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Author:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 18
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Author:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 18
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Author: Monica Hargraves
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 18
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Author: Patrick Bolton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 57
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We study a dynamic-contracting problem involving risk sharing between two parties -- the Proposer and the Responder -- who invest in a risky asset until an exogenous but random termination time. In any time period they must invest all their wealth in the risky asset, but they can share the underlying investment and termination risk. When the project ends they consume their final accumulated wealth. The Proposer and the Responder have constant relative risk aversion R and r respectively, with R>r>0. We show that the optimal contract has three components: a non-contingent flow payment, a share in investment risk and a termination payment. We derive approximations for the optimal share in investment risk and the optimal termination payment, and we use numerical simulations to show that these approximations offer a close fit to the exact rules. The approximations take the form of a myopic benchmark plus a dynamic correction. In the case of the approximation for the optimal share in investment risk, the myopic benchmark is simply the classical formula for optimal risk sharing. This benchmark is endogenous because it depends on the wealths of the two parties. The dynamic correction is driven by counterparty risk. If both parties are fairly risk tolerant, in the sense that 2>R>r, then the Proposer takes on more risk than she would under the myopic benchmark. If both parties are fairly risk averse, in the sense that R>r>2, then the Proposer takes on less risk than she would under the myopic benchmark. In the mixed case, in which R>2>r, the Proposer takes on more risk when the Responder's share in total wealth is low and less risk when the Responder's share in total wealth is high. In the case of the approximation for the optimal termination payment, the myopic benchmark is zero. The dynamic correction tells us, among other things, that: (i) if the asset has a high return then, following termination, the Responder compensates the Proposer for the loss of a valu.
Author: Konstantinos Serfes
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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We study the matching patterns between heterogeneous principals and agents in a principal-agent model. The resulting equilibrium relationship between risk and incentives could be negative, positive or U-shaped. These results may provide an explanation for the absence of systematic empirical support for the standard risk model.
Author: Elyes Jouini
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 28
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We consider the problem of optimal risk sharing of some given total risk between two economic agents characterized by law-invariant monetary utility functions or equivalently, law-invariant risk measures. We first prove existence of an optimal risk sharing allocation which is in addition increasing in terms of the total risk. We next provide an explicit characterization in the case where both agents' utility functions are comonotone. The general form of the optimal contracts turns out to be given by a sum of options (stop-loss contracts, in the language of insurance) on the total risk. In order to show the robustness of this type of contracts to more general utility functions, we introduce a new notion of strict risk aversion conditionally on lower tail events, which is typically satisfied by the semi-deviation and the entropic risk measures. Then, in the context of an AV@R-agent facing an agent with strict monotone preferences and exhibiting strict risk aversion conditional on lower tail events, we prove that optimal contracts again are European options on the total risk.
Author: National Research Council
Publisher: National Academies Press
ISBN: 0309181615
Category : Transportation
Languages : en
Pages : 102
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Effective risk management is essential for the success of large projects built and operated by the Department of Energy (DOE), particularly for the one-of-a-kind projects that characterize much of its mission. To enhance DOE's risk management efforts, the department asked the NRC to prepare a summary of the most effective practices used by leading owner organizations. The study's primary objective was to provide DOE project managers with a basic understanding of both the project owner's risk management role and effective oversight of those risk management activities delegated to contractors.
Author: Robert Clews
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 0128005297
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 416
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Book Description
This overview of project finance for the oil and gas industry covers financial markets, sources and providers of finance, financial structures, and capital raising processes. About US$300 billion of project finance debt is raised annually across several capital intensive sectors—including oil and gas, energy, infrastructure, and mining—and the oil and gas industry represents around 30% of the global project finance market. With over 25 year’s project finance experience in international banking and industry, author Robert Clews explores project finance techniques and their effectiveness in the petroleum industry. He highlights the petroleum industry players, risks, economics, and commercial/legal arrangements. With petroleum industry projects representing amongst the largest industrial activities in the world, this book ties together concepts and tools through real examples and aims to ensure that project finance will continue to play a central role in bringing together investors and lenders to finance these ventures. Combines the theory and practice of raising long-term funding for capital intensive projects with insights about the appeal of project finance to the international oil and gas industry Includes case studies and examples covering projects in the Arctic, East Africa, Latin America, North America, and Australia Emphasizes the full downstream value chain of the industry instead of limiting itself to upstream and pipeline project financing Highlights petroleum industry players, risks, economics, and commercial and legal arrangements
Author: Martin Gaynor
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Author:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This paper examines qualitative properties of efficient insurance contracts in the presence of background risk. In order to get results for all strictly risk-averse expected utility maximizers, the concept of "stochastic increasingness" is used. Different assumptions on the stochastic dependence between the insurable and uninsurable risk lead to different qualitative properties of the efficient contracts. The new results obtained under hypotheses of dependent risks are compared to classical results in the absence of background risk or to the case of independent risks. The theory is further generalized to nonexpected utility maximizers.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 456
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