Moral Judgments as Educated Intuitions PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Moral Judgments as Educated Intuitions PDF full book. Access full book title Moral Judgments as Educated Intuitions by Hanno Sauer. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Hanno Sauer
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 026203560X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 328
Get Book Here
Book Description
An argument that moral reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment through episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Rationalists about the psychology of moral judgment argue that moral cognition has a rational foundation. Recent challenges to this account, based on findings in the empirical psychology of moral judgment, contend that moral thinking has no rational basis. In this book, Hanno Sauer argues that moral reasoning does play a role in moral judgment—but not, as is commonly supposed, because conscious reasoning produces moral judgments directly. Moral reasoning figures in the acquisition, formation, maintenance, and reflective correction of moral intuitions. Sauer proposes that when we make moral judgments we draw on a stable repertoire of intuitions about what is morally acceptable, which we have acquired over the course of our moral education—episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Moral judgments are educated and rationally amenable moral intuitions. Sauer engages extensively with the empirical evidence on the psychology of moral judgment and argues that it can be shown empirically that reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment. He offers detailed counterarguments to the anti-rationalist challenge (the claim that reason and reasoning play no significant part in morality and moral judgment) and the emotionist challenge (the argument for the emotional basis of moral judgment). Finally, he uses Joshua Greene's Dual Process model of moral cognition to test the empirical viability and normative persuasiveness of his account of educated intuitions. Sauer shows that moral judgments can be automatic, emotional, intuitive, and rational at the same time.
Author: Hanno Sauer
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 026203560X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 328
Get Book Here
Book Description
An argument that moral reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment through episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Rationalists about the psychology of moral judgment argue that moral cognition has a rational foundation. Recent challenges to this account, based on findings in the empirical psychology of moral judgment, contend that moral thinking has no rational basis. In this book, Hanno Sauer argues that moral reasoning does play a role in moral judgment—but not, as is commonly supposed, because conscious reasoning produces moral judgments directly. Moral reasoning figures in the acquisition, formation, maintenance, and reflective correction of moral intuitions. Sauer proposes that when we make moral judgments we draw on a stable repertoire of intuitions about what is morally acceptable, which we have acquired over the course of our moral education—episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Moral judgments are educated and rationally amenable moral intuitions. Sauer engages extensively with the empirical evidence on the psychology of moral judgment and argues that it can be shown empirically that reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment. He offers detailed counterarguments to the anti-rationalist challenge (the claim that reason and reasoning play no significant part in morality and moral judgment) and the emotionist challenge (the argument for the emotional basis of moral judgment). Finally, he uses Joshua Greene's Dual Process model of moral cognition to test the empirical viability and normative persuasiveness of his account of educated intuitions. Sauer shows that moral judgments can be automatic, emotional, intuitive, and rational at the same time.
Author: Hanno Sauer
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 131546747X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 153
Get Book Here
Book Description
In recent research, dual-process theories of cognition have been the primary model for explaining moral judgment and reasoning. These theories understand moral thinking in terms of two separate domains: one deliberate and analytic, the other quick and instinctive. This book presents a new theory of the philosophy and cognitive science of moral judgment. Hanno Sauer develops and defends an account of "triple-process" moral psychology, arguing that moral thinking and reasoning are only insufficiently understood when described in terms of a quick but intuitive and a slow but rational type of cognition. This approach severely underestimates the importance and impact of dispositions to initiate and engage in critical thinking – the cognitive resource in charge of counteracting my-side bias, closed-mindedness, dogmatism, and breakdowns of self-control. Moral cognition is based, not on emotion and reason, but on an integrated network of intuitive, algorithmic and reflective thinking. Moral Thinking, Fast and Slow will be of great interest to philosophers and students of ethics, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science.
Author: Pauline Kleingeld
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789036766401
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 303
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Hanno Sauer
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262546701
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 327
Get Book Here
Book Description
An argument that moral reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment through episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Rationalists about the psychology of moral judgment argue that moral cognition has a rational foundation. Recent challenges to this account, based on findings in the empirical psychology of moral judgment, contend that moral thinking has no rational basis. In this book, Hanno Sauer argues that moral reasoning does play a role in moral judgment—but not, as is commonly supposed, because conscious reasoning produces moral judgments directly. Moral reasoning figures in the acquisition, formation, maintenance, and reflective correction of moral intuitions. Sauer proposes that when we make moral judgments we draw on a stable repertoire of intuitions about what is morally acceptable, which we have acquired over the course of our moral education—episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Moral judgments are educated and rationally amenable moral intuitions. Sauer engages extensively with the empirical evidence on the psychology of moral judgment and argues that it can be shown empirically that reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment. He offers detailed counterarguments to the anti-rationalist challenge (the claim that reason and reasoning play no significant part in morality and moral judgment) and the emotionist challenge (the argument for the emotional basis of moral judgment). Finally, he uses Joshua Greene's Dual Process model of moral cognition to test the empirical viability and normative persuasiveness of his account of educated intuitions. Sauer shows that moral judgments can be automatic, emotional, intuitive, and rational at the same time.
