Author: Robin Higham
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
ISBN: 0813150507
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 296
Get Book Here
Book Description
On October 28, 1940, the Italian army under Benito Mussolini invaded Greece. The British had insisted on guaranteeing Greek and Turkish neutrality, despite the fact that Greece was never more than a limited campaign in an unlimited war as far as they were concerned. The British, however, were never quite sure that Greece was not their last foothold in Europe, and they harbored dreams of holding on to this last bastion of civilization and of protecting it with a diplomatic and military alliance—a Balkan bloc. These dreams bore little relation to military and economic realities, and so the stage was set for tragedy. In Diary of a Disaster, Robin Higham details the unfolding events from the invasion, though the Italian defeat and the subsequent German invasion, until the British evacuation at the end of April 1941. The Greek army, while tough, was small and based largely upon reserves. They were also largely equipped with obsolete French, Polish, and Czech arms for which there was now no other source than captured Italian materiel. Transportation was also lacking as Greece lacked all-weather roads over much of the country, had no all-weather airport, and only one rail line connecting Athens with Salonika and Florina in the north. Added to the woes of the Greek military, the British commander-in-chief for the Middle East, Sir Archibald Wavell, faced huge logistical challenges as well. Based in Cairo, he was responsible for a huge theatre of operation, from hostile Vichy French forces in Syria to the Boers in South Africa nearly six thousand miles away. His air force was comprised of only a handful of modern aircraft with biplanes and outdated, early monoplanes making up the bulk of his force. Radar was also unavailable to him. His navy was woefully short on destroyers and often incommunicado while at sea. While Wavell had roughly 500,000 men under his command, he was severely limited in how he could use them. The South Africans could only be deployed in East Africa and the Austrians and New Zealanders could not be employed without the consent of their home governments. In short, Churchill had instructed Wavell to offer support that he did not really have and could not afford to give to the Greeks. Higham walks readers through these events as they unfold like a modern Greek tragedy. Using the format of a diary, he recounts day-by-day the British efforts though the failure of Operation Lustre, which no one outside of London thought had any chance of stemming the Nazi tide in Greece.
Author: Pier Paolo Battistelli
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 1472842588
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 97
Get Book Here
Book Description
The first of two volumes on the Axis campaigns in the Balkans, exploring Mussolini's fateful decision to move against Greece in October 1940. The Greek President Metaxas rejected the Italian ultimatum with a famous 'Oxi' ('No'), and what followed was Italy's first debacle in World War II. In the wake of Italy's rapid annexation of Albania in April 1940, Mussolini's decision to attack Greece in October that year is widely acknowledged as a fatal mistake, leading to a domestic crisis and to the collapse of Italy's reputation as a military power (re-emphasized by the Italian defeat in North Africa in December 1940). The Italian assault on Greece came to a stalemate in less than a fortnight, and was followed a week later by a Greek counter-offensive that broke through the Italian defences before advancing into Albania, forcing the Italian forces to withdraw north before grinding to a half in January 1941 due to logistical issues. Eventually, the Italians took advantage of this brief hiatus to reorganize and prepare a counteroffensive, the failure of which marked the end of the first stage of the Axis Balkan campaign. The first of two volumes examining the Axis campaigns in the Balkans, this book offers a detailed overview of the Italian and Greek armies, their fighting power, and the terrain in which they fought. Complimented by rarely seen images and full colour illustrations, it shows how expectations of an easy Italian victory quickly turned into one of Mussolini's greatest blunders.
Author: Richard Carrier
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 0429015321
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 246
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book analyses why the Italian army failed to defeat its Greek opponent between October 1940 and April 1941. It thoroughly examines the multiple forms of ineffectiveness that plagued the political leadership as well as the military organisation. Mussolini’s aggression of Greece ranks among the most neglected campaigns of the Second World War. Initiated on 28 October 1940, the offensive came to a halt less than ten days later; by mid-November, the Greek counter-offensive put the Italian armies on the defensive, and back in Albania. From then on, the fatal interaction between failing command structures, inadequate weapons and equipment, unprepared and unmotivated combatants, and terrible logistics lowered to a dangerous level the fighting power of Italian combatants. This essay proposes that compared to the North African and Russian campaigns where the Regio Esercito achieved a decent level of military effectiveness, the operation against Greece was a military fiasco. Only the courage of its soldiers and the German intervention saved the dictator’s army from complete disaster. This book would appeal to anyone interested in the history of the world war, and to those involved in the study of military effectiveness and intrigued by why armies fail.
