Author: Carla Guadalupi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 79
Book Description
This paper examines the optimal pricing strategy for newly introduced experience goods in a two-period monopoly market with experimentation and private information about quality. Consumers learn about quality through price signaling and experimentation, and communicate their ndings to other buyers via word of mouth. We show the existence of a unique separating equilibrium that satis es the intuitive criterion. In this equilibrium, a high-quality seller signals high quality through a low introductory price that rises in the next period (after experimentation has occurred), while a low-quality one charges a high introductory price, which declines over time because the revealed information is likely to be bad. This result helps explain recent empirical evidence and case studies on the introductory pricing strategies of rms entering foreign product markets.
Prices as Signals of Quality
Author: Carla Guadalupi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 79
Book Description
This paper examines the optimal pricing strategy for newly introduced experience goods in a two-period monopoly market with experimentation and private information about quality. Consumers learn about quality through price signaling and experimentation, and communicate their ndings to other buyers via word of mouth. We show the existence of a unique separating equilibrium that satis es the intuitive criterion. In this equilibrium, a high-quality seller signals high quality through a low introductory price that rises in the next period (after experimentation has occurred), while a low-quality one charges a high introductory price, which declines over time because the revealed information is likely to be bad. This result helps explain recent empirical evidence and case studies on the introductory pricing strategies of rms entering foreign product markets.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 79
Book Description
This paper examines the optimal pricing strategy for newly introduced experience goods in a two-period monopoly market with experimentation and private information about quality. Consumers learn about quality through price signaling and experimentation, and communicate their ndings to other buyers via word of mouth. We show the existence of a unique separating equilibrium that satis es the intuitive criterion. In this equilibrium, a high-quality seller signals high quality through a low introductory price that rises in the next period (after experimentation has occurred), while a low-quality one charges a high introductory price, which declines over time because the revealed information is likely to be bad. This result helps explain recent empirical evidence and case studies on the introductory pricing strategies of rms entering foreign product markets.
Prices as Signals of Quality
Author: Joseph von Rosthorn Farrell
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Pricing
Languages : en
Pages : 222
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Pricing
Languages : en
Pages : 222
Book Description
Listing Prices as Signals of Quality in Markets with Negotiation
Author: Ruqu Wang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We analyze markets where a buyer may pay the listing price or negotiate. We show that listing prices can signal quality to attract the right type of buyers. Prices are lower without quality uncertainty or without some of the lower qualities. In equilibrium, higher qualities/prices induce more bargaining, and thus more expensive goods are sold more often through bargaining.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
We analyze markets where a buyer may pay the listing price or negotiate. We show that listing prices can signal quality to attract the right type of buyers. Prices are lower without quality uncertainty or without some of the lower qualities. In equilibrium, higher qualities/prices induce more bargaining, and thus more expensive goods are sold more often through bargaining.
Prices as signals of quality in duopoly
Author: Mark N. Hertzendorf
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Book Description
Price and "money Back Guarantees" as Signals of Product Quality
Author: Shiou Shieh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Price indexes
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Price indexes
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
The Role of Price as a Signal of Product Quality in Monopolistic Markets
Author: Scott Davis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumer behavior
Languages : en
Pages : 302
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumer behavior
Languages : en
Pages : 302
Book Description
Warranty and Price as Quality Signals
Author: Sultan Alaswad Alenazi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumer goods
Languages : en
Pages : 110
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumer goods
Languages : en
Pages : 110
Book Description
Perceived Quality
Author: Jacob Jacoby
Publisher: Lexington Books
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 344
Book Description
Publisher: Lexington Books
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 344
Book Description
The Role of Price as Signal of Product Quality in Monopolistic Markets
Author: Scott Davis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 134
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 134
Book Description
Price as a Signal of Quality in Canadian and International Markets
Author: Richard William Bodell
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Prices
Languages : en
Pages : 16
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Prices
Languages : en
Pages : 16
Book Description