Author: Lucian A. Bebchuk
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 9780674020634
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Pay Without Performance
Author: Lucian A. Bebchuk
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 9780674020634
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 9780674020634
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Pay without Performance
Author: Lucian Bebchuk
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 067426195X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 293
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 067426195X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 293
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance
Author: Benjamin Hermalin
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0444635408
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 762
Book Description
The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. - Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on - Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces - Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field's substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0444635408
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 762
Book Description
The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. - Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on - Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces - Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field's substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward
Searching for a Corporate Savior
Author: Rakesh Khurana
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400841097
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 318
Book Description
Corporate CEOs are headline news. Stock prices rise and fall at word of their hiring and firing. Business media debate their merits and defects as if individual leaders determined the health of the economy. Yet we know surprisingly little about how CEOs are selected and dismissed or about their true power. This is the first book to take us into the often secretive world of the CEO selection process. Rakesh Khurana's findings are surprising and disturbing. In recent years, he shows, corporations have increasingly sought CEOs who are above all else charismatic, whose fame and force of personality impress analysts and the business media, but whose experience and abilities are not necessarily right for companies' specific needs. The labor market for CEOs, Khurana concludes, is far less rational than we might think. Khurana's findings are based on a study of the hiring and firing of CEOs at over 850 of America's largest companies and on extensive interviews with CEOs, corporate board members, and consultants at executive search firms. Written with exceptional clarity and verve, the book explains the basic mechanics of the selection process and how hiring priorities have changed with the rise of shareholder activism. Khurana argues that the market for CEOs, which we often assume runs on cool calculation and the impersonal forces of supply and demand, is culturally determined and too frequently inefficient. Its emphasis on charisma artificially limits the number of candidates considered, giving them extraordinary leverage to demand high salaries and power. It also raises expectations and increases the chance that a CEO will be fired for failing to meet shareholders' hopes. The result is corporate instability and too little attention to long-term strategy. The book is a major contribution to our understanding of corporate culture and the nature of markets and leadership in general.
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400841097
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 318
Book Description
Corporate CEOs are headline news. Stock prices rise and fall at word of their hiring and firing. Business media debate their merits and defects as if individual leaders determined the health of the economy. Yet we know surprisingly little about how CEOs are selected and dismissed or about their true power. This is the first book to take us into the often secretive world of the CEO selection process. Rakesh Khurana's findings are surprising and disturbing. In recent years, he shows, corporations have increasingly sought CEOs who are above all else charismatic, whose fame and force of personality impress analysts and the business media, but whose experience and abilities are not necessarily right for companies' specific needs. The labor market for CEOs, Khurana concludes, is far less rational than we might think. Khurana's findings are based on a study of the hiring and firing of CEOs at over 850 of America's largest companies and on extensive interviews with CEOs, corporate board members, and consultants at executive search firms. Written with exceptional clarity and verve, the book explains the basic mechanics of the selection process and how hiring priorities have changed with the rise of shareholder activism. Khurana argues that the market for CEOs, which we often assume runs on cool calculation and the impersonal forces of supply and demand, is culturally determined and too frequently inefficient. Its emphasis on charisma artificially limits the number of candidates considered, giving them extraordinary leverage to demand high salaries and power. It also raises expectations and increases the chance that a CEO will be fired for failing to meet shareholders' hopes. The result is corporate instability and too little attention to long-term strategy. The book is a major contribution to our understanding of corporate culture and the nature of markets and leadership in general.
An Introduction to Executive Compensation
Author: Steven Balsam
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 9780120771264
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 410
Book Description
General readers have no idea why people should care about what executives are paid and why they are paid the way they are. That's the reason that The Wall Street Journal, Fortune, Forbes, and other popular and practitioner publications have regular coverage on them. This book not only proposes a reason - executives need incentives in order to maximize firm value (economists call this agency theory) - it also describes the nature and design of executive compensation practices. Those incentives can take the form of benefits (salary, stock options), or prerquisites (reflecting the status of the executive within the organizational culture.
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 9780120771264
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 410
Book Description
General readers have no idea why people should care about what executives are paid and why they are paid the way they are. That's the reason that The Wall Street Journal, Fortune, Forbes, and other popular and practitioner publications have regular coverage on them. This book not only proposes a reason - executives need incentives in order to maximize firm value (economists call this agency theory) - it also describes the nature and design of executive compensation practices. Those incentives can take the form of benefits (salary, stock options), or prerquisites (reflecting the status of the executive within the organizational culture.
Myths and Realities of Executive Pay
Author: Ira Kay
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521871952
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 278
Book Description
This book answers the question 'Are CEOs overpaid?' with a resounding 'No.' Defying dogma and business myths, it documents the realities of executive pay in the United States and the forces that have shaped pay in recent years. The authors, both expert consultants on the subject, investigate the extent to which pay is related to corporate performance and provide clear guidance for an approach that drives business success and shareholder value. Based on extensive research and decades of direct experience in working with thousands of companies, the book provides provocative insights for executives, analysts, government officials, and shareholders.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521871952
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 278
Book Description
This book answers the question 'Are CEOs overpaid?' with a resounding 'No.' Defying dogma and business myths, it documents the realities of executive pay in the United States and the forces that have shaped pay in recent years. The authors, both expert consultants on the subject, investigate the extent to which pay is related to corporate performance and provide clear guidance for an approach that drives business success and shareholder value. Based on extensive research and decades of direct experience in working with thousands of companies, the book provides provocative insights for executives, analysts, government officials, and shareholders.
