On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players PDF Download
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Author: Ali Khan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 33
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Book Description
Author: Ali Khan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 33
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Book Description
Author: Guilherme Carmona
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814390658
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 153
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Book Description
The book aims at describing the recent developments in the existence and stability of Nash equilibrium. The two topics are central to game theory and economics and have been extensively researched. Recent results on existence and stability of Nash equilibrium are scattered and the relationship between them has not been explained clearly. The book will make these results easily accessible and understandable to researchers in the field. Book jacket.
Author: Michael R. Baye
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 62
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Author: Susan Athey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This paper derives sufficient conditions for a class of games of incomplete information, such as first price auctions, to have pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). The paper treats games between two or more heterogeneous agents, each with private information about his own type (for example, a bidder's value for an object of a firm's marginal cost of production), and the types are drawn from an atomless joint probability distribution which potentially allows for correlation between types. Agents' utility may depend directly on the realizations of other agents' types, as in Milgrom and Weber's (1982) formulation of the "mineral rights" auction. The restriction we consider is that each player's expected payoffs satisfy the following single crossing condition: whenever each opponent uses a nondecreasing strategy (that is, an opponent who has a higher type chooses a higher action), then a player's best response strategy is also nondecreasing in her type. The paper has two main results. The first result shows that, when players are restricted to choose among a finite set of actions (for example, bidding or pricing where the smallest unit is a penny), games where players' objective functions satisfy this single crossing condition will have PSNE. The second result demonstrates that when players' utility functions are continuous, as well as in mineral rights auction games and other games where "winning" creates a discontinuity in payoffs, the existence result can be extended to the case where players choose from a continuum of actions. The paper then applies the theory to several classes of games, providing conditions on utility functions and joint distributions over types under which each class of games satisfies the single crossing condition. In particular, the single crossing condition is shown to hold in all first-price, private value auctions with potentially heterogeneous, risk-averse bidders, with either independent or affiliated values, and with reserve prices which may differ across bidders; mineral rights auctions with two heterogeneous bidders and affiliated values; a class of pricing games with incomplete information about costs; a class of all-pay auction games; and a class of noisy signaling games. Finally, the formulation of the problem introduced in this paper suggests a straightforward algorithm for numerically computing equilibrium bidding strategies in games such as first price auctions, and we present numerical analyses of several auctions under alternative assumptions about the joint distribution of types.
Author: Indrajit Mallick
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We construct a generalized two-person discrete strategy static game of complete information where continuity, convexity and compactness cannot be invoked to show the existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium. We show that, when Best Responses are unique from both sides, a condition of Minimal Acyclicity is necessary and sufficient for the existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria.
Author: Guilherme Carmona
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 24
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Book Description
We consider an asymptotic version of Mas-Colell's theorem on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large games. Our result states that, if players' payoff functions are selected from an equicontinuous family, then all sufficiently large games have an pure, equilibrium for all gt; 0. We also show that our result is equivalent to Mas-Colell's existence theorem, implying that it can properly be considered as its asymptotic version.
Author: Idione Meneghel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 35
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Book Description
"The question of existence of a Nash equilibrium is one of the most important questions in game theory. This thesis aims to advance our understanding of the question in two broad directions: 1) by providing weaker sets of sufficient conditions; and 2) by introducing novel techniques, which allow for straightforward proofs and results that give new economic insights. Discontinuous games: This project considers the existence problem in games in which strategy sets are compact and convex, but preferences of the players are represented by numerical functions that may not be continuous. One way to show existence of equilibrium in such games is to apply the 'better reply security' logic, introduced by Reny (1999), combined with some form of quasiconcavity of utility functions. As long as players have securing strategies that are robust to other players' small deviations, one can show that the game has an equilibrium. The novelty of the techniques used relies in combining three main ideas: 1) a local continuous selection of each player's strict upper contour set; 2) the idea of activating different players locally; and 3) a weak notion of convexity of preferences. Bayesian games: Games of incomplete information have been shown to apply to a huge variety of economic, political and other social interactions. Still, the question of existence of equilibria in such games has been largely dealt with on a case-by-case basis. That is, given a particular game with incomplete information, one has to find the equilibrium to prove that it exists. The reason is that the usual tools to prove existence (continuous and quasiconcave payoffs defined on convex and compact strategy sets) do not apply to the general framework of games with incomplete information. This project investigates sufficient conditions for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in games of incomplete information. The assumption of nonatomicity of the distribution of types allows for an analysis that does not require convexity assumptions on action spaces and/or payoff functions"--Pages iv-v.
Author: Alvaro Riascos Villegas
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : es
Pages : 10
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Author: Guilherme Carmona
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Book Description
We characterize Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players (Mas-Colell (1984)) in terms of approximate equilibria of large finite games. For the concept of (; ) equilibrium in which the fraction of players not optimizing is less than we show that a strategy is a Nash equilibrium in a game with a continuum of players if and only if there exists a sequence of finite games such that its restriction is an (n; n) equilibria, with n converging to zero. The same holds for equilibrium in which almost all players are optimizing provided that either players' payoff functions are equicontinuous or players' action space is finite. Furthermore, we give conditions under which the above results hold for all approximating sequences of games. In our characterizations, a sequence of finite games approaches the continuum game in the sense that the number of players converges to infinity and the distribution of characteristics and actions in the finite games converges to that of the continuum game. These results render approximate equilibria of large finite economies as an alternative way of obtaining strategic insignificance.
Author: Hiroshi Tateishi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 6
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Book Description
This paper is concerned with the existence of approximate pure strategy equilibria of games with incomplete information.
