Author: Dominic D. P. Johnson
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674039165
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 289
Book Description
Opponents rarely go to war without thinking they can win--and clearly, one side must be wrong. This conundrum lies at the heart of the so-called "war puzzle": rational states should agree on their differences in power and thus not fight. But as Dominic Johnson argues in Overconfidence and War, states are no more rational than people, who are susceptible to exaggerated ideas of their own virtue, of their ability to control events, and of the future. By looking at this bias--called "positive illusions"--as it figures in evolutionary biology, psychology, and the politics of international conflict, this book offers compelling insights into why states wage war. Johnson traces the effects of positive illusions on four turning points in twentieth-century history: two that erupted into war (World War I and Vietnam); and two that did not (the Munich crisis and the Cuban missile crisis). Examining the two wars, he shows how positive illusions have filtered into politics, causing leaders to overestimate themselves and underestimate their adversaries--and to resort to violence to settle a conflict against unreasonable odds. In the Munich and Cuban missile crises, he shows how lessening positive illusions may allow leaders to pursue peaceful solutions. The human tendency toward overconfidence may have been favored by natural selection throughout our evolutionary history because of the advantages it conferred--heightening combat performance or improving one's ability to bluff an opponent. And yet, as this book suggests--and as the recent conflict in Iraq bears out--in the modern world the consequences of this evolutionary legacy are potentially deadly.
Overconfidence and War
Author: Dominic D. P. Johnson
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674039165
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 289
Book Description
Opponents rarely go to war without thinking they can win--and clearly, one side must be wrong. This conundrum lies at the heart of the so-called "war puzzle": rational states should agree on their differences in power and thus not fight. But as Dominic Johnson argues in Overconfidence and War, states are no more rational than people, who are susceptible to exaggerated ideas of their own virtue, of their ability to control events, and of the future. By looking at this bias--called "positive illusions"--as it figures in evolutionary biology, psychology, and the politics of international conflict, this book offers compelling insights into why states wage war. Johnson traces the effects of positive illusions on four turning points in twentieth-century history: two that erupted into war (World War I and Vietnam); and two that did not (the Munich crisis and the Cuban missile crisis). Examining the two wars, he shows how positive illusions have filtered into politics, causing leaders to overestimate themselves and underestimate their adversaries--and to resort to violence to settle a conflict against unreasonable odds. In the Munich and Cuban missile crises, he shows how lessening positive illusions may allow leaders to pursue peaceful solutions. The human tendency toward overconfidence may have been favored by natural selection throughout our evolutionary history because of the advantages it conferred--heightening combat performance or improving one's ability to bluff an opponent. And yet, as this book suggests--and as the recent conflict in Iraq bears out--in the modern world the consequences of this evolutionary legacy are potentially deadly.
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674039165
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 289
Book Description
Opponents rarely go to war without thinking they can win--and clearly, one side must be wrong. This conundrum lies at the heart of the so-called "war puzzle": rational states should agree on their differences in power and thus not fight. But as Dominic Johnson argues in Overconfidence and War, states are no more rational than people, who are susceptible to exaggerated ideas of their own virtue, of their ability to control events, and of the future. By looking at this bias--called "positive illusions"--as it figures in evolutionary biology, psychology, and the politics of international conflict, this book offers compelling insights into why states wage war. Johnson traces the effects of positive illusions on four turning points in twentieth-century history: two that erupted into war (World War I and Vietnam); and two that did not (the Munich crisis and the Cuban missile crisis). Examining the two wars, he shows how positive illusions have filtered into politics, causing leaders to overestimate themselves and underestimate their adversaries--and to resort to violence to settle a conflict against unreasonable odds. In the Munich and Cuban missile crises, he shows how lessening positive illusions may allow leaders to pursue peaceful solutions. The human tendency toward overconfidence may have been favored by natural selection throughout our evolutionary history because of the advantages it conferred--heightening combat performance or improving one's ability to bluff an opponent. And yet, as this book suggests--and as the recent conflict in Iraq bears out--in the modern world the consequences of this evolutionary legacy are potentially deadly.
Failing to Win
Author: Dominic D. P. Johnson
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674039173
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 358
Book Description
How do people decide which country came out ahead in a war or a crisis? Why, for instance, was the Mayaguez Incident in May 1975--where 41 U.S. soldiers were killed and dozens more wounded in a botched hostage rescue mission--perceived as a triumph and the 1992-94 U.S. humanitarian intervention in Somalia, which saved thousands of lives, viewed as a disaster? In Failing to Win, Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney dissect the psychological factors that predispose leaders, media, and the public to perceive outcomes as victories or defeats--often creating wide gaps between perceptions and reality. To make their case, Johnson and Tierney employ two frameworks: "Scorekeeping," which focuses on actual material gains and losses; and "Match-fixing," where evaluations become skewed by mindsets, symbolic events, and media and elite spin. In case studies ranging from the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the current War on Terror, the authors show that much of what we accept about international politics and world history is not what it seems--and why, in a time when citizens offer or withdraw support based on an imagined view of the outcome rather than the result on the ground, perceptions of success or failure can shape the results of wars, the fate of leaders, and the "lessons" we draw from history.
