Author: Oksana Loginova
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Book Description
A two-period model in which a monopolist endeavors to learn about the permanent demand parameter of a specific repeat buyer is investigated. The buyer may strategically reject the seller's first-period offer for one of two reasons. First, in order to conceal information (i.e., to pool), a high-valuation buyer may reject high prices that would never be accepted by a low-valuation buyer. Second, in order to reveal information (i.e., to signal), a low-valuation buyer may reject low prices that would always be accepted by a high-valuation buyer. Given this, the seller often finds it optimal to post prices that reveal no useful information. Indeed, in the equilibrium where there is no signaling, the seller never charges an informative first-period price. Learning may occur in the equilibrium where there is maximal signaling, but the scope for learning is quite limited even in this case. Indeed, in order to preempt information transmission through signaling, the seller may be induced to set a first-period price strictly below the buyer's lowest possible valuation.
Author: Gary Biglaiser
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 43
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Book Description
Author: Gary Biglaiser
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition, Imperfect
Languages : en
Pages : 43
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Book Description
Author: Hale Catmakas
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We study the pricing problem of a seller offering a single item to buyers purchasing multiple units in two periods. Each buyer aims to maximize her total utility over two periods, and is strategic in two dimensions: she may delay the purchase in anticipation of a price discount (at the expense of a reduced utility), and takes other buyers into account when determining her purchase quantity. The seller sequentially sets the price in each period to maximize his profit. We show the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the game between the buyers and derive the equilibrium of the two-stage sequential game between the seller and the buyers. Analysis reveals that strategic buyer interaction shifts the purchases to the later period, which in turn leads the seller to lower the price. Thus, buyer interaction decreases the seller's profit while almost always benefiting the buyers. The seller's profit decreases further if he ignores the buyer interaction. Through numerical analysis, we quantify the loss to the seller due to buyer interaction and due to ignoring the interaction. As a remedial policy to deter strategic buyer behavior, we study commitment pricing where the retailer announces a price path at the beginning of the selling horizon. The seller prefers commitment pricing over sequential pricing when the buyers are impatient or when the cost of the item in the earlier period is relatively low since the seller can induce early purchases in such cases.
Author: Dick Bergemann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We present a model of entry and exit with Bayesian learning and price competition. A new product of initially unknown quality is introduced in the market, and purchases of the product yield information on its true quality. We assume that the performance of the new product is publicly observable. As agents learn from the experiments of others, informational externalities arise. We determine the Markov Perfect Equilibrium prices and allocations. In a single market, the combination of the informational externalities among the buyers and the strategic pricing by the sellers results in excessive experimentation. If the new product is launched in many distinct markets, the path of sales converges to the efficient path in the limit as the number of markets grows.
Author: Carla Guadalupi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 79
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Book Description
This paper examines the optimal pricing strategy for newly introduced experience goods in a two-period monopoly market with experimentation and private information about quality. Consumers learn about quality through price signaling and experimentation, and communicate their ndings to other buyers via word of mouth. We show the existence of a unique separating equilibrium that satis es the intuitive criterion. In this equilibrium, a high-quality seller signals high quality through a low introductory price that rises in the next period (after experimentation has occurred), while a low-quality one charges a high introductory price, which declines over time because the revealed information is likely to be bad. This result helps explain recent empirical evidence and case studies on the introductory pricing strategies of rms entering foreign product markets.
Author: Harry E. Cook
Publisher: Quality Press
ISBN: 0873892682
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 385
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Book Description
Design for Six Sigma as Strategic Experimentation develops a practical, science-based methodology for guiding the product realization process for highly-competitive markets. Forecasts of cash flow, market share, and price are used to select the final design from among the alternatives considered. A single formalism is used to integrate the tasks and responsibilities of marketing research, product planning, finance, design, engineering, and manufacturing within the overall product realization process. The targeted audiences for this book are graduate engineers, statisticians, and scientists who are or who soon will be involved in planning, designing, manufacturing, and servicing products for highly-competitive markets. "This book is a significant contribution to statisticians, systems and industrial engineers interested in the big picture. It has the potential to increase the relevance of statistical analysis and improve the statistical ability of system engineers to deal with new product design using economic considerations. Teachers, students and practitioners will find the book a useful addition to their libraries." Ron S. Kenett PA Ranaana, Isrrael (from Quality Progress magazine) "The book is an important path-breaking contribution to the critical societal need to more closely link engineering with business and other broad societal issues...Employing the approaches has the clear potential for achieving competitive advantage for corporations that grow capacity to use these tools and insights as additions to existing Six Sigma and Product Development improvement initiatives." Chris Magee Professor of the Practice of Mechanical Engineering and Engineering Systems and Director of the Center for Innovation in Product Development Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Author: Robert G. Glaser
Publisher: Plural Publishing
ISBN: 163550015X
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 789
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Book Description
One of the major skills required for success in practice is to know how to manage a clinic. Strategic Practice Management: Business Considerations for Audiologists and Other Healthcare Professionals, Third Edition is extremely useful for clinicians currently managing their own clinics as well as for the development and teaching of courses in practice management. The first and second editions of this text have been used in university training programs. The third edition contains contributions from nine guest chapter authors, six who are new to this text, and all are experts in their field. Their insight provides the reader with an enlightening resource essential to the operational and business management of the practice setting, including developing an appropriate business plan; startup and long-term planning; essential legal considerations; fiscal monitoring and methods to assess the ongoing financial health of the practice; reimbursement capture; patient and referral source management; human resource issues, including compensation strategies; and much more. Dr. Robert Glaser and Dr. Robert Traynor have extensively updated all of the retained chapters with significant improvements to the content, tables, and figures. Comprehensively researched, every effort has been made to provide the most recent and thorough references for further review. NEW CONTRIBUTORS AND CHAPTERS: Legal Considerations in Practice Management: Michael G. Leesman, JDDeliberations on Ethics in the Practice of Audiology: Rebecca L. Bingea, AuDNEW! Itemizing Professional Hearing Care Services: Stephanie J. Sjoblad, AuDNEW! Office Management Systems: Brian Urban, AuDNEW! Audiology in the Insurance System: Amber Lund-Knettel, MA, and Thomas J. Tedeschi, AuD ADDITIONAL NEW TOPICS: Management Implications for Audiology PracticeCompetition in Audiology PracticeProfessional Selling Techniques This text covers virtually every current area of practice management and is an excellent resource for any health care practitioner considering a startup venture, purchasing an ongoing practice, reinventing their current practice, or for those interested in sharpening their clinical service delivery model in the current competitive arena.
Author: J. Chris Leach
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 35
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Book Description
Author: Milkyway Media
Publisher: Milkyway Media
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 24
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Book Description
Get the Summary of Ulrik Lehrskov-Schmidt's The Pricing Roadmap in 20 minutes. Please note: This is a summary & not the original book. "The Pricing Roadmap" by Ulrik Lehrskov-Schmidt is a comprehensive guide for B2B SaaS executives and entrepreneurs grappling with the complexities of pricing strategies. The book emphasizes the importance of customer-centric pricing over product-centric approaches, advocating for a structure that reflects the value delivered to different customer segments. Lehrskov-Schmidt draws parallels with historical industries, such as the 1860s railroad, to illustrate the effectiveness of differentiated services and the necessity of pricing based on customer willingness to pay...