Author: John Gooch
Publisher: Simon and Schuster
ISBN: 164313549X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 304
Get Book Here
Book Description
A remarkable new history evoking the centrality of Italy to World War II, outlining the brief rise and triumph of the Fascists, followed by the disastrous fall of the Italian military campaign. While staying closely aligned with Hitler, Mussolini remained carefully neutral until the summer of 1940. At that moment, with the wholly unexpected and sudden collapse of the French and British armies, Mussolini declared war on the Allies in the hope of making territorial gains in southern France and Africa. This decision proved a horrifying miscalculation, dooming Italy to its own prolonged and unwinnable war, immense casualties, and an Allied invasion in 1943 that ushered in a terrible new era for the country. John Gooch's new history is the definitive account of Italy's war experience. Beginning with the invasion of Abyssinia and ending with Mussolini's arrest, Gooch brilliantly portrays the nightmare of a country with too small an industrial sector, too incompetent a leadership and too many fronts on which to fight. Everywhere—whether in the USSR, the Western Desert, or the Balkans—Italian troops found themselves against either better-equipped or more motivated enemies. The result was a war entirely at odds with the dreams of pre-war Italian planners—a series of desperate improvisations against an allied force who could draw on global resources, and against whom Italy proved helpless.
Author: John Carr
Publisher: Pen and Sword Military
ISBN: 1526765047
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 257
Get Book Here
Book Description
This WWII history examines the most consequential and hard-fought battle between Greek and Italian forces in Albania. On March 9th, 1941, the Italians launched their Spring Offensive, designed to stem four months of humiliating reverses. Watched by Mussolini himself, the operation’s objective was a pair of parallel valleys dominated by the Greek-held Hill 731. The Italian Eighth Corps, part of Geloso’s 11th Army, had the task of seizing the heights, spearheaded by 38 (Puglie) Division. Holding the position was the Greek 1 Division of II Corps, with 4 and 6 Division on the flanks. For seventeen days, after a massive artillery barrage, the Italians threw themselves against the Evzones on the hill—only to be repeatedly smashed with appalling losses. It was a merciless fight at close quarters, where bayonets held the place of honor but the battered Greeks held. Mussolini had wanted a spring victory to impress the Führer. Instead, the bloody debacle of Hill 731 could well have contributed to Hitler’s decision to postpone his invasion of Russia. John Carr sheds light on this consequential episode in the Mediterranean theater of operations.
Author: Phoebus Athanassiou
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 1472819195
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Get Book Here
Book Description
In October 1940 an Italian army some 200,000 strong invaded Greece across its largely undefended border with Albania. Although supported by Great Britain, at first by sea and in the air and later by landing British and ANZAC troops from North Africa, Greece bore the main brunt of the six-month war. Outclassed in materiel and outnumbered, LtGen Papagos's Greek army was so successful against the Italians in north-west Greece that, by 22 November 1940, it was advancing into Italian-held Albania. This would eventually force Hitler to send in German reinforcements to support his beleaguered Italian allies, delaying his invasion of the Soviet Union. Complete with contemporary photographs and full-colour uniform plates, this fascinating study explores the history, organization, and appearance of the armies of this oft forgotten conflict.
Author: H. James Burgwyn
Publisher: Enigma Books
ISBN: 1936274299
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 354
Get Book Here
Book Description
The first study of Benito Mussolini's failure as a war leader.
Author: Craig Stockings
Publisher: BRILL
ISBN: 9004254595
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 664
Get Book Here
Book Description
Swastika over the Acropolis is a new, multi-national account which provides a new and compelling interpretation of the Greek campaign of 1941, and its place in the history of World War II. It overturns many previously accepted English-language assumptions about the fighting in Greece in April 1941 – including, for example, the impact usually ascribed to the Luftwaffe, German armour and the conduct of the Greek Army Further, Swastika over the Acropolis demonstrates that this last complete strategic victory by Nazi Germany in World War II is set against a British-Dominion campaign mounted as a withdrawal, not an attempt to ‘save’ Greece from invasion and occupation. At the same time, on the German side, the campaign revealed serious and systemic weaknesses in the planning and the conduct of large-scale operations that would play a significant role in the regime’s later defeats.
