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Author: Kent Davis Hertzing
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Incentives in industry
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Kent Davis Hertzing
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Incentives in industry
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 854
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Author: Wei Cai
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This study examines how the design of incentive contracts for tasks defined as workers' official responsibilities (i.e., standard tasks) influences workers' propensity to engage in employee-initiated innovation (EII). EII corresponds to innovation activities that are not formally assigned to workers but are nonetheless encouraged and considered to be important for the company's success. Like other extra-role behaviors, EII is difficult to incentivize directly. Therefore, it is important to understand whether and how explicit incentive contracts designed for the workers' standard tasks may indirectly influence their EII activity. We use field data from a manufacturing company that uses a dedicated information system to track workers' EII idea submissions. We find theory-consistent evidence that, compared to workers receiving fixed pay, employees rewarded for their standard tasks with variable compensation contracts exhibit a lower propensity to engage in EII. This result is concentrated among ideas benefiting other constituents and activities beyond the proponents' standard task (i.e., broad-scope ideas). In contrast, we find no difference attributable to standard task incentive design in the proposal of innovation ideas narrowly focused on the proponent's standard task (i.e., narrow-scope ideas). Our findings suggest that variable pay narrows employees' conceptual focus around the standard task and hinders employee engagement in broad-scope innovation activities compared to fixed compensation contracts. We contribute to the literature on incentives for innovation by showing that standard task compensation contracts have spillover effects on EII behavior. We also contribute to the nascent literature on EII by showing that innovation types, defined based on their relation with the proponent's standard task, matter. Our results are relevant for practitioners in that managers relying on variable pay contracts to incentivize standard task performance should expect lower employee engagement in broad-scope EII.
Author:
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ISBN:
Category : Catalogs, Union
Languages : en
Pages : 1032
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Includes entries for maps and atlases.
Author:
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ISBN:
Category : Dissertation abstracts
Languages : en
Pages : 696
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Author: Frederike Hinz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 920
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Author: Robert F. Göx
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 49
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We study how a firm owner motivates a manager to create value by optimally designing an information system and a compensation contract based on a manipulable performance measure. In equilibrium, the firm either implements a perfect or an uninformative system. The information system and the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of the compensation contract can be substitutes in a sense that the firm optimally combines a perfect information system with a low PPS or an uninformative system with a high PPS. Because the information design is endogenous, firms facing relatively high manipulation threat may offer financial incentives that are higher-powered than the ones offered by their peers facing lower manipulation threat. If the manager is in charge of implementing the information system, he chooses a perfect one unless the firm uses the information for internal control. The firm may prefer to commit to an internal control level before observing any information.
Author: Christian Ewerhart
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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In a pioneering approach towards the explanation of the phenomenon of "yes man" behavior in organizations, Prendergast [American Economic Review 83 (1993) 757-770] argued that incentive contracts in employment relationships generally make a worker distort his privately acquired information. This would imply that there is a trade-off between inducing a worker to exert costly effort and inducing him to tell the truth. In contrast, we show that with optimally designed contracts, which we term integrity contracts, the worker will both exert effort and report his information truthfully, and hence the first best can be achieved.
Author: Mikhail V. Belov
Publisher: CRC Press
ISBN: 1000344223
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 277
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Book Description
In the modern world, most gross product is created within Enterprise firms, project programs, state agencies, transnational corporations and their divisions, as well as various associations and compositions of the above entities. Enterprises, being, on the one hand, complex, and, on the other hand, widespread systems, are the subject matter of cybernetics, system theory, operations research, management sciences and many other fields of knowledge. However, the complexity of the system obstructs the development of mathematically rigorous foundations for Enterprise control. Moreover, methods of operations research and related sciences, which are widely used in practice, provide optimization of the constituents of an Enterprise, without modeling it as a whole system. But the optimization of parts does not lead to the optimality of the whole, and, also, the absence of top-down and holistic mathematical models of Enterprise contradicts the principle of holism and the system approach. The approach in this book looks first at Enterprise Systems and their essential aspects as complex sociotechnical systems composed of integrated sets of structural and process models (Chapters 1 and 2). A uniform description of all the heterogeneous fields of the modern Enterprise (marketing, sales, manufacturing, HR, finance, etc.) is then made, and the Enterprise Control Problem is posed as a top-down and holistic mathematical optimization problem (Chapter 3). Original models and methods of contract theory (Chapter 4), technology management (Chapter 5), human behavior and human capital (Chapter 6) and complex activity and resource planning (Chapter 7) are developed to solve the problem. Structural processes and mathematical models constitute an Optimal Enterprise Control Framework (Chapter 8) that provides a practical solution to the Enterprise Control Problem. This book is a resource for postgraduate and doctoral students, postdoctoral researchers and professors with research interests in the following fields of science: Fundamental Complex Systems study, Complex Systems Engineering, Enterprise Systems Engineering Applications of Operations Research, Optimization, Probability and Stochastic processes to Management Science, Economics and Business Theory of the Firm Business and Management – general, strategy/leadership, organization management, operations management and management information systems Theory of Business Processes, Business Processes Improvement and Reengineering
