Politics, Paradigms, and Intelligence Failures PDF Download
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Author: Ofira Seliktar
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317462440
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 297
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Book Description
Washington's failure to foresee the collapse of its superpower rival ranks high in the pantheon of predictive failures. The question of who got what right or wrong has been intertwined with the deeper issue of "who won" the Cold War. Like the disputes over "who lost" China and Iran, this debate has been fought out along ideological and partisan lines, with conservatives claiming credit for the Evil Empire's demise and liberals arguing that the causes were internal to the Soviet Union. The intelligence community has come in for harsh criticism for overestimating Soviet strength and overlooking the symptoms of crisis; the discipline of "Sovietology" has dissolved into acrimonious irrelevance. Drawing on declassified documents, interviews, and careful analysis of contemporaneous literature, this book offers the first systematic analysis of this predictive failure at the paradigmatic, foreign policy, and intelligence levels. Although it is focused on the Soviet case, it offers lessons that are both timely and necessary.
Author: Ofira Seliktar
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317462440
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 297
Get Book Here
Book Description
Washington's failure to foresee the collapse of its superpower rival ranks high in the pantheon of predictive failures. The question of who got what right or wrong has been intertwined with the deeper issue of "who won" the Cold War. Like the disputes over "who lost" China and Iran, this debate has been fought out along ideological and partisan lines, with conservatives claiming credit for the Evil Empire's demise and liberals arguing that the causes were internal to the Soviet Union. The intelligence community has come in for harsh criticism for overestimating Soviet strength and overlooking the symptoms of crisis; the discipline of "Sovietology" has dissolved into acrimonious irrelevance. Drawing on declassified documents, interviews, and careful analysis of contemporaneous literature, this book offers the first systematic analysis of this predictive failure at the paradigmatic, foreign policy, and intelligence levels. Although it is focused on the Soviet case, it offers lessons that are both timely and necessary.
Author: Babak Ganji
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 0857715755
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 329
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Book Description
Did the United States know more than it acknowledges about growing unrest under the Shah in mid-1970s Iran? Have historians of American-Iranian relations focused too narrowly on prevailing historical theory and personal recollection? In a period of escalating tension between the United States and Iran, what can the two nations' history of conflict tell us about their diplomatic future? Covering Carter's policy from the end of the Shah's reign to the revolution under Ayatollah Khomeini, Babak Ganji explores the nature of their perpetually antagonistic relations and the mistrust and misunderstanding that fuels it. Politics of Confrontation is a penetrating critique of international relations theory within the historical framework of US-Iranian relations, as well as a thorough examination of American policy towards Iran. It is the first in-depth look at documents seized by revolutionary students from the American Embassy during the infamous hostage crisis, and debunks the myth that US officials were unaware of the nature of opposition to the Shah or of Soviet influence on senior clerics. These findings are an essential addition to the discourse of foreign policy theorists and invaluable for historians of the US, Iran and the Cold War.
Author: O. Seliktar
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230610404
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 219
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Book Description
Coming at the heels of September 11, Operation Iraqi Freedom has focused the limelight on the way in which the United States predicts and manages political change. The failure to find WMD and more important, the continued violence in Iraq instead of the hoped for democracy, has engender an acrimonious debate on the motives of the Bush administration and its uses or misuses of intelligence. The question of who got what right or wrong has been fought out along ideological, and partisan lines, with supporters claiming that, given what was known about Saddam Hussein, the decision to change his regime was justified and detractors arguing that a group of largely Jewish neoconservatives, acting on behalf of Israel, manipulated intelligence in order to trick the United States into an unnecessary and costly war. The book provides a systematic and objective analysis of the problems that faced American intelligence in deciphering the behavior of the highly secretive and confusing Iraq regime and its enigmatic leader.
Author: Robert Jervis
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 0801457610
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 249
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Book Description
The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations—analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind—were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation. In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved.
Author: Milo Jones
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 0804787158
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 389
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Book Description
Constructing Cassandra analyzes the intelligence failures at the CIA that resulted in four key strategic surprises experienced by the US: the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Iranian revolution of 1978, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks—surprises still play out today in U.S. policy. Although there has been no shortage of studies exploring how intelligence failures can happen, none of them have been able to provide a unified understanding of the phenomenon. To correct that omission, this book brings culture and identity to the foreground to present a unified model of strategic surprise; one that focuses on the internal make-up the CIA, and takes seriously those Cassandras who offered warnings, but were ignored. This systematic exploration of the sources of the CIA's intelligence failures points to ways to prevent future strategic surprises.
