Author: Georgios Raedt
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3031015584
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 150
Book Description
Cooperative game theory is a branch of (micro-)economics that studies the behavior of self-interested agents in strategic settings where binding agreements among agents are possible. Our aim in this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory. We begin by formally defining transferable utility games in characteristic function form, and introducing key solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value. We then discuss two major issues that arise when considering such games from a computational perspective: identifying compact representations for games, and the closely related problem of efficiently computing solution concepts for games. We survey several formalisms for cooperative games that have been proposed in the literature, including, for example, cooperative games defined on networks, as well as general compact representation schemes such as MC-nets and skill games. As a detailed case study, we consider weighted voting games: a widely-used and practically important class of cooperative games that inherently have a natural compact representation. We investigate the complexity of solution concepts for such games, and generalizations of them. We briefly discuss games with non-transferable utility and partition function games. We then overview algorithms for identifying welfare-maximizing coalition structures and methods used by rational agents to form coalitions (even under uncertainty), including bargaining algorithms. We conclude by considering some developing topics, applications, and future research directions.
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
Author: Georgios Raedt
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3031015584
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 150
Book Description
Cooperative game theory is a branch of (micro-)economics that studies the behavior of self-interested agents in strategic settings where binding agreements among agents are possible. Our aim in this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory. We begin by formally defining transferable utility games in characteristic function form, and introducing key solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value. We then discuss two major issues that arise when considering such games from a computational perspective: identifying compact representations for games, and the closely related problem of efficiently computing solution concepts for games. We survey several formalisms for cooperative games that have been proposed in the literature, including, for example, cooperative games defined on networks, as well as general compact representation schemes such as MC-nets and skill games. As a detailed case study, we consider weighted voting games: a widely-used and practically important class of cooperative games that inherently have a natural compact representation. We investigate the complexity of solution concepts for such games, and generalizations of them. We briefly discuss games with non-transferable utility and partition function games. We then overview algorithms for identifying welfare-maximizing coalition structures and methods used by rational agents to form coalitions (even under uncertainty), including bargaining algorithms. We conclude by considering some developing topics, applications, and future research directions.
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3031015584
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 150
Book Description
Cooperative game theory is a branch of (micro-)economics that studies the behavior of self-interested agents in strategic settings where binding agreements among agents are possible. Our aim in this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory. We begin by formally defining transferable utility games in characteristic function form, and introducing key solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value. We then discuss two major issues that arise when considering such games from a computational perspective: identifying compact representations for games, and the closely related problem of efficiently computing solution concepts for games. We survey several formalisms for cooperative games that have been proposed in the literature, including, for example, cooperative games defined on networks, as well as general compact representation schemes such as MC-nets and skill games. As a detailed case study, we consider weighted voting games: a widely-used and practically important class of cooperative games that inherently have a natural compact representation. We investigate the complexity of solution concepts for such games, and generalizations of them. We briefly discuss games with non-transferable utility and partition function games. We then overview algorithms for identifying welfare-maximizing coalition structures and methods used by rational agents to form coalitions (even under uncertainty), including bargaining algorithms. We conclude by considering some developing topics, applications, and future research directions.
Epistemic Game Theory
Author: Andrés Perea
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107008913
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 581
Book Description
The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107008913
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 581
Book Description
The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.
A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation
Author: Debraj Ray
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019920795X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 336
Book Description
Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019920795X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 336
Book Description
Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.