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674039173
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 358
Book Description
How do people decide which country came out ahead in a war or a crisis? Why, for instance, was the Mayaguez Incident in May 1975--where 41 U.S. soldiers were killed and dozens more wounded in a botched hostage rescue mission--perceived as a triumph and the 1992-94 U.S. humanitarian intervention in Somalia, which saved thousands of lives, viewed as a disaster? In Failing to Win, Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney dissect the psychological factors that predispose leaders, media, and the public to perceive outcomes as victories or defeats--often creating wide gaps between perceptions and reality. To make their case, Johnson and Tierney employ two frameworks: "Scorekeeping," which focuses on actual material gains and losses; and "Match-fixing," where evaluations become skewed by mindsets, symbolic events, and media and elite spin. In case studies ranging from the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the current War on Terror, the authors show that much of what we accept about international politics and world history is not what it seems--and why, in a time when citizens offer or withdraw support based on an imagined view of the outcome rather than the result on the ground, perceptions of success or failure can shape the results of wars, the fate of leaders, and the "lessons" we draw from history.
Strategic Instincts
Author: Dominic D. P. Johnson
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691210608
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 392
Book Description
"A very timely book."—Anne-Marie Slaughter, CEO of New America How cognitive biases can guide good decision making in politics and international relations A widespread assumption in political science and international relations is that cognitive biases—quirks of the brain we all share as human beings—are detrimental and responsible for policy failures, disasters, and wars. In Strategic Instincts, Dominic Johnson challenges this assumption, explaining that these nonrational behaviors can actually support favorable results in international politics and contribute to political and strategic success. By studying past examples, he considers the ways that cognitive biases act as “strategic instincts,” lending a competitive edge in policy decisions, especially under conditions of unpredictability and imperfect information. Drawing from evolutionary theory and behavioral sciences, Johnson looks at three influential cognitive biases—overconfidence, the fundamental attribution error, and in-group/out-group bias. He then examines the advantageous as well as the detrimental effects of these biases through historical case studies of the American Revolution, the Munich Crisis, and the Pacific campaign in World War II. He acknowledges the dark side of biases—when confidence becomes hubris, when attribution errors become paranoia, and when group bias becomes prejudice. Ultimately, Johnson makes a case for a more nuanced understanding of the causes and consequences of cognitive biases and argues that in the complex world of international relations, strategic instincts can, in the right context, guide better performance. Strategic Instincts shows how an evolutionary perspective can offer the crucial next step in bringing psychological insights to bear on foundational questions in international politics.
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691210608
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 392
Book Description
"A very timely book."—Anne-Marie Slaughter, CEO of New America How cognitive biases can guide good decision making in politics and international relations A widespread assumption in political science and international relations is that cognitive biases—quirks of the brain we all share as human beings—are detrimental and responsible for policy failures, disasters, and wars. In Strategic Instincts, Dominic Johnson challenges this assumption, explaining that these nonrational behaviors can actually support favorable results in international politics and contribute to political and strategic success. By studying past examples, he considers the ways that cognitive biases act as “strategic instincts,” lending a competitive edge in policy decisions, especially under conditions of unpredictability and imperfect information. Drawing from evolutionary theory and behavioral sciences, Johnson looks at three influential cognitive biases—overconfidence, the fundamental attribution error, and in-group/out-group bias. He then examines the advantageous as well as the detrimental effects of these biases through historical case studies of the American Revolution, the Munich Crisis, and the Pacific campaign in World War II. He acknowledges the dark side of biases—when confidence becomes hubris, when attribution errors become paranoia, and when group bias becomes prejudice. Ultimately, Johnson makes a case for a more nuanced understanding of the causes and consequences of cognitive biases and argues that in the complex world of international relations, strategic instincts can, in the right context, guide better performance. Strategic Instincts shows how an evolutionary perspective can offer the crucial next step in bringing psychological insights to bear on foundational questions in international politics.
Blinders, Blunders, and Wars
Author: David C. Gompert
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833087789
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 329
Book Description
The history of wars caused by misjudgments, from Napoleon’s invasion of Russia to America’s invasion of Iraq, reveals that leaders relied on cognitive models that were seriously at odds with objective reality. Blinders, Blunders, and Wars analyzes eight historical examples of strategic blunders regarding war and peace and four examples of decisions that turned out well, and then applies those lessons to the current Sino-American case.
