies. In particular, a natural condition on dynamics was identified: uncoupledness, whereby decision-makers do not know each other''s payoffs and utilities (so, while chosen actions may be observable, the motivations are not). This condition turns out to severely limit the equilibria that can be reached. Interestingly, there are connections to the behavioral and neurobiological sciences and also to computer science and engineering (e.g., via notions of OC regretOCO).Simple Adaptive Strategies is self-contained and unified in its presentation. Together with the formal treatment of concepts, theorems, and proofs, significant space is devoted to informal explanations and illuminating examples. It may be used for advanced graduate courses OCo in game theory, economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering OCo and for further research.
Author: Sergiu Hart
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814390704
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 335
Get Book Here
Book Description
This volume collects almost two decades of joint work of Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell on game dynamics and equilibria. The starting point was the introduction of the adaptive strategy called regret-matching, which on the one hand is simple and natural, and on the other is shown to lead to correlated equilibria. This initial finding OCo boundedly rational behavior that yields fully rational outcomes in the long run OCo generated a large body of work on the dynamics of simple adaptive strategies. In particular, a natural condition on dynamics was identified: uncoupledness, whereby decision-makers do not know each other''s payoffs and utilities (so, while chosen actions may be observable, the motivations are not). This condition turns out to severely limit the equilibria that can be reached. Interestingly, there are connections to the behavioral and neurobiological sciences and also to computer science and engineering (e.g., via notions of OC regretOCO).Simple Adaptive Strategies is self-contained and unified in its presentation. Together with the formal treatment of concepts, theorems, and proofs, significant space is devoted to informal explanations and illuminating examples. It may be used for advanced graduate courses OCo in game theory, economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering OCo and for further research.
Author: Sergiu Hart
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814401595
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 335
Get Book Here
Book Description
This volume collects almost two decades of joint work of Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell on game dynamics and equilibria. The starting point was the introduction of the adaptive strategy called regret-matching, which on the one hand is simple and natural, and on the other is shown to lead to correlated equilibria. This initial finding — boundedly rational behavior that yields fully rational outcomes in the long run — generated a large body of work on the dynamics of simple adaptive strategies. In particular, a natural condition on dynamics was identified: uncoupledness, whereby decision-makers do not know each other's payoffs and utilities (so, while chosen actions may be observable, the motivations are not). This condition turns out to severely limit the equilibria that can be reached. Interestingly, there are connections to the behavioral and neurobiological sciences and also to computer science and engineering (e.g., via notions of “regret”).Simple Adaptive Strategies is self-contained and unified in its presentation. Together with the formal treatment of concepts, theorems, and proofs, significant space is devoted to informal explanations and illuminating examples. It may be used for advanced graduate courses — in game theory, economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering — and for further research.
Author: Ron Lavi
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3662448033
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 307
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Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2014, held in Haifa, Israel, in October 2014. The 24 full papers and 5 short papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 65 submissions. They cover various important aspects of algorithmic game theory, such as matching theory, game dynamics, games of coordination, networks and social choice, markets and auctions, price of anarchy, computational aspects of games, mechanism design and auctions.
Author: Nicolo Cesa-Bianchi
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 113945482X
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 4
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Book Description
This important text and reference for researchers and students in machine learning, game theory, statistics and information theory offers a comprehensive treatment of the problem of predicting individual sequences. Unlike standard statistical approaches to forecasting, prediction of individual sequences does not impose any probabilistic assumption on the data-generating mechanism. Yet, prediction algorithms can be constructed that work well for all possible sequences, in the sense that their performance is always nearly as good as the best forecasting strategy in a given reference class. The central theme is the model of prediction using expert advice, a general framework within which many related problems can be cast and discussed. Repeated game playing, adaptive data compression, sequential investment in the stock market, sequential pattern analysis, and several other problems are viewed as instances of the experts' framework and analyzed from a common nonstochastic standpoint that often reveals new and intriguing connections.
Author: Vikram Krishnamurthy
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107134609
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 491
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Book Description
This book covers formulation, algorithms, and structural results of partially observed Markov decision processes, whilst linking theory to real-world applications in controlled sensing. Computations are kept to a minimum, enabling students and researchers in engineering, operations research, and economics to understand the methods and determine the structure of their optimal solution.