The Probabilistic Method
Author: Noga Alon
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1119062071
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 396
Book Description
Praise for the Third Edition “Researchers of any kind of extremal combinatorics or theoretical computer science will welcome the new edition of this book.” - MAA Reviews Maintaining a standard of excellence that establishes The Probabilistic Method as the leading reference on probabilistic methods in combinatorics, the Fourth Edition continues to feature a clear writing style, illustrative examples, and illuminating exercises. The new edition includes numerous updates to reflect the most recent developments and advances in discrete mathematics and the connections to other areas in mathematics, theoretical computer science, and statistical physics. Emphasizing the methodology and techniques that enable problem-solving, The Probabilistic Method, Fourth Edition begins with a description of tools applied to probabilistic arguments, including basic techniques that use expectation and variance as well as the more advanced applications of martingales and correlation inequalities. The authors explore where probabilistic techniques have been applied successfully and also examine topical coverage such as discrepancy and random graphs, circuit complexity, computational geometry, and derandomization of randomized algorithms. Written by two well-known authorities in the field, the Fourth Edition features: Additional exercises throughout with hints and solutions to select problems in an appendix to help readers obtain a deeper understanding of the best methods and techniques New coverage on topics such as the Local Lemma, Six Standard Deviations result in Discrepancy Theory, Property B, and graph limits Updated sections to reflect major developments on the newest topics, discussions of the hypergraph container method, and many new references and improved results The Probabilistic Method, Fourth Edition is an ideal textbook for upper-undergraduate and graduate-level students majoring in mathematics, computer science, operations research, and statistics. The Fourth Edition is also an excellent reference for researchers and combinatorists who use probabilistic methods, discrete mathematics, and number theory. Noga Alon, PhD, is Baumritter Professor of Mathematics and Computer Science at Tel Aviv University. He is a member of the Israel National Academy of Sciences and Academia Europaea. A coeditor of the journal Random Structures and Algorithms, Dr. Alon is the recipient of the Polya Prize, The Gödel Prize, The Israel Prize, and the EMET Prize. Joel H. Spencer, PhD, is Professor of Mathematics and Computer Science at the Courant Institute of New York University. He is the cofounder and coeditor of the journal Random Structures and Algorithms and is a Sloane Foundation Fellow. Dr. Spencer has written more than 200 published articles and is the coauthor of Ramsey Theory, Second Edition, also published by Wiley.
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1119062071
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 396
Book Description
Praise for the Third Edition “Researchers of any kind of extremal combinatorics or theoretical computer science will welcome the new edition of this book.” - MAA Reviews Maintaining a standard of excellence that establishes The Probabilistic Method as the leading reference on probabilistic methods in combinatorics, the Fourth Edition continues to feature a clear writing style, illustrative examples, and illuminating exercises. The new edition includes numerous updates to reflect the most recent developments and advances in discrete mathematics and the connections to other areas in mathematics, theoretical computer science, and statistical physics. Emphasizing the methodology and techniques that enable problem-solving, The Probabilistic Method, Fourth Edition begins with a description of tools applied to probabilistic arguments, including basic techniques that use expectation and variance as well as the more advanced applications of martingales and correlation inequalities. The authors explore where probabilistic techniques have been applied successfully and also examine topical coverage such as discrepancy and random graphs, circuit complexity, computational geometry, and derandomization of randomized algorithms. Written by two well-known authorities in the field, the Fourth Edition features: Additional exercises throughout with hints and solutions to select problems in an appendix to help readers obtain a deeper understanding of the best methods and techniques New coverage on topics such as the Local Lemma, Six Standard Deviations result in Discrepancy Theory, Property B, and graph limits Updated sections to reflect major developments on the newest topics, discussions of the hypergraph container method, and many new references and improved results The Probabilistic Method, Fourth Edition is an ideal textbook for upper-undergraduate and graduate-level students majoring in mathematics, computer science, operations research, and statistics. The Fourth Edition is also an excellent reference for researchers and combinatorists who use probabilistic methods, discrete mathematics, and number theory. Noga Alon, PhD, is Baumritter Professor of Mathematics and Computer Science at Tel Aviv University. He is a member of the Israel National Academy of Sciences and Academia Europaea. A coeditor of the journal Random Structures and Algorithms, Dr. Alon is the recipient of the Polya Prize, The Gödel Prize, The Israel Prize, and the EMET Prize. Joel H. Spencer, PhD, is Professor of Mathematics and Computer Science at the Courant Institute of New York University. He is the cofounder and coeditor of the journal Random Structures and Algorithms and is a Sloane Foundation Fellow. Dr. Spencer has written more than 200 published articles and is the coauthor of Ramsey Theory, Second Edition, also published by Wiley.