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833087789
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 329
Book Description
The history of wars caused by misjudgments, from Napoleon’s invasion of Russia to America’s invasion of Iraq, reveals that leaders relied on cognitive models that were seriously at odds with objective reality. Blinders, Blunders, and Wars analyzes eight historical examples of strategic blunders regarding war and peace and four examples of decisions that turned out well, and then applies those lessons to the current Sino-American case.
The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution
Author: Gary E. Bolton
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199730857
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 419
Book Description
Individuals, groups, and societies all experience and resolve conflict. In this handbook, scholars from multiple disciplines offer perspectives on the current state and future challenges in negotiation and conflict resolution. This confluence of research perspectives will identify further synergies and advances in our understanding of conflict resolution.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199730857
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 419
Book Description
Individuals, groups, and societies all experience and resolve conflict. In this handbook, scholars from multiple disciplines offer perspectives on the current state and future challenges in negotiation and conflict resolution. This confluence of research perspectives will identify further synergies and advances in our understanding of conflict resolution.
A Bright Shining Lie
Author: Neil Sheehan
Publisher: Vintage
ISBN: 0679603808
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 898
Book Description
One of the most acclaimed books of our time—the definitive Vietnam War exposé and the winner of the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Award. When he came to Vietnam in 1962, Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann was the one clear-sighted participant in an enterprise riddled with arrogance and self-deception, a charismatic soldier who put his life and career on the line in an attempt to convince his superiors that the war should be fought another way. By the time he died in 1972, Vann had embraced the follies he once decried. He died believing that the war had been won. In this magisterial book, a monument of history and biography that was awarded the National Book Award and the Pulitzer Prize for Nonfiction, a renowned journalist tells the story of John Vann—"the one irreplaceable American in Vietnam"—and of the tragedy that destroyed a country and squandered so much of America's young manhood and resources.
Publisher: Vintage
ISBN: 0679603808
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 898
Book Description
One of the most acclaimed books of our time—the definitive Vietnam War exposé and the winner of the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Award. When he came to Vietnam in 1962, Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann was the one clear-sighted participant in an enterprise riddled with arrogance and self-deception, a charismatic soldier who put his life and career on the line in an attempt to convince his superiors that the war should be fought another way. By the time he died in 1972, Vann had embraced the follies he once decried. He died believing that the war had been won. In this magisterial book, a monument of history and biography that was awarded the National Book Award and the Pulitzer Prize for Nonfiction, a renowned journalist tells the story of John Vann—"the one irreplaceable American in Vietnam"—and of the tragedy that destroyed a country and squandered so much of America's young manhood and resources.
Yalu River 1950–51
Author: Clayton K. S. Chun
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 147283724X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 97
Book Description
Following the Inchon landings and the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, UN forces crossed the North Korean border on 9 October and moved on the capital Pyongyang. Many in America believed the war would be over by Christmas, but some Washington diplomatic, military, and intelligence experts continued to raise dire warnings that the People's Republic of China might intervene. Nevertheless, General MacArthur decided to push on to the Chinese/North Korean border, the Yalu River. On 25 October, Communist Chinese Forces unexpectedly attacked Republic of Korea forces near Unsan. Then, on 25 November, the day after MacArthur announced a 'final offensive to end the war', the Chinese 13th Army Group struck in mass against the Eighth Army in the north-west corner of North Korea, overrunning the US 2nd and 25th Infantry Divisions. The Chinese attacks quickly shattered Truman's dream of a unified Korea. American, UN, and ROK forces could not hold a successful defensive line against the combined CCF and NKPA attacks. At the Chosin Reservoir, US Marine Corps and Army units retreated south whilst MacArthur's forces withdrew from Pyongyang and X Corps later pulled out of Hungnam. Using expert research, bird's-eye views, and full-colour maps, this study tells the fascinating history of the critical Yalu campaign, including the famous retreat past the 38th Parallel.
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 147283724X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 97
Book Description
Following the Inchon landings and the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, UN forces crossed the North Korean border on 9 October and moved on the capital Pyongyang. Many in America believed the war would be over by Christmas, but some Washington diplomatic, military, and intelligence experts continued to raise dire warnings that the People's Republic of China might intervene. Nevertheless, General MacArthur decided to push on to the Chinese/North Korean border, the Yalu River. On 25 October, Communist Chinese Forces unexpectedly attacked Republic of Korea forces near Unsan. Then, on 25 November, the day after MacArthur announced a 'final offensive to end the war', the Chinese 13th Army Group struck in mass against the Eighth Army in the north-west corner of North Korea, overrunning the US 2nd and 25th Infantry Divisions. The Chinese attacks quickly shattered Truman's dream of a unified Korea. American, UN, and ROK forces could not hold a successful defensive line against the combined CCF and NKPA attacks. At the Chosin Reservoir, US Marine Corps and Army units retreated south whilst MacArthur's forces withdrew from Pyongyang and X Corps later pulled out of Hungnam. Using expert research, bird's-eye views, and full-colour maps, this study tells the fascinating history of the critical Yalu campaign, including the famous retreat past the 38th Parallel.
