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Author: Sir John Chilcot (chairman)
Publisher: Canbury Press
ISBN: 099549780X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 220
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Book Description
All the key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by the British government led by Tony Blair. Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as the 'Chilcot Report') tackled: Saddam Hussein's threat to Britainthe legal advice for the invasionintelligence about weapons of mass destruction andplanning for a post-conflict Iraq. This 60,000-word executive summary was published in July 2016. Philippe Sands QC wrote in the London Review of Books: 'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.' Published under an Open Government Licence, this book aims to make better known the findings of the Iraq Inquiry, which took seven years to complete at a cost of £10 million. The text, headings, footnotes and any emphasis are exactly those of the original document. Contents Introduction Pre-conflict strategy and planning The UK decision to support US military action Why Iraq? Why now? The UK's relationship with the US Decision-making Advice on the legal basis for military action Weapons of mass destruction Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq The post-conflict period Occupation Transition Planning for withdrawal Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq? Key findings Lessons Timeline of events REVIEWS The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot and composed of five privy councillors, finally published its report on the morning of 6 July, seven years and 21 days after it was established by Gordon Brown with a remit to look at the run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons. It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate. — Philippe Sands, London Review of Books A more productive way to think of the Chilcot report is as a tool to help us set agendas for renewed best efforts in creating more effective and accountable statecraft. Chilcot has confirmed that... we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times. — Derek B. Miller, The Guardian Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies. Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted; that military action was not a last resort... — Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The New York Review of Books Ideal for any student of politics, diplomacy, or conflict.
Author: Sir John Chilcot (chairman)
Publisher: Canbury Press
ISBN: 099549780X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 220
Get Book Here
Book Description
All the key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by the British government led by Tony Blair. Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as the 'Chilcot Report') tackled: Saddam Hussein's threat to Britainthe legal advice for the invasionintelligence about weapons of mass destruction andplanning for a post-conflict Iraq. This 60,000-word executive summary was published in July 2016. Philippe Sands QC wrote in the London Review of Books: 'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.' Published under an Open Government Licence, this book aims to make better known the findings of the Iraq Inquiry, which took seven years to complete at a cost of £10 million. The text, headings, footnotes and any emphasis are exactly those of the original document. Contents Introduction Pre-conflict strategy and planning The UK decision to support US military action Why Iraq? Why now? The UK's relationship with the US Decision-making Advice on the legal basis for military action Weapons of mass destruction Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq The post-conflict period Occupation Transition Planning for withdrawal Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq? Key findings Lessons Timeline of events REVIEWS The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot and composed of five privy councillors, finally published its report on the morning of 6 July, seven years and 21 days after it was established by Gordon Brown with a remit to look at the run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons. It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate. — Philippe Sands, London Review of Books A more productive way to think of the Chilcot report is as a tool to help us set agendas for renewed best efforts in creating more effective and accountable statecraft. Chilcot has confirmed that... we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times. — Derek B. Miller, The Guardian Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies. Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted; that military action was not a last resort... — Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The New York Review of Books Ideal for any student of politics, diplomacy, or conflict.
Author:
Publisher: Canbury Press
ISBN: 1912454300
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
The key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by the British government led by Tony Blair. Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as there 'Chilcot Report') tackled: Saddam Hussein's threat to Britainthe legal advice for the invasionintelligence about weapons of mass destruction andplanning for a post-conflict Iraq. This 60,000-word executive summary was published in July 2016. Philippe Sands QC wrote in the London Review of Books: 'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.' Published under an Open Government Licence, this book aims to make better known the findings of the Iraq Inquiry, which took seven years to complete at a cost of £10 million. The text, headings, footnotes and any emphasis are exactly those of the original document. Contents Introduction Pre-conflict strategy and planning The UK decision to support US military action Why Iraq? Why now? The UK's relationship with the US Decision-making Advice on the legal basis for military action Weapons of mass destruction Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq The post-conflict period Occupation Transition Planning for withdrawal Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq? Key findings Lessons Timeline of events Reviews The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot and composed of five privy councillors, finally published its report on the morning of 6 July, seven years and 21 days after it was established by Gordon Brown with a remit to look at the run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons. It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate. — Philippe Sands, London Review of Books A more productive way to think of the Chilcot report is as a tool to help us set agendas for renewed best efforts in creating more effective and accountable statecraft. Chilcot has confirmed that... we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times. — Derek B. Miller, The Guardian Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies. Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted; that military action was not a last resort... — Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The New York Review of Books Ideal for any student of politics, diplomacy, or conflict.
