Relativity, Inequality, and Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation PDF Download
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Author: Ravi Kanbur
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
How does concern for consumption relative to others (“relativity”) affect the structure of optimal nonlinear income taxation? Our article provides three sets of answers to this general question. First, it supports the conclusion in the literature that relativity leads to higher marginal tax rates. In doing so, it both generalizes some of the conditions under which this result is obtained in the literature and fleshes out the detailed structure for optimal marginal tax rates for specific functional forms for distribution, utility function, and social welfare function. Second, the article goes beyond the literature and examines the impact of relativity on the progression of optimal marginal tax rates. By and large, we find support for greater progressivity, defined as the steepness of the rise of the marginal tax rate schedule, as relativity concern increases. Third, none of the papers in the literature, to our knowledge, examines the interplay of relativity and inequality in determining the optimal structure of income taxes. Our special analytical cases and more general numerical calculations support the conclusion that higher inequality dampens the positive impact of greater relativity on the level and the progression of marginal tax rates. More work is needed to further explore this interaction between relativity and inequality that our analysis has uncovered.
Author: Ravi Kanbur
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
How does concern for consumption relative to others (“relativity”) affect the structure of optimal nonlinear income taxation? Our article provides three sets of answers to this general question. First, it supports the conclusion in the literature that relativity leads to higher marginal tax rates. In doing so, it both generalizes some of the conditions under which this result is obtained in the literature and fleshes out the detailed structure for optimal marginal tax rates for specific functional forms for distribution, utility function, and social welfare function. Second, the article goes beyond the literature and examines the impact of relativity on the progression of optimal marginal tax rates. By and large, we find support for greater progressivity, defined as the steepness of the rise of the marginal tax rate schedule, as relativity concern increases. Third, none of the papers in the literature, to our knowledge, examines the interplay of relativity and inequality in determining the optimal structure of income taxes. Our special analytical cases and more general numerical calculations support the conclusion that higher inequality dampens the positive impact of greater relativity on the level and the progression of marginal tax rates. More work is needed to further explore this interaction between relativity and inequality that our analysis has uncovered.
Author:
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 24
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Author: Morten Nyborg Støstad
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper introduces an income inequality externality into the classical optimal non-linear income taxation model, noting that such an externality arises if income inequality affects pertinent societal outcomes. There are two new mathematical terms in the optimal taxation formula, corresponding to a Pigouvian tax and an increased social taste for (in)equality. The two new terms vary more across the distribution than standard externality terms and always influence optimal rates in the same direction at the top of the distribution. As a result, optimal top tax rates are largely driven by the size of the inequality externality. The overall tax schedule is strongly reliant on the type of inequality externality (pre-tax income, post-tax income, utility) and on the externality structure. The findings indicate a new equality-relevant dimension to the optimal policy problem, provide a theoretical basis for previously unsupported tax policies, and show that the size of the inequality externality could be considered a crucial economic variable.
Author: Kari Syreeni
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bible
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Book Description
Author: Matti Tuomala
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0191067741
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 631
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Book Description
Tax systems raise large amounts of revenue for funding public sector's activities, and tax/transfer policy, together with public provision of education, health care, and social services, play a crucial role in treating the symptoms and the causes of poverty. The normative analysis is crucial for tax/transfer design because it makes it possible to assess separately how changes in the redistributive criterion of the government, and changes in the size of the behavioural responses to taxes and transfers, affect the optimal tax/transfer system. Optimal tax theory provides a way of thinking rigorously about these trade-offs. Written primarily for graduate students and researchers, this volume is intended as a textbook and research monograph, connecting optimal tax theory to tax policy. It comments on some policy recommendations of the Mirrlees Review, and builds on the authors work on public economics, optimal tax theory, behavioural public economics, and income inequality. The book explains in depth the Mirrlees model and presents various extensions of it. The first set of extensions considers changing the preferences for consumption and work: behavioural-economic modifications (such as positional externalities, prospect theory, paternalism, myopic behaviour and habit formation) but also heterogeneous work preferences (besides differences in earnings ability). The second set of modifications concerns the objective of the government. The book explains the differences in optimal redistributive tax systems when governments - instead of maximising social welfare - minimise poverty or maximise social welfare based on rank order or charitable conservatism social welfare functions. The third set of extensions considers extending the Mirrlees income tax framework to allow for differential commodity taxes, capital income taxation, public goods provision, public provision of private goods, and taxation commodities that generate externalities. The fourth set of extensions considers incorporating a number of important real-word extensions such as tagging of tax schedules to certain groups of tax payers. In all extensions, the book illustrates the main mechanisms using advanced numerical simulations.