Author: Graham Wood
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 1000819914
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 81
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book brings together three distinct research programmes in moral psychology – Moral Foundations Theory, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange, and the Linguistic Analogy in Moral Psychology – and shows that they can be combined to create a unified cognitive science of moral intuition. The book assumes evolution has furnished the human mind with two types of judgement: intuitive and deliberative. Focusing on moral intuitions (understood as moral judgments that were not arrived at via a process of conscious deliberation), the book explores the origins of these intuitions, examines how they are produced, and explains why the moral intuitions of different humans differ. Providing a unique synthesis of three separate established fields, this book presents a new research program that will further our understanding of the various different intuitive moral judgements at the heart of some of the moral tensions within human society.
Author: Hans A. Hartmann
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 9781138528338
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 344
Get Book Here
Book Description
The study of morality is an empirical as well as conceptual task, one that involves data collection, statistical analysis, and the formulation and testing of hypotheses. This volume is about moral judgment, especially its exercise in selected social settings. The contributors are psychologists, sociologists, and philosophers of morality, most of whom have collaborated on long-ranged research projects in Europe involving socialization. These essays make it clear that moral judgment is a complex phenomena. The book fuses developmental psychology, sociology, and social psychology. It relates this directly to the work of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, who wrote the introduction to the book. Whether moral reasoning has a content-specific domain, or whether its structures transcend specific issues of justice, obedience, and rights, these and similar questions suggest that moral philosophers and ethical theorists have much to say about the human condition. The contributors represent diverse disciplines; but they have as their common concern the topic of the interaction of individual or group-specific moral development and social milieu. Although deeply involved in empirical research, they maintain that research on moral development can be pursued properly only in conjunction with a well-formulated theory of the relationship between society, cognition, and behavior. Moral development is an institutional as well as individual concern for schools, universities, and the military. It is rooted in the ability to formulate genuine and coherent moral judgments that reflect social conditions at two levels: individual socialization and historical development of the social system. This classic volume, now available in paperback, not only exemplifies that framework, but also makes an important contribution to it.
Author: Jay Spitzley
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
Empirical research suggests that our moral behaviors, judgments, and intuitions have been evolutionarily selected for because they provide strategic solutions to the problems we face as social animals. Nonetheless, a great deal of moral philosophy relies on employing our moral judgments and intuitive moral concepts to guide our understanding of morality and justifications for moral actions. Moral argumentation is commonly guided by thought experiments, counterexamples, attractive principles, as well as concepts like justice and desert. While our moral intuitions and judgments might be helpful in pursuing moral understanding, using these judgments without also appreciating the natural facts about morality will inevitably lead to failures. In this dissertation, I focus on a subset of morality, moral responsibility, and show that certain intuitive views regarding moral responsibility are inherently problematic in light of the empirical explanation of our moral judgments and behaviors. I start by discussing punishment. Punishment has been a topic of great interest to biologists and behavioral economists because of how difficult it is to explain. If morality and moral behavior are adaptive, punishment seems to provide a counterexample; it is not obvious how punishment could straightforwardly benefit the punisher and it certainly does not seem to benefit the one who is punished. I argue that the logic of punishment constrains what sorts of punishment behavior can be adaptive and that our current punishment behaviors and judgments conform to this logic. Thus, I offer an explanation for many of our prevalent and firmly held intuitive judgments and behaviors about punishment. I argue that this explanation illuminates problematic aspects for certain philosophical views and arguments surrounding punishment, as well as moral responsibility more generally. For instance, I argue that this evolutionary explanation poses a problem for anyone who attempts to justify treating people in ways they deserve to be treated because they deserve to be treated that way. More specifically, I argue that desert-based justifications for treatment face a dilemma. Either there is some relationship between justifications for our practices of treating people in ways they deserve to be treated and the evolutionary selective forces that determine what sorts of desert judgments we make or there is no such relationship. If there is no relationship, then we cannot rely on desert judgments to inform us about justifiably deserved treatment. If there is a relationship, then desert-based justifications are at odds with the scientific understanding of our moral judgments. Desert-based justifications for treatment face this dilemma because they both appeal to intuitive judgments about deserved treatment and also require an assumption that is at odds with the evolutionary explanation of our desert intuitions. The problematic assumption stems from the backward-looking nature of desert justifications for treatment. Desert-based justifications do not take any future or forward-looking considerations to be relevant to the justification for such treatment. The concept of desert itself is also thought to be backward-looking, in that the basis of desert is independent of forward-looking considerations. That is, it is normally assumed that if we judge that a person deserves something, it is in virtue of something that person did or some character trait they have that they deserve this, and never because of some fact about the future. Given that desert is central to most understandings of moral responsibility, I investigated whether our everyday concepts of desert and moral responsibility are in fact entirely backward-looking. My results suggest that this is not the case. Therefore, if appealing to intuitions is a valid method of discovering the nature of moral responsibility and desert, it seems either desert is not entirely backward-looking or moral responsibility is not exclusively desert-based. These experimental results also suggest that consequentialist accounts of moral responsibility, which have largely been abandoned due to their counterintuitive nature, are perhaps not so counterintuitive after all. In sum, I argue that progress in understanding morality, and moral responsibility specifically, requires empirical clarity.
