Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437942962
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 29
Book Description
Operation Moshtarak (Afghanistan): Lessons Learned
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437927416
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
Book Description
In the context of a review of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan during September-November 2009, the performance and legitimacy of the Afghan government figured prominently. In his December 1, 2009, speech announcing a way forward in Afghanistan, President Obama stated that the Afghan government would be judged on performance, and "The days of providing a blank check are over." The policy statement was based, in part, on an assessment of the security situation furnished by the top commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, which warned of potential mission failure unless a fully resourced classic counterinsurgency strategy is employed. That counterinsurgency effort is deemed to require a legitimate Afghan partner. The Afghan government's limited writ and widespread official corruption are believed by U.S. officials to be helping sustain a Taliban insurgency and complicating international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. At the same time, President Hamid Karzai has, through compromise with faction leaders, been able to confine ethnic disputes to political competition, enabling his government to focus on trying to win over those members of the ethnic Pashtun community that support Taliban and other insurgents.
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437927416
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
Book Description
In the context of a review of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan during September-November 2009, the performance and legitimacy of the Afghan government figured prominently. In his December 1, 2009, speech announcing a way forward in Afghanistan, President Obama stated that the Afghan government would be judged on performance, and "The days of providing a blank check are over." The policy statement was based, in part, on an assessment of the security situation furnished by the top commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, which warned of potential mission failure unless a fully resourced classic counterinsurgency strategy is employed. That counterinsurgency effort is deemed to require a legitimate Afghan partner. The Afghan government's limited writ and widespread official corruption are believed by U.S. officials to be helping sustain a Taliban insurgency and complicating international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. At the same time, President Hamid Karzai has, through compromise with faction leaders, been able to confine ethnic disputes to political competition, enabling his government to focus on trying to win over those members of the ethnic Pashtun community that support Taliban and other insurgents.
War, Will, and Warlords
Author:
Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 9780160915574
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 292
Book Description
Compares the reasons for and the responses to the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan since October 2001. Also examines the lack of security and the support of insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the 1970s that explain the rise of the Pakistan-supported Taliban. Explores the border tribal areas between the two countries and how they influence regional stability and U.S. security. Explains the implications of what happened during this 10-year period to provide candid insights on the prospects and risks associated with bringing a durable stability to this area of the world.
Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 9780160915574
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 292
Book Description
Compares the reasons for and the responses to the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan since October 2001. Also examines the lack of security and the support of insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the 1970s that explain the rise of the Pakistan-supported Taliban. Explores the border tribal areas between the two countries and how they influence regional stability and U.S. security. Explains the implications of what happened during this 10-year period to provide candid insights on the prospects and risks associated with bringing a durable stability to this area of the world.
U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001-2009
Author: U S Marine Corps History Division
Publisher: St, John's Press
ISBN: 9781946411235
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
This volume presents a collection of 38 articles, interviews, and speeches describing many aspects of the U.S. Marine Corps' participation in Operation Enduring Freedom from 2001 to 2009. This work is intended to serve as a general overview and provisional reference to inform both Marines and the general public until the History Division completes monographs dealing with major Marine Corps operations during the campaign. The accompanying annotated bibliography provides a detailed look at selected sources that currently exist until new scholarship and archival materials become available. From the Preface - From the outset, some experts doubted that the U.S. Marines Corps would play a major role in Afghanistan given the landlocked nature of the battlefield. Naval expeditionary Task Force 58 (TF-58) commanded by then-Brigadier General James N. Mattis silenced naysayers with the farthest ranging amphibious assault in Marine Corps/Navy history. In late November 2001, Mattis' force seized what became Forward Operating Base Rhino, Afghanistan, from naval shipping some 400 miles away. The historic assault not only blazed a path for follow-on forces, it also cut off fleeing al-Qaeda and Taliban elements and aided in the seizure of Kandahar. While Corps doctrine and culture advocates Marine employment as a fully integrated Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), deployments to Afghanistan often reflected what former Commandant General Charles C. Krulak coined as the "three-block war." Following TF-58's deployment during the initial take down of the Taliban regime, the MAGTF made few appearances in Afghanistan until 2008. Before then, subsequent Marine units often deployed as a single battalion under the command of the U.S. Army Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) to provide security for provincial reconstruction teams. The Marine Corps also provided embedded training teams to train and mentor the fledgling Afghan National Army and Police. Aviation assets sporadically deployed to support the U.S.-led coalition mostly to conduct a specific mission or to bridge a gap in capability, such as close air support or electronic warfare to counter the improvised explosive device threat. From 2003 to late 2007, the national preoccupation with stabilizing Iraq focused most Marine Corps assets on stemming the insurgency, largely centered in the restive al-Anbar Province. As a result of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) taking over command of Afghan operations and Marine Corps' commitments in Iraq, relatively few Marine units operated in Afghanistan from late 2006 to 2007. Although Marines first advocated shifting resources from al-Anbar to southern Afghanistan in early 2007, the George W. Bush administration delayed the Marine proposal for fear of losing the gains made as a result of Army General David H. Petraeus' "surge strategy" in Iraq. By late 2007, the situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated to the point that it inspired Rolling Stone to later publish the story "How We Lost the War We Won." In recognition of the shifting tides in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration began to transfer additional resources to Afghanistan in early 2008. The shift prompted senior Marines to again push for a more prominent role in the Afghan campaign, even proposing to take over the Afghan mission from the Army. . . .
