Author: Roger Dean Lagunoff
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 34
Book Description
On the Evolution of Pareto Optimal Behavior in Repeated Coordination Problems
The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
Author: Atsushi Kajii
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 60
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 60
Book Description
An "anti-Folk Theorem" for a Class of Asynchronously Repeated Games
Author: Roger D. Lagunoff
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth Into Economic Models
Author: Harold Linh Cole
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 30
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 30
Book Description
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions
Author: George Joseph Mailath
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 18
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 18
Book Description
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergence to Nash Equilibrium
Author: Alvaro Sandroni
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
Microeconomics
Author: Samuel Bowles
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400829313
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 608
Book Description
In this novel introduction to modern microeconomic theory, Samuel Bowles returns to the classical economists' interest in the wealth and poverty of nations and people, the workings of the institutions of capitalist economies, and the coevolution of individual preferences and the structures of markets, firms, and other institutions. Using recent advances in evolutionary game theory, contract theory, behavioral experiments, and the modeling of dynamic processes, he develops a theory of how economic institutions shape individual behavior, and how institutions evolve due to individual actions, technological change, and chance events. Topics addressed include institutional innovation, social preferences, nonmarket social interactions, social capital, equilibrium unemployment, credit constraints, economic power, generalized increasing returns, disequilibrium outcomes, and path dependency. Each chapter is introduced by empirical puzzles or historical episodes illuminated by the modeling that follows, and the book closes with sets of problems to be solved by readers seeking to improve their mathematical modeling skills. Complementing standard mathematical analysis are agent-based computer simulations of complex evolving systems that are available online so that readers can experiment with the models. Bowles concludes with the time-honored challenge of "getting the rules right," providing an evaluation of markets, states, and communities as contrasting and yet sometimes synergistic structures of governance. Must reading for students and scholars not only in economics but across the behavioral sciences, this engagingly written and compelling exposition of the new microeconomics moves the field beyond the conventional models of prices and markets toward a more accurate and policy-relevant portrayal of human social behavior.
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400829313
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 608
Book Description
In this novel introduction to modern microeconomic theory, Samuel Bowles returns to the classical economists' interest in the wealth and poverty of nations and people, the workings of the institutions of capitalist economies, and the coevolution of individual preferences and the structures of markets, firms, and other institutions. Using recent advances in evolutionary game theory, contract theory, behavioral experiments, and the modeling of dynamic processes, he develops a theory of how economic institutions shape individual behavior, and how institutions evolve due to individual actions, technological change, and chance events. Topics addressed include institutional innovation, social preferences, nonmarket social interactions, social capital, equilibrium unemployment, credit constraints, economic power, generalized increasing returns, disequilibrium outcomes, and path dependency. Each chapter is introduced by empirical puzzles or historical episodes illuminated by the modeling that follows, and the book closes with sets of problems to be solved by readers seeking to improve their mathematical modeling skills. Complementing standard mathematical analysis are agent-based computer simulations of complex evolving systems that are available online so that readers can experiment with the models. Bowles concludes with the time-honored challenge of "getting the rules right," providing an evaluation of markets, states, and communities as contrasting and yet sometimes synergistic structures of governance. Must reading for students and scholars not only in economics but across the behavioral sciences, this engagingly written and compelling exposition of the new microeconomics moves the field beyond the conventional models of prices and markets toward a more accurate and policy-relevant portrayal of human social behavior.
Sufficiently Specialized Economies Have Nonempty Cores
Author: Roger D. Lagunoff
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
Book Description
The Evolution of Cooperation
Author: Robert Axelrod
Publisher: Basic Books
ISBN: 0786734884
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 258
Book Description
A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.
Publisher: Basic Books
ISBN: 0786734884
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 258
Book Description
A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.
Underemployment of Resources and Self-confirming Beliefs
Author: Alessandro Citanna
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Book Description