Optimal Nonlinear Pricing by a Monopolist with Information Ambiguity PDF Download
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Author: Chaozheng Li
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Chaozheng Li
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: David Martimort
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumers
Languages : en
Pages : 28
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Book Description
Empirical evidence suggests that consumers facing complex nonlinear pricing often make choices based on average (not marginal) prices. Given such behavior, we characterize a monopolist's optimal nonlinear price schedule. In contrast to the textbook setting, nonlinear prices designed for "average-price bias" distort consumption downward for consumers at the top, may produce efficient consumption for consumers at the bottom, and typically feature quantity premia rather than quantity discounts. These properties arise because the bias replaces consumer information rents with curvature rents. Whether or not a monopolist prefers consumers with average-price bias depends upon underlying preferences and costs.
Author: Babu Nahata
Publisher:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This pedagogical note explains how the same basic principle can be applied to explain the profit-maximizing behavior of a monopolist under both linear and nonlinear pricing by introducing an average price function. It is shown that optimal conditions under nonlinear pricing are similar to that of linear pricing. These conditions can be explained through a simple graphical exposition. The optimal conditions under monopolistic linear and nonlinear price discriminations are also similar.
Author: Susanna Esteban
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This paper studies optimal nonlinear pricing for a monopolist when consumers' preferences exhibit temptation and self-control as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). Consumers are subject to temptation inside the store but exercise self-control, and those foreseeing large self-control costs do not enter the store. Consumers differ in their preferences under temptation. When all consumers are tempted by more expensive, higher quality choices, the optimal menu is a singleton, which saves consumers from self-control and extracts consumers' commitment surplus. When some consumers are tempted by cheaper, lower quality choices, the optimal menu may contain a continuum of choices.
Author: Daniel Krähmer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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We introduce consumers with intrinsic privacy preferences into the monopolistic non-linear pricing model. Next to classical consumers, there is a share of data-sensitive consumers who incur a privacy cost if their purchase reveals information to the monopolist. The monopolist discriminates between privacy types using privacy mechanisms which consist of a direct mechanism and a privacy option, targeting, respectively, classical and data-sensitive consumers. We show that a privacy mechanism is optimal if privacy costs are large and that it yields classical consumers a higher utility than data-sensitive consumers with the same valuation. If, by contrast, privacy preferences are public information, data-sensitive consumers with a low valuation obtain a strictly higher utility than classical consumers. With public privacy preferences, data-sensitive consumers and the monopolist are better off, whereas classical consumers are worse off. Our results are relevant for policy measures that target the data-awareness of consumers, such as the European GDPR.
Author: Suren Basov
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 9811010412
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 181
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Book Description
This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation. Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design. This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.
Author: Richard Schmalensee
Publisher: North Holland
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1002
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Book Description
Determinants of firm and market organization; Analysis of market behavior; Empirical methods and results; International issues and comparision; government intervention in the Marketplace.
Author:
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1349588024
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 7493
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Book Description
The award-winning The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition is now available as a dynamic online resource. Consisting of over 1,900 articles written by leading figures in the field including Nobel prize winners, this is the definitive scholarly reference work for a new generation of economists. Regularly updated! This product is a subscription based product.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 352
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Author: Jean Tirole
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262303787
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1482
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Book Description
The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In Part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In Part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises. Important Notice: The digital edition of this book is missing some of the images found in the physical edition.