Publisher: St, John's Press
ISBN: 9781946411235
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
This volume presents a collection of 38 articles, interviews, and speeches describing many aspects of the U.S. Marine Corps' participation in Operation Enduring Freedom from 2001 to 2009. This work is intended to serve as a general overview and provisional reference to inform both Marines and the general public until the History Division completes monographs dealing with major Marine Corps operations during the campaign. The accompanying annotated bibliography provides a detailed look at selected sources that currently exist until new scholarship and archival materials become available. From the Preface - From the outset, some experts doubted that the U.S. Marines Corps would play a major role in Afghanistan given the landlocked nature of the battlefield. Naval expeditionary Task Force 58 (TF-58) commanded by then-Brigadier General James N. Mattis silenced naysayers with the farthest ranging amphibious assault in Marine Corps/Navy history. In late November 2001, Mattis' force seized what became Forward Operating Base Rhino, Afghanistan, from naval shipping some 400 miles away. The historic assault not only blazed a path for follow-on forces, it also cut off fleeing al-Qaeda and Taliban elements and aided in the seizure of Kandahar. While Corps doctrine and culture advocates Marine employment as a fully integrated Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), deployments to Afghanistan often reflected what former Commandant General Charles C. Krulak coined as the "three-block war." Following TF-58's deployment during the initial take down of the Taliban regime, the MAGTF made few appearances in Afghanistan until 2008. Before then, subsequent Marine units often deployed as a single battalion under the command of the U.S. Army Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) to provide security for provincial reconstruction teams. The Marine Corps also provided embedded training teams to train and mentor the fledgling Afghan National Army and Police. Aviation assets sporadically deployed to support the U.S.-led coalition mostly to conduct a specific mission or to bridge a gap in capability, such as close air support or electronic warfare to counter the improvised explosive device threat. From 2003 to late 2007, the national preoccupation with stabilizing Iraq focused most Marine Corps assets on stemming the insurgency, largely centered in the restive al-Anbar Province. As a result of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) taking over command of Afghan operations and Marine Corps' commitments in Iraq, relatively few Marine units operated in Afghanistan from late 2006 to 2007. Although Marines first advocated shifting resources from al-Anbar to southern Afghanistan in early 2007, the George W. Bush administration delayed the Marine proposal for fear of losing the gains made as a result of Army General David H. Petraeus' "surge strategy" in Iraq. By late 2007, the situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated to the point that it inspired Rolling Stone to later publish the story "How We Lost the War We Won." In recognition of the shifting tides in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration began to transfer additional resources to Afghanistan in early 2008. The shift prompted senior Marines to again push for a more prominent role in the Afghan campaign, even proposing to take over the Afghan mission from the Army. . . .