Author: Frank Joseph
Publisher: Helion and Company
ISBN: 1906033560
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 241
Get Book Here
Book Description
Among the great misconceptions of modern times is the assumption that Benito Mussolini was Hitler's junior partner, who made no significant contributions to the Second World War. That conclusion originated with Allied propagandists determined to boost Anglo-American morale, while undermining Axis cooperation. The Duce's failings, real or imagined, were inflated and ridiculed; his successes, pointedly demeaned or ignored. Italy's bungling navy, ineffectual army - as cowardly as it was ill-equipped - and air force of antiquated biplanes were handily dealt with by the Western Allies. So effective was this disinformation campaign that it became post-war history, and is still generally taken for granted even by otherwise well-informed scholars and students of World War Two. But a closer examination of recently disclosed, and often neglected, original source materials presents an entirely different picture. They shine new light, for example, on Italy's submarine service, the world's greatest in terms of tonnage, its boats sinking nearly three-quarters of a million tons of Allied shipping in three years' time. During a single operation, Italian 'human torpedoes' sank the battleships HMS Valiant and Queen Elizabeth, plus an eight-thousand-ton tanker, at their home anchorage in Alexandria, Egypt. By mid-1942, Mussolini's navy had fought its way back from crushing defeats to become the dominant power in the Mediterranean Sea. Contrary to popular belief, his Fiat biplanes gave as good as they got in the Battle of Britain, and their monoplane replacements, such as the Macchi Greyhound, were state-of-the-art interceptors superior to the American Mustang. Savoia-Marchetti Sparrowhawk bombers accounted for seventy-two Allied warships and one hundred-ninety-six freighters before the Bagdolio armistice in 1943. On 7 June 1942, infantry of the Italian X Corps saved Rommel's XV Brigade near Gazala, in North Africa, from otherwise certain annihilation, while horse-soldiers of the Third Cavalry Division Amedeo Duca d'Aosta defeated Soviet forces on the Don River before Stalingrad the following August in history's last cavalry charge. As influential as these operations were on the course of World War Two, more potentially decisive was Mussolini's planned aggression against the United States' mainland. Postponed only at the last moment when its conventional explosives were slated for substitution by a nuclear device, New York City escaped an atomic attack by margins more narrow than previously understood. It is now known that Italian scientists led the world in nuclear research in 1939, and a four-engine Piaggio heavy bomber was modified to carry an atomic bomb five years later. These and numerous other disclosures combine to debunk lingering propaganda stereotypes of an inept, ineffectual Italian armed forces. That dated portrayal is rendered obsolete by a true-to-life account of the men and weapons of Mussolini's War.
Author: John Carr
Publisher: Pen and Sword
ISBN: 1473828309
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 294
Get Book Here
Book Description
This military history of the WWII Battle of Greece presents a vivid and detailed account with special focus on the Greek forces defending their homeland. On October 28th, 1940, the Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Metaxas refused to accept an ultimatum from Italy’s Fascist leader Benito Mussolini. Immediately upon his refusal, Italian forces began the invasion of Greece via Albania. This aggression was prompted by Mussolini's desire for a quick victory to rival Hitler's rapid conquest of France and the Low Countries. But Mussolini had underestimated the skill and determination of the defenders. Within weeks, the Italian invaders were driven back over the border and Greek forces actually advanced deep into Albania. Eventually, Hitler was forced to intervene, sending German forces into Greece via Bulgaria on April 6th. The Greeks, assisted by British forces, were overwhelmed by the Germans and their blitzkrieg tactics. After Athens fell on April 27th, the British evacuated to Crete. But the following month, German airborn troops invaded and eventually took the strategically vital island. John Carr's masterful account of these desperate campaigns draws heavily on Greek sources to emphasize the oft-neglected experience of Greeks soldiers and their contribution to the fight against fascism.
