Reasons from Within

Reasons from Within PDF Author: Alan H. Goldman
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191610364
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 284

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Book Description
Do the reasons we have for acting as we do derive from our concerns and desires, or are there objective values in the world that we are rationally required to pursue and protect? Alan H. Goldman argues for the internalist or subjectivist view of practical reasons on the grounds that it is simpler, more unified, and more comprehensible than the rival objectivist position. He provides a naturalistic account of practical rationality in terms of coherence within sets of desires or motivational states, and between motivations, intentions, and actions. Coherence is defined as the avoidance of self-defeat, the defeat of one's own deepest concerns. The demand for coherence underlies both practical and theoretical reason and derives from the natural aims of belief and action. In clarifying which desires create reasons, drawing on the literature of cognitive psychology, Goldman offers conceptual analyses of desires, emotions, and attitudes. Reasons are seen to derive ultimately from our deepest occurrent concerns. These concerns require no reasons themselves but provide reasons for many more superficial desires. In defense of this theory, Goldman argues that rational agents need not be morally motivated or concerned for their narrow self-interest. Objective values would demand such concern. They would be independent of our desires but would provide reasons for us to pursue and protect them. They would require rational agents to be motivated by them. But, Goldman argues, we are not motivated in that way, and it makes no sense to demand that our informed and coherent desires be generally other than they are. We need not appeal to such objective values in order to explain how our lives can be good and meaningful. Reasons from Within will appeal to anyone interested in the nature of values and reasons, particularly students of philosophy, psychology, and decision theory.

Reasons from Within

Reasons from Within PDF Author: Alan H. Goldman
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191610364
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 284

Get Book Here

Book Description
Do the reasons we have for acting as we do derive from our concerns and desires, or are there objective values in the world that we are rationally required to pursue and protect? Alan H. Goldman argues for the internalist or subjectivist view of practical reasons on the grounds that it is simpler, more unified, and more comprehensible than the rival objectivist position. He provides a naturalistic account of practical rationality in terms of coherence within sets of desires or motivational states, and between motivations, intentions, and actions. Coherence is defined as the avoidance of self-defeat, the defeat of one's own deepest concerns. The demand for coherence underlies both practical and theoretical reason and derives from the natural aims of belief and action. In clarifying which desires create reasons, drawing on the literature of cognitive psychology, Goldman offers conceptual analyses of desires, emotions, and attitudes. Reasons are seen to derive ultimately from our deepest occurrent concerns. These concerns require no reasons themselves but provide reasons for many more superficial desires. In defense of this theory, Goldman argues that rational agents need not be morally motivated or concerned for their narrow self-interest. Objective values would demand such concern. They would be independent of our desires but would provide reasons for us to pursue and protect them. They would require rational agents to be motivated by them. But, Goldman argues, we are not motivated in that way, and it makes no sense to demand that our informed and coherent desires be generally other than they are. We need not appeal to such objective values in order to explain how our lives can be good and meaningful. Reasons from Within will appeal to anyone interested in the nature of values and reasons, particularly students of philosophy, psychology, and decision theory.

Reasons and Persons

Reasons and Persons PDF Author: Derek Parfit
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191622443
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 880

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Book Description
This book challenges, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity. The author claims that we have a false view of our own nature; that it is often rational to act against our own best interests; that most of us have moral views that are directly self-defeating; and that, when we consider future generations the conclusions will often be disturbing. He concludes that moral non-religious moral philosophy is a young subject, with a promising but unpredictable future.

The Reasons of Love

The Reasons of Love PDF Author: Harry G. Frankfurt
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400826063
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 112

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Book Description
From the author of the #1 New York Times bestseller On Bullshit, a profound meditation on how and why we love In The Reasons of Love, leading moral philosopher and bestselling author Harry Frankfurt argues that the key to a fulfilled life is to pursue wholeheartedly what one cares about, that love is the most authoritative form of caring, and that the purest form of love is, in a complicated way, self-love. Through caring, we infuse the world with meaning. Caring provides us with stable ambitions and concerns, and it shapes the framework of aims and interests within which we lead our lives. Love is a nonvoluntary, disinterested concern for the flourishing of what we loveā€”and self-love, as distinct from self-indulgence, is at heart of this concern. The most elementary form of self-love is no more than the desire to love, and self-love is simply a commitment to finding meaning in our lives.

Federal Register

Federal Register PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Administrative law
Languages : en
Pages : 1314

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Book Description


Kinds of Reasons

Kinds of Reasons PDF Author: Maria Alvarez
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191613932
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 220

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Book Description
Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities is one of the central tasks of philosophy. The task requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions and motives, and of how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. In Kinds of Reasons, Maria Alvarez offers a fresh and incisive treatment of these issues, focusing in particular on reasons as they feature in contexts of agency. Her account builds on some important recent work in the area; but she takes her main inspiration from the tradition that receives its seminal contemporary expression in the writings of G.E.M. Anscombe, a tradition that runs counter to the broadly Humean orthodoxy that has dominated the theory of action for the past forty years. Alvarez's conclusions are therefore likely to be controversial; and her bold and painstaking arguments will be found provocative by participants on every side of the debates with which she engages. Clear and directly written, Kinds of Reasons aims to stake out a distinctive position within one of the most hotly contested areas of contemporary philosophy.

The Domain of Reasons

The Domain of Reasons PDF Author: John Skorupski
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199587639
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 558

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Book Description
This book is about normativity and reasons. But by the end the subject becomes the relation between self, thought and world. Skorupski argues that the key concepts of epistemology and moral theory are normative concepts, and that what makes them normative is that they depend on reasons. The concept of a reason is fundamental to all thought.

Partiality

Partiality PDF Author: Simon Keller
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400846382
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 177

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Book Description
We are partial to people with whom we share special relationships--if someone is your child, parent, or friend, you wouldn't treat them as you would a stranger. But is partiality justified, and if so, why? Partiality presents a theory of the reasons supporting special treatment within special relationships and explores the vexing problem of how we might reconcile the moral value of these relationships with competing claims of impartial morality. Simon Keller explains that in order to understand why we give special treatment to our family and friends, we need to understand how people come to matter in their own rights. Keller first presents two main accounts of partiality: the projects view, on which reasons of partiality arise from the place that people take within our lives and our commitments, and the relationships view, on which relationships themselves contain fundamental value or reason-giving force. Keller then argues that neither view is satisfactory because neither captures the experience of acting well within special relationships. Instead, Keller defends the individuals view, on which reasons of partiality arise from the value of the individuals with whom our relationships are shared. He defends this view by saying that we must accept that two people, whether friend or stranger, can have the same value, even as their value makes different demands upon people with whom they share different relationships. Keller explores the implications of this claim within a wider understanding of morality and our relationships with groups, institutions, and countries.

Reasons from Within

Reasons from Within PDF Author: Alan H. Goldman
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199576904
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 284

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Book Description
Reasons from Within defends the view that all our reasons for acting derive from our desires, and ultimately from our deepest concerns. There are no objective values in the world that could require our concerns to be other than they are. It will be of interest to anyone interested in the nature of values and reasons.

Reasons as Defaults

Reasons as Defaults PDF Author: John F. Horty
Publisher: OUP USA
ISBN: 0199744076
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 276

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Book Description
In this volume, John Horty brings to bear his work in logic to present a framework that allows for answers to key questions about reasons and reasoning, namely: What are reasons, and how do they support actions or conclusions?

Index-digest, Decisions of the United States Department of the Interior

Index-digest, Decisions of the United States Department of the Interior PDF Author: United States. Department of the Interior
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Public lands
Languages : en
Pages : 754

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Book Description