International Corporate Governance After Sarbanes-Oxley
Author: Paul Ali
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1118161122
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 405
Book Description
"The Sabanes-Oxley Act has been one of the most significant developments in corporate and securities regulation since the New Deal. This collection of important articles would be a valuable resource for anyone seeking to understand Sabanes-Oxley's far-reaching effects on corporate governance in the United States and elsewhere." —Jesse Fried, coauthor of Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation and Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley "The editors have assembled the latest cutting-edge research on international corporate governance by respected academics in this field. In this handbook, the editors deal with all aspects of the significant legislative changes to corporate governance regulation. It introduces the reader to the new rules that will certainly improve the reliability and the accuracy of disclosures made by corporations. The book comes at the right moment with the recent scandals such as Enron, which will educate all readers especially shareholders of corporate stock." —Komlan Sedzro, Professor of Finance, University of Quebec at Montreal "Today, corporate governance is a topic at the center of public policy debate in most industrialized countries. The range of concerns; the variety of approaches; and their tendency to converge in some areas or diverge in others (not always in the right directions) are emphatically demonstrated by these essays. There is material here of enormous interest for scholars of comparative law and economic regulation. And significantly, the presentation of essays from legal, financial, and regulatory viewpoints demonstrates the growing practical as well as theoretical utility of interdisciplinary work in this area. Professors Ali and Gregoriou are to be warmly congratulated for their skill and initiative in assembling an important publication, as well as for their own contributions to interdisciplinary scholarship." —R. P. Austin, BA, LLM (Sydney), DPhil (Oxon), Supreme Court of New South Wales "This very international collection emphasizes the economic line of descent, while including legal and socio-legal contributions. It fills a very important gap in our empirical knowledge of corporate governance. It is accessible and comprehensive and will greatly assist readers from all relevant disciplines, who are trying to discern the shape of corporate governance as a mature field." —Dimity Kingsford Smith, Professor of Law, University of New South Wales
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1118161122
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 405
Book Description
"The Sabanes-Oxley Act has been one of the most significant developments in corporate and securities regulation since the New Deal. This collection of important articles would be a valuable resource for anyone seeking to understand Sabanes-Oxley's far-reaching effects on corporate governance in the United States and elsewhere." —Jesse Fried, coauthor of Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation and Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley "The editors have assembled the latest cutting-edge research on international corporate governance by respected academics in this field. In this handbook, the editors deal with all aspects of the significant legislative changes to corporate governance regulation. It introduces the reader to the new rules that will certainly improve the reliability and the accuracy of disclosures made by corporations. The book comes at the right moment with the recent scandals such as Enron, which will educate all readers especially shareholders of corporate stock." —Komlan Sedzro, Professor of Finance, University of Quebec at Montreal "Today, corporate governance is a topic at the center of public policy debate in most industrialized countries. The range of concerns; the variety of approaches; and their tendency to converge in some areas or diverge in others (not always in the right directions) are emphatically demonstrated by these essays. There is material here of enormous interest for scholars of comparative law and economic regulation. And significantly, the presentation of essays from legal, financial, and regulatory viewpoints demonstrates the growing practical as well as theoretical utility of interdisciplinary work in this area. Professors Ali and Gregoriou are to be warmly congratulated for their skill and initiative in assembling an important publication, as well as for their own contributions to interdisciplinary scholarship." —R. P. Austin, BA, LLM (Sydney), DPhil (Oxon), Supreme Court of New South Wales "This very international collection emphasizes the economic line of descent, while including legal and socio-legal contributions. It fills a very important gap in our empirical knowledge of corporate governance. It is accessible and comprehensive and will greatly assist readers from all relevant disciplines, who are trying to discern the shape of corporate governance as a mature field." —Dimity Kingsford Smith, Professor of Law, University of New South Wales
Compensation Committee Handbook
Author: James F. Reda
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 0471698407
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 481
Book Description
This Second Edition provides a comprehensive review of the issues facing compensation committees and covers functional issues such as organising, planning, and best practice tips. Compliance advice on the implications of Sarbanes-Oxley and other regulations is addressed along with new requirements on disclosures of financial transactions involving management and principal stockholders.
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 0471698407
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 481
Book Description
This Second Edition provides a comprehensive review of the issues facing compensation committees and covers functional issues such as organising, planning, and best practice tips. Compliance advice on the implications of Sarbanes-Oxley and other regulations is addressed along with new requirements on disclosures of financial transactions involving management and principal stockholders.
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION.
Author: Lucian A. Bebchuk
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay
Author: Fabrizio Ferri
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781680834215
Category : Compensation management
Languages : en
Pages : 103
Book Description
This monograph explores the relation between corporate governance and executive compensation and evaluates the conditions under which shareholders can benefit from the right to interfere with the pay setting process by voting on the compensation proposed by the board of directors (Say on Pay). The first part of the monograph lays out the theoretical framework. The second part provides an overview of the origins and country-specific differences in Say on Pay regulation and a detailed summary and evaluation of the empirical literature on the subject.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781680834215
Category : Compensation management
Languages : en
Pages : 103
Book Description
This monograph explores the relation between corporate governance and executive compensation and evaluates the conditions under which shareholders can benefit from the right to interfere with the pay setting process by voting on the compensation proposed by the board of directors (Say on Pay). The first part of the monograph lays out the theoretical framework. The second part provides an overview of the origins and country-specific differences in Say on Pay regulation and a detailed summary and evaluation of the empirical literature on the subject.