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Author: Brian Feltham
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0199579954
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 272
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Book Description
Issues of impartiality and partiality are a major focus of debate in moral theory. Should our personal relationships and commitments have a special place in our moral deliberations? Ten specially written essays by experts in the field offer a variety of perspectives, which will interest readers in both theoretical and practical ethics.
Author: Brian Feltham
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0199579954
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 272
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Book Description
Issues of impartiality and partiality are a major focus of debate in moral theory. Should our personal relationships and commitments have a special place in our moral deliberations? Ten specially written essays by experts in the field offer a variety of perspectives, which will interest readers in both theoretical and practical ethics.
Author: Simon Keller
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400846382
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 177
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Book Description
We are partial to people with whom we share special relationships--if someone is your child, parent, or friend, you wouldn't treat them as you would a stranger. But is partiality justified, and if so, why? Partiality presents a theory of the reasons supporting special treatment within special relationships and explores the vexing problem of how we might reconcile the moral value of these relationships with competing claims of impartial morality. Simon Keller explains that in order to understand why we give special treatment to our family and friends, we need to understand how people come to matter in their own rights. Keller first presents two main accounts of partiality: the projects view, on which reasons of partiality arise from the place that people take within our lives and our commitments, and the relationships view, on which relationships themselves contain fundamental value or reason-giving force. Keller then argues that neither view is satisfactory because neither captures the experience of acting well within special relationships. Instead, Keller defends the individuals view, on which reasons of partiality arise from the value of the individuals with whom our relationships are shared. He defends this view by saying that we must accept that two people, whether friend or stranger, can have the same value, even as their value makes different demands upon people with whom they share different relationships. Keller explores the implications of this claim within a wider understanding of morality and our relationships with groups, institutions, and countries.
Author: Garrett Cullity
Publisher: Clarendon Press
ISBN: 0191622567
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 297
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Book Description
How much are we morally required to do to help people who are much worse off than us? On any credible moral outlook, other people's pressing need for assistance can ground moral requirements on us to help them---requirements of beneficence. How far do those requirements extend? One way to think about this is by means of a simple analogy: an analogy between joining in efforts to help people at a distance and rescuing a needy person yourself, directly. Part I of Garrett Cullity's book examines this analogy. In some ways, the analogy is not only simple, but politically and metaphysically simplistic. However, it contains an important truth: we are morally required to help other people, indirectly as well as directly. But the number of needy people in the world is enormous, and their need is very great. Once we start to recognize requirements to help them, when is it morally acceptable to stop? Cullity answers this question in Part II. Examining the nature of beneficence, he argues that its requirements only make sense on the assumption that many of the interests we share in common-rich and poor alike-are interests it is not wrong to pursue.
Author: M. Molefe
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 1498599443
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 181
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Book Description
Partiality and Impartiality in African Philosophy fills the lacuna in African philosophy literature on the inherent tension between requirements of partiality (favoritism) and impartiality (equality). Motsamai Molefe deploys two strategies to philosophically resolve the tension between partiality and impartiality. The first strategy involves applying the moral theories of Kwasi Wiredu, Thaddeus Metz, and Kwame Gyekye to the problem. Finding their views useful in some ways and seriously limited in others, Molefe turns to the second strategy in which he invokes the salient normative concept of personhood in African cultures. Molefe argues that the concept of personhood adjoins theories of human dignity and moral perfection (virtue). The major insight that emerges is a robust ethical theory qua personhood that accommodates both partiality and impartiality. He grounds requirements of impartiality on human dignity, which operates largely as a macro-ethical concept that normatively informs the character of our social institutions (politics). Politics is characterized by fairness, equality, and impartiality. Partiality (the agent-and-other-centred forms of it) is directly connected with the agent’s chief moral duty to achieve her own virtue (moral perfection), which operates as a micro-ethical concept. These two kinds of moral partialism, self-favoritism and close ties such as family, are justified by appeal to the project's view, instead of the individuals-and-relationships view typically invoked to justify moral partiality in the literature.
Author: Dale Dorsey
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198728905
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 246
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Book Description
Dale Dorsey considers one of the most important questions in philosophical ethics: to what extent do the demands of morality have authority over us and our lives? He defends a position that runs counter to the traditional view, and argues that we are not required to conform to moral demands. Furthermore, doing so can be (quite literally) wrong.
Author: Susan R. Wolf
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0195332814
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 289
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Book Description
For over thirty years Susan Wolf has been writing about moral and nonmoral values and the relation between them. This volume collects Wolf's most important essays on the topics of morality, love, and meaning, ranging from her classic essay "Moral Saints" to her most recent "The Importance of Love." Wolf's essays warn us against the common tendency to classify values in terms of a dichotomy that contrasts the personal, self-interested, or egoistic with the impersonal, altruistic or moral. On Wolf's view, this tendency ignores or distorts the significance of such values as love, beauty, and truth, and neglects the importance of meaningfulness as a dimension of the good life. These essays show us how a self-conscious recognition of the variety of values leads to new understandings of the point, the content, and the limits of morality and to new ways of thinking about happiness and well-being.
Author: Bernice Bovenkerk
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030635236
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 574
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Book Description
This Open Access book brings together authoritative voices in animal and environmental ethics, who address the many different facets of changing human-animal relationships in the Anthropocene. As we are living in complex times, the issue of how to establish meaningful relationships with other animals under Anthropocene conditions needs to be approached from a multitude of angles. This book offers the reader insight into the different discussions that exist around the topics of how we should understand animal agency, how we could take animal agency seriously in farms, urban areas and the wild, and what technologies are appropriate and morally desirable to use regarding animals. This book is of interest to both animal studies scholars and environmental ethics scholars, as well as to practitioners working with animals, such as wildlife managers, zookeepers, and conservation biologists.
Author: Nicholas Southwood
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199539650
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 221
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Book Description
Proposes a new model of contractualism based on an interpersonal, deliberative conception of practical reason which answers the twin demands of moral accuracy and explanatory adequacy.
Author: Rachel Cohon
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199268444
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 296
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Book Description
Rachel Cohon offers an original interpretation of the ethical thinking of the 18th-century philosopher David Hume. She focuses on two claims: that human beings figure out what is good or evil by using our feelings or emotions, and that some of the good traits we recognize are produced by informal social agreement and teaching.
Author: D. D. Raphael
Publisher: Clarendon Press
ISBN: 0191526649
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 152
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Book Description
D. D. Raphael provides a critical account of the moral philosophy of Adam Smith, presented in his first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Whilst it does not have the same prominence in its field as his work on economics, The Wealth of Nations, Smith's writing on ethics is of continuing importance and interest today, especially for its theory of conscience. Smith sees the origin of conscience in the sympathetic and antipathetic feelings of spectators. As spectators of the actions of other people, we can imagine how we would feel in their situation. If we would share their motives, we approve of their action. If not, we disapprove. When we ourselves take an action, we know from experience what spectators would feel, approval or disapproval. That knowledge forms conscience, an imagined impartial spectator who tells us whether an action is right or wrong. In describing the content of moral judgement, Smith is much influenced by Stoic ethics, with an emphasis on self-command, but he voices criticism as well as praise. His own position is a combination of Stoic and Christian values. There is a substantial difference between the first five editions of the Moral Sentiments and the sixth. Failure to take account of this has led some commentators to mistaken views about the supposed youthful idealism of the Moral Sentiments as contrasted with the mature realism of The Wealth of Nations. A further source of error has been the supposition that Smith treats sympathy as the motive of moral action, as contrasted with the supposedly universal motive of self-interest in The Wealth of Nations.