Author: Itai Shapira
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 1040153259
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 257
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Book Description
The book offers a novel conceptualization of Israeli national intelligence culture, describing the way in which Israelis perceive and practice intelligence. Different nations have different national intelligence cultures, relying on different ideas of intelligence, perceiving and practicing intelligence in different ways. Written by a former senior intelligence officer, this book is the first study dedicated to Israeli intelligence culture and the way it reflects Israeli strategic culture. Relying on more than 30 elite interviews with acting and former Israeli practitioners, the book highlights the Israeli aversion to intelligence theory and scientific methods, as well as to the structured management of the intelligence system at the national level. It describes the intelligence system's emphasis on contrarian thinking and moral courage as the foundations of intelligence professionalism, and the growing inclination of Israeli intelligence toward action and influence. Intelligence is perceived and practiced by Israelis as a tool for problem-solving, addressing unique Israeli challenges. While some traits of the Israeli national intelligence culture have contributed to its high reputation and its ‘success story’, others might have also contributed to its failure in anticipating the Hamas terrorist attack on October 2023 or have remained aspirational norms rather than realized practice. The October 2023 failure, as that of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, will undoubtfully influence Israeli national intelligence culture for many years to come. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, Israeli politics, strategic studies, and international relations.
Author: Paul Maddrell
Publisher: Georgetown University Press
ISBN: 1626162409
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 311
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Book Description
Intelligence agencies spend huge sums of money to collect and analyze vast quantities of national security data for their political leaders. How well is this intelligence analyzed, how often is it acted on by policymakers, and does it have a positive or negative effect on decision making? Drawing on declassified documents, interviews with intelligence veterans and policymakers, and other sources, The Image of the Enemy breaks new ground as it examines how seven countries analyzed and used intelligence to shape their understanding of their main adversary. The cases in the book include the Soviet Union's analysis of the United States (and vice versa), East Germany's analysis of West Germany (and vice versa), British intelligence in the early years of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, Israeli intelligence about the Palestinians, Pakistani intelligence on India, and US intelligence about Islamist terrorists. These rivalries provide rich case studies for scholars and offer today’s analysts and policymakers the opportunity to closely evaluate past successes and failures in intelligence analysis and the best ways to give information support to policymakers. Using these lessons from the past, they can move forward to improve analysis of current adversaries and future threats.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Intelligence service
Languages : en
Pages : 618
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Book Description
Author: Andrew Monaghan
Publisher: Manchester University Press
ISBN: 1526155605
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 207
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Book Description
This illuminating book explains how and why Russia’s relations with the west have deteriorated to the point of initiating a new era of ‘great power competition’. An updated version of the bestselling 2016 edition, it explores the decline in relations since the early 2000s, taking in the war in Syria and the 2022 escalation in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Beyond geopolitical considerations, the book delves into the nature of power in Russia itself, providing an in-depth examination of the networks of influence that define the country's political landscape. In doing so it moves beyond the simplistic, Putin-centric narratives often found in western accounts, offering readers a fresh perspective on Russian politics. Understanding Russia is crucial for western leaders seeking to establish stable and constructive relations in the future. The new politics of Russia serves as a key resource, challenging conventional wisdom and unpicking the complex dynamics at play in the relationship between Russia and the west.
Author: David C. Engerman
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199886687
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 473
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Book Description
As World War II ended, few Americans in government or universities knew much about the Soviet Union. As David Engerman shows in this book, a network of scholars, soldiers, spies, and philanthropists created an enterprise known as Soviet Studies to fill in this dangerous gap in American knowledge. This group brought together some of the nation's best minds from the left, right, and center, colorful and controversial individuals ranging from George Kennan to Margaret Mead to Zbigniew Brzezinski, not to mention historians Sheila Fitzpatrick and Richard Pipes. Together they created the knowledge that helped fight the Cold War and define Cold War thought. Soviet Studies became a vibrant intellectual enterprise, studying not just the Soviet threat, but Soviet society and culture at a time when many said that these were contradictions in terms, as well as Russian history and literature. And this broad network, Engerman argues, forever changed the relationship between the government and academe, connecting the Pentagon with the ivory tower in ways that still matter today.