Perfectly Confident
Author: Don A. Moore
Publisher: HarperCollins
ISBN: 0062887777
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 272
Book Description
An expert on the psychology of decision making at Berkeley’s Haas School of Business helps readers calibrate their confidence, arguing that some confidence is good, but overconfidence can hinder growth. A surge of confidence can feel fantastic—offering a rush of energy, even a dazzling vision of the future. It can give us courage and bolster our determination when facing adversity. But if that self-assurance leads us to pursue impossible goals, it can waste time, money, and energy. Self-help books and motivational speakers tell us that the more confident we are, the better. But this way of thinking can lead to enormous trouble. Decades of research demonstrates that we often have an over-inflated sense of self and are rarely as good as we believe. Perfectly Confident is the first book to bring together the best psychological and economic studies to explain exactly what confidence is, when it can be helpful, and when it can be destructive in our lives. Confidence is an attitude that takes into account both personal feelings and the facts. Don Moore identifies the ways confidence behaves in real life and raises thought-provoking questions. How optimistic should you be about an uncertain future? What justifies your confidence in something amorphous and subjective like your attractiveness or sense of humor? Moore reminds us that the key to success is to avoid being both over- and under-confident. In this essential guide, he shows how to become perfectly confident—how to strive for and maintain the well-calibrated, adaptive confidence that can elevate all areas of our lives.
Publisher: HarperCollins
ISBN: 0062887777
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 272
Book Description
An expert on the psychology of decision making at Berkeley’s Haas School of Business helps readers calibrate their confidence, arguing that some confidence is good, but overconfidence can hinder growth. A surge of confidence can feel fantastic—offering a rush of energy, even a dazzling vision of the future. It can give us courage and bolster our determination when facing adversity. But if that self-assurance leads us to pursue impossible goals, it can waste time, money, and energy. Self-help books and motivational speakers tell us that the more confident we are, the better. But this way of thinking can lead to enormous trouble. Decades of research demonstrates that we often have an over-inflated sense of self and are rarely as good as we believe. Perfectly Confident is the first book to bring together the best psychological and economic studies to explain exactly what confidence is, when it can be helpful, and when it can be destructive in our lives. Confidence is an attitude that takes into account both personal feelings and the facts. Don Moore identifies the ways confidence behaves in real life and raises thought-provoking questions. How optimistic should you be about an uncertain future? What justifies your confidence in something amorphous and subjective like your attractiveness or sense of humor? Moore reminds us that the key to success is to avoid being both over- and under-confident. In this essential guide, he shows how to become perfectly confident—how to strive for and maintain the well-calibrated, adaptive confidence that can elevate all areas of our lives.
Ethics, Security, and The War-Machine
Author: Ned Dobos
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192604228
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 182
Book Description
If pacifists are correct in thinking that war is always unjust, then it follows that we ought to eliminate the possibility and temptation of ever engaging in it; we should not build war-making capacity, and if we already have, then demilitarization—or military abolition—would seem to be the appropriate course to take. On the other hand, if war is sometimes justified, as many believe, then it must be permissible to prepare for it by creating and maintaining a military establishment. Yet this view that the justifiability of war-making is also sufficient to justify war-building is mistaken. This book addresses questions of jus ante bellum, or justice before war. Under what circumstances is it justifiable for a polity to prepare for war by militarizing? When (if ever) and why (if at all) is it morally permissible to create and maintain the potential to wage war? In doing so it highlights the ways in which a civilian population compromises its own security in maintaining a permanent military establishment, explores the moral and social costs of militarization, and evaluates whether or not these costs are worth bearing.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192604228
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 182
Book Description
If pacifists are correct in thinking that war is always unjust, then it follows that we ought to eliminate the possibility and temptation of ever engaging in it; we should not build war-making capacity, and if we already have, then demilitarization—or military abolition—would seem to be the appropriate course to take. On the other hand, if war is sometimes justified, as many believe, then it must be permissible to prepare for it by creating and maintaining a military establishment. Yet this view that the justifiability of war-making is also sufficient to justify war-building is mistaken. This book addresses questions of jus ante bellum, or justice before war. Under what circumstances is it justifiable for a polity to prepare for war by militarizing? When (if ever) and why (if at all) is it morally permissible to create and maintain the potential to wage war? In doing so it highlights the ways in which a civilian population compromises its own security in maintaining a permanent military establishment, explores the moral and social costs of militarization, and evaluates whether or not these costs are worth bearing.
The Origins of the First World War
Author: James Joll
Publisher: Longman Publishing Group
ISBN: 9780582490161
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 244
Book Description
Publisher: Longman Publishing Group
ISBN: 9780582490161
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 244
Book Description