Author: H. Peyton Young
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199269181
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 178
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Book Description
Table of contents
Author: Rida Laraki
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 303026646X
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 240
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Book Description
This book gives a concise presentation of the mathematical foundations of Game Theory, with an emphasis on strategic analysis linked to information and dynamics. It is largely self-contained, with all of the key tools and concepts defined in the text. Combining the basics of Game Theory, such as value existence theorems in zero-sum games and equilibrium existence theorems for non-zero-sum games, with a selection of important and more recent topics such as the equilibrium manifold and learning dynamics, the book quickly takes the reader close to the state of the art. Applications to economics, biology, and learning are included, and the exercises, which often contain noteworthy results, provide an important complement to the text. Based on lectures given in Paris over several years, this textbook will be useful for rigorous, up-to-date courses on the subject. Apart from an interest in strategic thinking and a taste for mathematical formalism, the only prerequisite for reading the book is a solid knowledge of mathematics at the undergraduate level, including basic analysis, linear algebra, and probability.
Author: Aviad Rubinstein
Publisher: Morgan & Claypool
ISBN: 1947487213
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 321
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Book Description
Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept in Game Theory. Since Nash’s original paper in 1951, it has found countless applications in modeling strategic behavior of traders in markets, (human) drivers and (electronic) routers in congested networks, nations in nuclear disarmament negotiations, and more. A decade ago, the relevance of this solution concept was called into question by computer scientists, who proved (under appropriate complexity assumptions) that computing a Nash equilibrium is an intractable problem. And if centralized, specially designed algorithms cannot find Nash equilibria, why should we expect distributed, selfish agents to converge to one? The remaining hope was that at least approximate Nash equilibria can be efficiently computed. Understanding whether there is an efficient algorithm for approximate Nash equilibrium has been the central open problem in this field for the past decade. In this book, we provide strong evidence that even finding an approximate Nash equilibrium is intractable. We prove several intractability theorems for different settings (two-player games and many-player games) and models (computational complexity, query complexity, and communication complexity). In particular, our main result is that under a plausible and natural complexity assumption ("Exponential Time Hypothesis for PPAD"), there is no polynomial-time algorithm for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player games. The problem of approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player game poses a unique technical challenge: it is a member of the class PPAD, which captures the complexity of several fundamental total problems, i.e., problems that always have a solution; and it also admits a quasipolynomial time algorithm. Either property alone is believed to place this problem far below NP-hard problems in the complexity hierarchy; having both simultaneously places it just above P, at what can be called the frontier of intractability. Indeed, the tools we develop in this book to advance on this frontier are useful for proving hardness of approximation of several other important problems whose complexity lies between P and NP: Brouwer’s fixed point, market equilibrium, CourseMatch (A-CEEI), densest k-subgraph, community detection, VC dimension and Littlestone dimension, and signaling in zero-sum games.
Author: Bikas K. Chakrabarti
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319613529
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 212
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Book Description
This book provides the first comprehensive introduction to multi-agent, multi-choice repetitive games, such as the Kolkata Restaurant Problem and the Minority Game. It explains how the tangible formulations of these games, using stochastic strategies developed by statistical physicists employing both classical and quantum physics, have led to very efficient solutions to the problems posed. Further, it includes sufficient introductory notes on information-processing strategies employing both classical statistical physics and quantum mechanics. Games of this nature, in which agents are presented with choices, from among which their goal is to make the minority choice, offer effective means of modeling herd behavior and market dynamics and are highly relevant to assessing systemic risk. Accordingly, this book will be of interest to economists, physicists, and computer scientists alike.
Author: Amit Tiwary
Publisher: CRC Press
ISBN: 1498724302
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 334
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Book Description
This book discusses business architecture as a basis for aligning efforts with outcomes. It views BA as complementary to enterprise architecture, where the focus of technological initiatives and inventories is to understand and improve business organization, business direction, and business decision-making. This book provides a practical, long-term view on BA. Based on the authors' consulting experience and industrial research, the material in this book is a valuable addition to the thought processes around BA and EA. The lead author has direct and practical experience with large clients in applying APQC capability framework for undertaking multiple enterprise-wide capability assessments.