Operations in Afghanistan
Author: Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Defence Committee
Publisher: The Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780215560599
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 288
Book Description
This report looks at operations in Afghanistan since 2006 and makes further recommendations for the anticipated draw-down of forces. UK Forces were deployed in Helmand Province in Afghanistan for three years from 2006 without the necessary personnel, equipment or intelligence to succeed in their mission. Mistakes were made as a result of a failure in military and political coordination. The decision to move UK Armed Forces into the South of Afghanistan in early 2006 was not fully thought through. The Committee is concerned that the MoD did not anticipate that the presence of the Armed Forces in Helmand might stir up a hornets' nest, especially as much of the intelligence was contradictory. Senior military advisers should have drawn attention to the need for force levels to be sufficiently robust to cope with an unpredictable conflict. The Committee is disturbed that the Secretary of State was told that commanders on the ground were content with the support they were being given in Helmand when clearly they were not. After only a matter of months in Helmand, the nature of the UK Mission changed, with serious strategic implications. The MoD did not respond quickly enough to changes in Taliban tactics. The MoD should prioritise the protection of personnel. The Government's room for manoeuvre regarding the number of troops that could be withdrawn from Afghanistan as part of an immediate transition is necessarily limited. More emphasis needs to be placed on capacity building within the political system if long-term success is to be achieved.
Publisher: The Stationery Office
ISBN: 9780215560599
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 288
Book Description
This report looks at operations in Afghanistan since 2006 and makes further recommendations for the anticipated draw-down of forces. UK Forces were deployed in Helmand Province in Afghanistan for three years from 2006 without the necessary personnel, equipment or intelligence to succeed in their mission. Mistakes were made as a result of a failure in military and political coordination. The decision to move UK Armed Forces into the South of Afghanistan in early 2006 was not fully thought through. The Committee is concerned that the MoD did not anticipate that the presence of the Armed Forces in Helmand might stir up a hornets' nest, especially as much of the intelligence was contradictory. Senior military advisers should have drawn attention to the need for force levels to be sufficiently robust to cope with an unpredictable conflict. The Committee is disturbed that the Secretary of State was told that commanders on the ground were content with the support they were being given in Helmand when clearly they were not. After only a matter of months in Helmand, the nature of the UK Mission changed, with serious strategic implications. The MoD did not respond quickly enough to changes in Taliban tactics. The MoD should prioritise the protection of personnel. The Government's room for manoeuvre regarding the number of troops that could be withdrawn from Afghanistan as part of an immediate transition is necessarily limited. More emphasis needs to be placed on capacity building within the political system if long-term success is to be achieved.
Afghan National Security Forces
Author: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publisher: CSIS
ISBN: 0892066083
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 274
Book Description
Includes bibliographical references (p. ).
Publisher: CSIS
ISBN: 0892066083
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 274
Book Description
Includes bibliographical references (p. ).
Counternarcotics
Author: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781722208615
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 270
Book Description
Counternarcotics : lessons from the U.S. experience in Afghanistan.
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781722208615
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 270
Book Description
Counternarcotics : lessons from the U.S. experience in Afghanistan.
Remote Warfare: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
Author: Alasdair McKay
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781910814567
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 266
Book Description
Modern warfare is becoming increasingly defined by distance. Today, many Western and non-Western states have shied away from deploying large numbers of their own troops to battlefields. Instead, they have limited themselves to supporting the frontline fighting of local and regional actors against non-state armed forces through the provision of intelligence, training, equipment and airpower. This is remote warfare, the dominant method of military engagement now employed by many states. Despite the increasing prevalence of this distinct form of military engagement, it remains an understudied subject and considerable gaps exist in the academic understanding of it. Bringing together writers from various backgrounds, this edited volume offers a critical enquiry into the use of remote warfare.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781910814567
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 266
Book Description
Modern warfare is becoming increasingly defined by distance. Today, many Western and non-Western states have shied away from deploying large numbers of their own troops to battlefields. Instead, they have limited themselves to supporting the frontline fighting of local and regional actors against non-state armed forces through the provision of intelligence, training, equipment and airpower. This is remote warfare, the dominant method of military engagement now employed by many states. Despite the increasing prevalence of this distinct form of military engagement, it remains an understudied subject and considerable gaps exist in the academic understanding of it. Bringing together writers from various backgrounds, this edited volume offers a critical enquiry into the use of remote warfare.
Briefing on Operation Moshtarak in Helmand Province, Afghanistan
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 42
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 42
Book Description
War in Afghanistan
Author: Matt Doeden
Publisher: Capstone
ISBN: 1476541906
Category : Juvenile Nonfiction
Languages : en
Pages : 113
Book Description
"Describes the people and events of the U.S. war in Afghanistan. The reader's choices reveal the historical details"--
Publisher: Capstone
ISBN: 1476541906
Category : Juvenile Nonfiction
Languages : en
Pages : 113
Book Description
"Describes the people and events of the U.S. war in Afghanistan. The reader's choices reveal the historical details"--