Author: Iraq Inquiry
Publisher: Canbury Press
ISBN: 9781912454044
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 184
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Book Description
The key findings of the public inquiry into Britain's handling of the 2003 Iraq war. Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry tackled the threat to Britain; the legal advice for the invasion; intelligence about weapons of mass destruction; and planning for a post-conflict Iraq. This 60,000-word executive summary was published in July 2016.
Author: Great Britain. Cabinet Office
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781474133326
Category : Governmental investigations
Languages : en
Pages : 145
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Book Description
Author: Sir John Chilcot
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781474133319
Category : Great Britain
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Judith Betts
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030503194
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 244
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Book Description
This book examines the decisions by Tony Blair and John Howard to take their nations into the 2003 Iraq War, and the questions these decisions raise about democratic governance. It also explores the significance of the US alliance in UK and Australian decision-making, and the process for taking a nation to war. Relying on primary government documents and interviews, and bringing together various strands of literature that have so far been discussed in isolation (including historical accounts, party politics, prime ministerial leadership and intelligence studies), the authors provide a comprehensive and original view on the various post-war inquiries conducted in the UK, Australia.
Author: Matt Woodhead
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 1783197749
Category : Drama
Languages : en
Pages : 86
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Book Description
Tasked with investigating Britain’s role in the Iraq War, the evidence presented to the Chilcot Inquiry was devastating and stark. Drawing together testimonies from leading political players with the forgotten voices of Iraqi refugees, veterans and military families against war – this pertinent and bold piece of documentary theatre explores the accountability of those who have power over us.
Author: Iraq Inquiry
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780102989601
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 6328
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Book Description
In 2003, for the first time since the Second World War, the United Kingdom took part in an invasion and full-scale occupation of a sovereign State. Saddam Hussein was undoubtedly a brutal dictator who had attacked Iraq's neighbours, repressed and killed many of his own people, and was in violation of obligations imposed by the UN Security Council. But the questions for the Inquiry were: whether it was right and necessary to invade Iraq in March 2003; and whether the UK could - and should - have been better prepared for what followed. The Inquiry concluded that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort. They also concluded that the judgements about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction - WMD - were presented with a certainty that was not justified. Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate. Military action in Iraq might have been necessary at some point but in March 2003 there was no imminent threat and the majority of the Security Council supported continuing UN inspections and monitoring. The Inquiry identified what lessons should be learned from experience in Iraq, including: the management of relations with allies, especially the US; the importance of collective Ministerial discussion which encourages frank and informed debate and challenge; the need to assess risks, weigh options and set an achievable and realistic strategy; the vital role of Ministerial leadership and co-ordination of action across Government, supported by senior officials; and the need to ensure that both the civilian and military arms of Government are properly equipped for their tasks
Author: Great Britain. Cabinet Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Iraq Inquiry
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781474133319
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 148
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Book Description
In 2003, for the first time since the Second World War, the United Kingdom took part in an invasion and full-scale occupation of a sovereign State. Saddam Hussein was undoubtedly a brutal dictator who had attacked Iraq's neighbours, repressed and killed many of his own people, and was in violation of obligations imposed by the UN Security Council. But the questions for the Inquiry were: whether it was right and necessary to invade Iraq in March 2003; and whether the UK could - and should - have been better prepared for what followed. The Inquiry concluded that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort. They also concluded that the judgements about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction - WMD - were presented with a certainty that was not justified. Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate. Military action in Iraq might have been necessary at some point but in March 2003 there was no imminent threat and the majority of the Security Council supported continuing UN inspections and monitoring. The Inquiry identified what lessons should be learned from experience in Iraq, including: the management of relations with allies, especially the US; the importance of collective Ministerial discussion which encourages frank and informed debate and challenge; the need to assess risks, weigh options and set an achievable and realistic strategy; the vital role of Ministerial leadership and co-ordination of action across Government, supported by senior officials; and the need to ensure that both the civilian and military arms of Government are properly equipped for their tasks