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Author: Marco Klapper
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 365622336X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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Book Description
Bachelor Thesis from the year 2012 in the subject Business economics - Business Management, Corporate Governance, grade: 1,3, University of Tubingen, language: English, abstract: It is the purpose of this paper to examine to what extent ownership structure can alleviate the agency problem and limit managerial expropriation of small shareholders. Since stock options and other forms of equity are frequently used as compensation for managers, special emphasis is placed on the question of how managerial ownership can affect agency costs and firm value. To evaluate the impact of ownership patterns on shareholder value, this paper surveys and reinterprets scientific advances in the corporate governance literature. A significant part of the analysis covers the interrelation of inside ownership, corporate policies, and shareholder value; as well as the role of endogeneity.
Author: Marco Klapper
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 365622336X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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Book Description
Bachelor Thesis from the year 2012 in the subject Business economics - Business Management, Corporate Governance, grade: 1,3, University of Tubingen, language: English, abstract: It is the purpose of this paper to examine to what extent ownership structure can alleviate the agency problem and limit managerial expropriation of small shareholders. Since stock options and other forms of equity are frequently used as compensation for managers, special emphasis is placed on the question of how managerial ownership can affect agency costs and firm value. To evaluate the impact of ownership patterns on shareholder value, this paper surveys and reinterprets scientific advances in the corporate governance literature. A significant part of the analysis covers the interrelation of inside ownership, corporate policies, and shareholder value; as well as the role of endogeneity.
Author: Beni Lauterbach
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 58
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Book Description
Author: Alberto Chong
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 0821369148
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 584
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Book Description
'Investor Protection and Corporate Governance' analyzes the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and valuation. Using unique datasets gathered at the firm-level the first such data in the region and results from a homogeneous corporate governance questionnaire, the book examines corporate governance characteristics, ownership structures, dividend policies, and performance measures. The book's analysis reveals the very high levels of ownership and voting rights concentrations and monolithic governance structures in the largest samples of Latin American companies up to now, and new data emphasize the importance of specific characteristics of the investor protection regimes in several Latin American countries. By and large, those firms with better governance measures across several dimensions are granted higher valuations and thus lower cost of capital. This title will be useful to researchers, policy makers, government officials, and other professionals involved in corporate governance, economic policy, and business finance, law, and management.
Author: Narjess Boubakri
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Environmental economics
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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Book Description
Author: Erica X. N. Li
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 45
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Book Description
Both shareholder protection and creditor protection are considered in a general equilibrium model with two competing technologies. Entrepreneurs are wealth-constrained and resort to banks and the equity market for external financing. The economy's financial structure is determined by the relative quality of shareholder protection and creditor protection. The coexistence of banks and the equity market is shown to be beneficial. The external financing preference of a firm follows the pecking order with limited debt capacity. Better creditor protection leads to larger debt capacity. I show that the ownership structure has a hump-shape relation with the quality of shareholder protection. Ownership is more concentrated with better creditor protection and in firms with wealthier entrepreneurs. The market return and entrepreneurial activities weakly increase with the quality of both shareholder protection and creditor protection. Increases in shareholder protection lower the firm values for firms that use sufficiently small amount of equity financing.
Author: Jonathan Fisher
Publisher: Sweet & Maxwell
ISBN: 9780421673007
Category : Financial services industy
Languages : en
Pages : 734
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Book Description
This series enables practitioners to stay up to date with litigation and developments in the field of entertainment law. Emphasis is placed on the practical implications of relevant legislative developments and the effects of technology on artists, rights owners and collecting societies
Author: Vasiliki Stergiou
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Concentrated ownership is perceived as an inefficient form of ownership because it allegedly increases the risk of minority expropriation, which is further exacerbated by the disproportionality of control and cash-flow rights of the controller. This thesis challenges the perception of concentration as a per se inefficient ownership structure. It argues that the 'inefficiency bias' is based on the oversimplified, incorrect assumption that concentration is characterised by the presence of one controlling shareholder and therefore disregards the variety of the forms of concentration. To substantiate this argument, this thesis categorises the forms of concentration based on the identity and number of the controllers and examines their impact on corporate governance. It is shown, that the distinct characteristics of the varieties of shareholders' profiles have an ambivalent impact on corporate governance: Families are strongly committed investors but also prone to extract private benefits of control; the state is inefficient in monitoring but can also be a driver of good corporate governance practices; multiple large shareholders improve internal contestability of control but shareholders' agreements can also be used for minority expropriation. In this context, the effectiveness of the legal framework to mitigate the arising corporate governance problems becomes the key factor which differentiates efficient from inefficient corporate ownership structures. The different corporate governance problems of concentration imply that adapted legal solutions and adequately flexible rules are the prerequisites of effective investor protection. Given the varieties of concentration, legal effectiveness and strong investor protection can therefore only be defined by reference to a given ownership structure. This thesis presents concrete examples of investor protection mechanisms which are adapted to the distinct characteristics of the varieties of concentration: In the case of family and state ownership, effective minority protection takes the form of special minority rights of board-representation; within multiple large blockholdings, shareholders' agreements limit the abuse of the governance rights of majority shareholders. Ultimately, the thesis deals with the implications of this complex interaction between ownership structures and corporate governance which compromise the reliability of indices as a metric of the quality of corporate governance, to the extent that the applied methodology fails to encompass the differences in shareholders' profiles and that a functional approach to the substantive legal analysis preceding the compilation of an index is not adopted.
Author: Inessa Love
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Ivana Raonic
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 33
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Book Description
This study examines the interactive influence of corporate ownership, corporate governance and investor protection on the incorporation of current value shocks in the accounting earnings of European companies. This influence is investigated not only by means of the association between current news and current earnings but also with respect to the association of the same news with expected future earnings, and its persistence. Consistent with the contractual explanation of accounting conservatism, it is shown that the accounting behaviour examined is a function of the demand created by shareholders, and that the institutional arrangements in force are of lesser significance in the presence of widely held ownership. On the other hand, greater separation between supervision and management and stronger investor protection are seen to be influential under close ownership, as these are shown to curb aggressive accounting in the form of a persistently lower recognition of bad news in earnings. Evidence is also provided that stricter corporate governance practices in Europe can substitute for weaknesses in investor protection provisions in law.
Author: Morad Abdel-Halim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Book Description
We investigate the relationship between firm's dividend policy and the corporate governance mechanism, measured by firm's ownership structure, in an emerging market characterized by weak corporate governance system and ineffective law enforcement. Evidence is drawn from non financial corporations over the period 2004-2008 using several econometric models with different specifications that account for firm-specific unobservable variables. We find a significant negative relationship between firm's dividend payout ratio and its percentage of capital owned by blockholders. This result implies that large shareholders are either expropriating the rights of minority shareholders or that firm's earnings are being used to finance its future investments. Our results support the first implication as we find that the negative impact of large shareholders' capital stake on dividend payments is robust and unchanged when firm's sales growth is controlled for.
