Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly PDF full book. Access full book title Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly by Nirvikar Singh. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Nirvikar Singh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Nirvikar Singh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Mónica Correa-López
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
This paper analyzes the noncooperative game on the choice of strategic variable to set in duopoly in the presence of an upstream market for the input. For the case of labor input, the analysis shows that if the wage is the result of decentralized firm-union bargain, a duopoly producing substitutes may choose to compete either in the quantity space or in the price space, depending upon the distribution of bargaining power in the wage negotiation and the union's relative preference over the wage. For the case of input suppliers as profit-maximizing firms, the paper shows that a vertically differentiated duopoly may prefer to compete either in the quantity space or in a mixed strategy setting where the high-quality firm plays price and the low-quality firm plays quantity, depending upon the extent of substitutability, the degree of vertical product differentiation and the distribution of bargaining power in the input price negotiation.
Author: Luca Lambertini
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781781958315
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 240
Get Book Here
Book Description
'This is a high-quality book on an important and central topic in the theory of industrial organisation. It is a cohesive and extremely well written volume which is destined to become a standard work on the subject.' - Mark Casson, University of Reading, UK This original new book offers a comprehensive and engaging perspective on the theory of vertical differentiation. It enables the reader to grasp the key concepts and effects that product quality has both on firms' behaviour and market structure, and the ways in which this relationship has evolved. With contributions from prominent figures in the field, the book investigates a number of important topics, such as the choice of the optimal product range, profit sharing, the existence of equilibrium in duopoly games, positional effects attached to status goods, international trade, collusion, advertising and the dynamics of capital accumulation for quality improvement and product innovation. Using both static and dynamic approaches, these aspects are assessed in relation to the manifold issues of regulation, competition policy and trade policy. Product differentiation and its influence on consumer behaviour and the performance of firms is a core topic in the existing literature in the fields of industrial organization, international trade and economic growth. This book will be an essential read for researchers, students and professional scholars working in these areas, especially those with an interest in antitrust regulation.
Author: Piercarlo Zanchettin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Duopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Xiangkang Yin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Kangsik Choi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
We investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities when unions are present. For the case of a unionised mixed duopoly, there exists a dominant strategy only for the public firm that chooses Bertrand competition irrespective of whether the goods are substitutes or complements; there is no dominant strategy for a private firm. Thus, we show that regardless of the nature of goods, social welfare under Bertrand competition is always determined in equilibrium, wherein Bertrand competition entails higher social welfare than Cournot competition. Moreover, our main results hold irrespective of the nature of goods, with the exception that when a sufficiently large parameter of complements is employed, the ranking of a private firm's profit is not reversed, which is in contrast to the standard findings.
Author: Iwan Bos
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Piercarlo Zanchettin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
In this paper, we compare Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with linear demand and cost functions. We extend the Singh and Vives (1984) model by allowing for a wider range of cost and demand (product quality) asymmetry between firms. Focusing on the case of substitute goods, we show that both the efficient firm's profits and industry profits are higher under Bertrand competition when asymmetry is strong and/or products are weakly differentiated. Therefore, Singh and Vives's ranking of profits between the two modes of competition is reversed in a sizeable portion of the relevant parameter space. Contrary to the standard result with symmetric firms, we also show that product differentiation can reduce both the efficient firm's and industry profits, implying that a local incentive towards less differentiation may arise.
Author: Kangsik Choi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
We consider a mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities when the public firm is less efficient than the private firm. Thus, even with cost asymmetry, we obtain exactly the same result (i.e., Bertrand competition) of Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) if Singh and Vives' (1984) assumption of positive primary outputs holds. However, compared to endogenous determination of the type of contract without cost asymmetry, our main finding is that in the wider range of cost asymmetry, different type(s) of equilibrium related to or not related to the limit-pricing strategy of the private firm can be sustained. Thus, when considering an implication on privatization, we may overestimate the welfare gain of privatization because Cournot competition takes place after privatization even though cost asymmetry exists between firms. While the result of Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) holds true if the goods are complements, we find the novel results in the case of substitutes.
Author: Andrew F. Daughety
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521361761
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 455
Get Book Here
Book Description
This volume focuses on the properties and uses of Cournot's model of competition among the few.