Technometrics
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Experimental design
Languages : en
Pages : 476
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Experimental design
Languages : en
Pages : 476
Book Description
Preference, Belief, and Similarity
Author: Amos Tversky
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262700931
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 1046
Book Description
Amos Tversky (1937–1996), a towering figure in cognitive and mathematical psychology, devoted his professional life to the study of similarity, judgment, and decision making. He had a unique ability to master the technicalities of normative ideals and then to intuit and demonstrate experimentally their systematic violation due to the vagaries and consequences of human information processing. He created new areas of study and helped transform disciplines as varied as economics, law, medicine, political science, philosophy, and statistics. This book collects forty of Tversky's articles, selected by him in collaboration with the editor during the last months of Tversky's life. It is divided into three sections: Similarity, Judgment, and Preferences. The Preferences section is subdivided into Probabilistic Models of Choice, Choice under Risk and Uncertainty, and Contingent Preferences. Included are several articles written with his frequent collaborator, Nobel Prize-winning economist Daniel Kahneman.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262700931
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 1046
Book Description
Amos Tversky (1937–1996), a towering figure in cognitive and mathematical psychology, devoted his professional life to the study of similarity, judgment, and decision making. He had a unique ability to master the technicalities of normative ideals and then to intuit and demonstrate experimentally their systematic violation due to the vagaries and consequences of human information processing. He created new areas of study and helped transform disciplines as varied as economics, law, medicine, political science, philosophy, and statistics. This book collects forty of Tversky's articles, selected by him in collaboration with the editor during the last months of Tversky's life. It is divided into three sections: Similarity, Judgment, and Preferences. The Preferences section is subdivided into Probabilistic Models of Choice, Choice under Risk and Uncertainty, and Contingent Preferences. Included are several articles written with his frequent collaborator, Nobel Prize-winning economist Daniel Kahneman.
Game Theory for Political Scientists
Author: James D. Morrow
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691213208
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 400
Book Description
Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interaction. In the fifty years since the appearance of von Neumann and Morgenstern's classic Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1944), game theory has been widely applied to problems in economics. Until recently, however, its usefulness in political science has been underappreciated, in part because of the technical difficulty of the methods developed by economists. James Morrow's book is the first to provide a standard text adapting contemporary game theory to political analysis. It uses a minimum of mathematics to teach the essentials of game theory and contains problems and their solutions suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in all branches of political science. Morrow begins with classical utility and game theory and ends with current research on repeated games and games of incomplete information. The book focuses on noncooperative game theory and its application to international relations, political economy, and American and comparative politics. Special attention is given to models of four topics: bargaining, legislative voting rules, voting in mass elections, and deterrence. An appendix reviews relevant mathematical techniques. Brief bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter suggest further readings, graded according to difficulty. This rigorous but accessible introduction to game theory will be of use not only to political scientists but also to psychologists, sociologists, and others in the social sciences.
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691213208
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 400
Book Description
Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interaction. In the fifty years since the appearance of von Neumann and Morgenstern's classic Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1944), game theory has been widely applied to problems in economics. Until recently, however, its usefulness in political science has been underappreciated, in part because of the technical difficulty of the methods developed by economists. James Morrow's book is the first to provide a standard text adapting contemporary game theory to political analysis. It uses a minimum of mathematics to teach the essentials of game theory and contains problems and their solutions suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in all branches of political science. Morrow begins with classical utility and game theory and ends with current research on repeated games and games of incomplete information. The book focuses on noncooperative game theory and its application to international relations, political economy, and American and comparative politics. Special attention is given to models of four topics: bargaining, legislative voting rules, voting in mass elections, and deterrence. An appendix reviews relevant mathematical techniques. Brief bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter suggest further readings, graded according to difficulty. This rigorous but accessible introduction to game theory will be of use not only to political scientists but also to psychologists, sociologists, and others in the social sciences.
Game Theory, Experience, Rationality
Author: W. Leinfellner
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401716544
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 476
Book Description
When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discover ies is not over. The recent advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401716544
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 476
Book Description
When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discover ies is not over. The recent advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory.
ECAI 2008
Author: European Coordinating Committee for Artificial Intelligence
Publisher: IOS Press
ISBN: 1586038915
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 972
Book Description
Includes subconference "Prestigious Applications of Intelligent Systems (PAIS 2008)."
Publisher: IOS Press
ISBN: 1586038915
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 972
Book Description
Includes subconference "Prestigious Applications of Intelligent Systems (PAIS 2008)."
The Theory of Learning in Games
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262061940
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 304
Book Description
This work explains that equilibrium is the long-run outcome of a process in which non-fully rational players search for optimality over time. The models they e×plore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262061940
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 304
Book Description
This work explains that equilibrium is the long-run outcome of a process in which non-fully rational players search for optimality over time. The models they e×plore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.