Author: James William Maw
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Self-enforcing Contracts, Adverse Selection and Labour Markets
Author: James William Maw
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Nonstationary Relational Contracts with Adverse Selection
Author: Huanxing Yang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
I develop a model of nonstationary relational contracts in order to study internal wage dynamics. Workers are heterogeneous, and each worker's ability is both private information and fixed for all time. Learning therefore occurs within employment relationships. The inferences, however, are confounded by moral hazard. Incentive provision is restricted by an inability to commit to long-term contracts. Relational contracts, which must be self-enforcing, must therefore be used. The wage dynamics in the optimal contract, which are pinned down by the tension between incentive provision and contractual enforcement, are intimately related to the learning effect.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
I develop a model of nonstationary relational contracts in order to study internal wage dynamics. Workers are heterogeneous, and each worker's ability is both private information and fixed for all time. Learning therefore occurs within employment relationships. The inferences, however, are confounded by moral hazard. Incentive provision is restricted by an inability to commit to long-term contracts. Relational contracts, which must be self-enforcing, must therefore be used. The wage dynamics in the optimal contract, which are pinned down by the tension between incentive provision and contractual enforcement, are intimately related to the learning effect.
Relational Contracts, Incentives and Information
Author: Jonathan David Levin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 133
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 133
Book Description
The Japanese Firm
Author: Masahiko Aoki
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 9780198292159
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 426
Book Description
Written by prominent scholars in the field, this is an account of the Japanese firm and its sources of success. Containing both theoretical and empirical work, the book ranges across labour and information economics, finance, organizational theory, and others.
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 9780198292159
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 426
Book Description
Written by prominent scholars in the field, this is an account of the Japanese firm and its sources of success. Containing both theoretical and empirical work, the book ranges across labour and information economics, finance, organizational theory, and others.
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Contract Law
Author: Nicole Petrick
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3640394127
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : de
Pages : 25
Book Description
Essay aus dem Jahr 2005 im Fachbereich BWL - Recht, Note: 1,7, Higher School of Economics Moscow, Russia, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Legal and economical interpretations of contract, contract law and contract theory, asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard. Paper explains negative effects of adverse selection and moral hazard for the case of transaction costs and incomplete contracts and describes incentives to avoid adverse selection and moral hazard, such as signaling and deductibles as well as indemnity contracts and valued contracts.
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3640394127
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : de
Pages : 25
Book Description
Essay aus dem Jahr 2005 im Fachbereich BWL - Recht, Note: 1,7, Higher School of Economics Moscow, Russia, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Legal and economical interpretations of contract, contract law and contract theory, asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard. Paper explains negative effects of adverse selection and moral hazard for the case of transaction costs and incomplete contracts and describes incentives to avoid adverse selection and moral hazard, such as signaling and deductibles as well as indemnity contracts and valued contracts.
Demystifying the Chinese Miracle
Author: Wang Yongqin
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 113501504X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 157
Book Description
The last three decades has witnessed miraculous economic growth of China. What has accounted for its miracle? What is the nature and future of the Chinese model? Is it unique? This book presents an analytical framework to demystify China's economic growth miracle. The book suggests that interlinked and relational contracts between the agents (in particular, between the state and the business) can compensate for flawed markets to achieve high growth. This kind of relational capitalism is significant in the investment-based stage of development, when mobilization of resources to exploit the existing technologies is key for growth. The book presents a general theory of interlinked relational contract, the workhorse model of the book. The theory highlights that effective governance is a function of market extent and market completeness. The process of economic development and modernization can be looked at fruitfully from two perspectives: the markets and the institutions and their interactions. The book stresses the critical fit between the development stage and the governance for a country's economic transition and development and thus the idea of "appropriate institutions".
