Revenue Non-equivalence of Auctions with Budget-constrained Buyers PDF Download
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Author: Yeon Koo Che
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 15
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Author: Yeon Koo Che
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 15
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Author: Soo Hong Chew
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Author: Yeon-Koo Che
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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Author: Yeon-Koo Che
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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Author: Philippe Jehiel
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ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 66
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Author: Gadi Fibich
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ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Author: Eric Maskin
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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The revenue-equivalence theorm for auctions predicts that expected seller revenue is independent of the bidding rules, as long as equilibrium has the properties that the buyer with the highest reservation price wins and any buyer with the lowest possible reservation price has zero expected surplus. Thus, in particular, the two most common auction institutions-the open 'English' and the sealed high-bid auction-are equivalent despite their rather different strategic properties.
Author: Lawrence M. Ausubel
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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We perform laboratory experiments comparing auctions with endogenous budget constraints. A principal imposes a budget limit on a bidder (an agent) in response to a principal-agent problem. In contrast to the existing literature where budget constraints are exogenous, this theory predicts that tighter constraints will be imposed in first-price auctions than in second-price auctions, offsetting any advantages attributable to the lower bidding strategy of the first-price auction. Our experimental findings support this theory: principals are found to set significantly lower budgets in first-price auctions. Our results help to explain the prevalence of ascending (i.e., second-price) formats in high-stakes auctions.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Author: Abhishek Pani
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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