Author: Weizhen Hu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This study develops an income tax competition framework in an overlapping generations economy and examines the economic impact of labor market integration. With two types of labor possessing varied ability levels and a perfectly mobile capital stock, local governments compete for labor and choose the optimal income taxes to maximize social welfare. We demonstrate that public goods can be either over- or under-provided and discuss the equity and efficiency of the optimal policy rules under a nonlinear income taxation scheme. Further, we compare the equilibrium to linear taxation and demonstrate that nonlinear taxation is not necessarily more “equal” or “effective” than linear taxation. Moreover, we compare the equilibrium to that of the classic static model, and find that the nonlinear optimal tax rates could be above or below the first-best tax level in both dynamic and static models, while the public goods can be either over- or under-provided in the dynamic framework but are always under-provided in the static framework.
Author: Aart Gerritsen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 37
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Book Description
I derive the optimal nonlinear income tax when individuals do not necessarily maximize their own well-being. This generates a corrective argument for taxation: optimal marginal taxes are higher (lower) if individuals work too much (too little) from a well-being point of view. I allow for multi-dimensional heterogeneity and derive the optimal tax schedule in terms of measurable sufficient statistics. One of these statistics measures the degree to which individuals fail to optimize their labor supply. I empirically estimate this by using British life satisfaction data as a measure of well-being. I find that low-income workers tend to work 'too little' and high-income workers 'too much,' providing a motive for lower marginal tax rates at the bottom and higher marginal tax rates at the top of the income distribution.
Author: Stefanie Stantcheva
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 207
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Book Description
This thesis consists of three chapters on optimal tax theory with endogenous wages. Chapter 1 studies optimal linear and nonlinear income taxation when firms do not know workers' abilities, and competitively screen them through nonlinear compensation contracts, unobservable to the government, in a Miyazaki-Wilson-Spence equilibrium. Adverse selection changes the optimal tax formulas because of the use of work hours as a screening tool, which for higher talent workers results in a "rat race," and for lower talent workers in informational rents and cross-subsidies. If the government has sufficiently strong redistributive goals, welfare is higher when there is adverse selection than when there is not. The model has practical implications for the interpretation, estimation, and use of taxable income elasticities, central to optimal tax design. Chapter 2 derives optimal income tax and human capital policies in a dynamic life cycle model with risky human capital formation through monetary expenses and training time. The government faces asymmetric information regarding the stochastic ability of agents and labor supply. When the wage elasticity with respect to ability is increasing in human capital, the optimal subsidy involves less than full deductibility of human capital expenses on the tax base, and falls with age. The optimal tax treatment of training time also depends on its interactions with contemporaneous and future labor supply. Income contingent loans, and a tax scheme with deferred deductibility of human capital expenses can implement the optimum. Numerical results suggest that full dynamic risk-adjusted deductibility of expenses is close to optimal, and that simple linear age-dependent policies can achieve most of the welfare gain from the second best. Chapter 3 considers dynamic optimal income, education, and bequest taxes in a Barro- Becker dynastic setup. Each generation is subject to idiosyncratic preference and productivity shocks. Parents can transfer resources to their children either through education investments, which improve the child's wage, or through financial bequests. I derive optimal linear tax formulas as functions of estimable sufficient statistics, robust to underlying heterogeneities in preferences. It is in general not optimal to make education expenses fully tax deductible. I also show how to derive equivalent formulas using reform-specific elasticities that can be targeted to already available estimates from existing reforms.
Author: Thomas Piketty
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This paper reviews recent developments in the theory of optimal labor income taxation. We emphasize connections between theory and empirical work that were initially lacking from optimal income tax theory. First, we provide historical and international background on labor income taxation and means-tested transfers. Second, we present the simple model of optimal linear taxation. Third, we consider optimal nonlinear income taxation with particular emphasis on the optimal top tax rate and the optimal profile of means-tested transfers. Fourth, we consider various extensions of the standard model including tax avoidance and income shifting, international migration, models with rent-seeking, relative income concerns, the treatment of couples and children, and non-cash transfers. Finally, we discuss limitations of the standard utilitarian approach and briefly review alternatives. In all cases, we use the simplest possible models and show how optimal tax formulas can be derived and expressed in terms of sufficient statistics that include social marginal welfare weights capturing society's value for redistribution, behavioral elasticities capturing the efficiency costs of taxation, as well as parameters of the earnings distribution. We also emphasize connections between actual practice and the predictions from theory, and in particular the limitations of both theory and empirical work in settling the political debate on optimal labor income taxation and transfers.
Author: Luca Micheletto
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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Book Description
This paper deals with the consequences of the assumption of negatively interdependent preferences for the shape of the optimal nonlinera income tax and the efficient level of public good provision in a setting where the policy maker maximizes an inequality averse social welfare function and the agents' market ability is private information. The analysis points out that the terms added in the tax formulas due to the presence of Veblen effects might justify a reduction in the optimal marginal tax rates faced by the different individuals. Also, the desirability of negative marginal tax rates cannot de ruled out. With respect to the issue of the optimal level of public good provision, we derive a modified Samuelson rule and highlight the fact that the Veblen-based part of the formula might require to distort downwards the efficient level of public good provision.