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 113501504X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 157
Book Description
The last three decades has witnessed miraculous economic growth of China. What has accounted for its miracle? What is the nature and future of the Chinese model? Is it unique? This book presents an analytical framework to demystify China's economic growth miracle. The book suggests that interlinked and relational contracts between the agents (in particular, between the state and the business) can compensate for flawed markets to achieve high growth. This kind of relational capitalism is significant in the investment-based stage of development, when mobilization of resources to exploit the existing technologies is key for growth. The book presents a general theory of interlinked relational contract, the workhorse model of the book. The theory highlights that effective governance is a function of market extent and market completeness. The process of economic development and modernization can be looked at fruitfully from two perspectives: the markets and the institutions and their interactions. The book stresses the critical fit between the development stage and the governance for a country's economic transition and development and thus the idea of "appropriate institutions".
Advanced Microeconomics for Contract, Institutional, and Organizational Economics
Author: W. Bentley MacLeod
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 026236946X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
Book Description
A graduate textbook on microeconomics, covering decision theory, game theory, and the foundations of contract theory, with a unique focus on the empirical. This graduate-level text on microeconomics, covering such topics as decision theory, game theory, bargaining theory, contract theory, trade under asymmetric information, and relational contract theory, is unique in its emphasis on the interplay between theory and evidence. It reviews the microeconomic theory of exchange “from the ground up,” aiming to produce a set of models and hypotheses amenable to empirical exploration, with particular focus on models that are useful for the study of contracts, institutions, and organizations. It explores research that extends price theory to the exchange of commodities when markets are incomplete, discussing recent developments in the field. Topics covered include the relationship between theory and evidence; decision theory as it is used in contract theory and institutional design; game theory; axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory; agency theory and the class of models that are considered to constitute contract theory, with discussions of moral hazard and trade with asymmetric information; and the theory of relational contracts. The final chapter offers a nontechnical review that provides a guide to which model is the most appropriate for a particular application. End-of-chapter exercises help students expand their understanding of the material, and an appendix provides brief introduction to optimization theory and the welfare theorem of general equilibrium theory. Students are assumed to be familiar with general equilibrium theory and basic constrained optimization theory.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 026236946X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
Book Description
A graduate textbook on microeconomics, covering decision theory, game theory, and the foundations of contract theory, with a unique focus on the empirical. This graduate-level text on microeconomics, covering such topics as decision theory, game theory, bargaining theory, contract theory, trade under asymmetric information, and relational contract theory, is unique in its emphasis on the interplay between theory and evidence. It reviews the microeconomic theory of exchange “from the ground up,” aiming to produce a set of models and hypotheses amenable to empirical exploration, with particular focus on models that are useful for the study of contracts, institutions, and organizations. It explores research that extends price theory to the exchange of commodities when markets are incomplete, discussing recent developments in the field. Topics covered include the relationship between theory and evidence; decision theory as it is used in contract theory and institutional design; game theory; axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory; agency theory and the class of models that are considered to constitute contract theory, with discussions of moral hazard and trade with asymmetric information; and the theory of relational contracts. The final chapter offers a nontechnical review that provides a guide to which model is the most appropriate for a particular application. End-of-chapter exercises help students expand their understanding of the material, and an appendix provides brief introduction to optimization theory and the welfare theorem of general equilibrium theory. Students are assumed to be familiar with general equilibrium theory and basic constrained optimization theory.
Self-enforcing Wage Contracts
Author: J. Thomas
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Three Essays on Adverse Selection and Labor Contracts
Author: Dorothea Kübler
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783826555749
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 65
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783826555749
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 65
Book Description
Selected Works of Joseph E. Stiglitz
Author: Joseph E. Stiglitz
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199533717
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 904
Book Description
The second in a series of six volumes containing a selection of Joseph Stiglitz's most important and widely cited work. Volume I set out the basic concepts underlying the economics of information. Volume II extends these concepts and applies them to a number of different settings in labour, capital, and product markets
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199533717
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 904
Book Description
The second in a series of six volumes containing a selection of Joseph Stiglitz's most important and widely cited work. Volume I set out the basic concepts underlying the economics of information. Volume II extends these concepts and applies them to a number of different settings in labour, capital, and product markets