Author: Keith J. Holyoak
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199313792
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 865
Get Book Here
Book Description
The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning brings together the contributions of many of the leading researchers in thinking and reasoning to create the most comprehensive overview of research on thinking and reasoning that has ever been available.
Author: John J. Park
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1000402150
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 370
Get Book Here
Book Description
This volume examines the psychological basis of moral judgments and asks what theories of concepts apply to moral concepts. By combining philosophical reasoning and empirical insights from the fields of moral psychology, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, and neuroscience, it considers what mental states not only influence, but also constitute our moral concepts and judgments. On this basis, Park proposes a novel pluralistic theory of moral concepts which includes three different cognitive structures and emotions. Thus, our moral judgments are shown to be a hybrid that express both cognitive and conative states. In part through analysis of new empirical data on moral semantic intuitions, gathered via cross-cultural experimental research, Park reveals that the referents of individuals’ moral judgments and concepts vary across time, contexts, and groups. On this basis, he contends for moral relativism, where moral judgments cannot be universally true across time and location but only relative to groups. This powerfully argued text will be of interest to researchers, academics, and educators with an interest in cognitive science, moral theory, philosophy of psychology, and moral psychology more broadly. Those interested in ethics, applied social psychology, and moral development will also benefit from the volume.
Author:
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 0080922775
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 384
Get Book Here
Book Description
This volume presents a variety of perspectives from within and outside moral psychology. Recently there has been an explosion of research in moral psychology, but it is one of the subfields most in need of bridge-building, both within and across areas. Interests in moral phenomena have spawned several separate lines of research that appear to address similar concerns from a variety of perspectives. The contributions to this volume examine key theoretical and empirical issues these perspectives share that connect these issues with the broader base of theory and research in social and cognitive psychology. The first two chapters discuss the role of mental representation in moral judgment and reasoning. Sloman, Fernbach, and Ewing argue that causal models are the canonical representational medium underlying moral reasoning, and Mikhail offers an account that makes use of linguistic structures and implicates legal concepts. Bilz and Nadler follow with a discussion of the ways in which laws, which are typically construed in terms of affecting behavior, exert an influence on moral attitudes, cognition, and emotions. Baron and Ritov follow with a discussion of how people's moral cognition is often driven by law-like rules that forbid actions and suggest that value-driven judgment is relatively less concerned by the consequences of those actions than some normative standards would prescribe. Iliev et al. argue that moral cognition makes use of both rules and consequences, and review a number of laboratory studies that suggest that values influence what captures our attention, and that attention is a powerful determinant of judgment and preference. Ginges follows with a discussion of how these value-related processes influence cognition and behavior outside the laboratory, in high-stakes, real-world conflicts. Two subsequent chapters discuss further building blocks of moral cognition. Lapsley and Narvaez discuss the development of moral characters in children, and Reyna and Casillas offer a memory-based account of moral reasoning, backed up by developmental evidence. Their theoretical framework is also very relevant to the phenomena discussed in the Sloman et al., Baron and Ritov, and Iliev et al. chapters. The final three chapters are centrally focused on the interplay of hot and cold cognition. They examine the relationship between recent empirical findings in moral psychology and accounts that rely on concepts and distinctions borrowed from normative ethics and decision theory. Connolly and Hardman focus on bridge-building between contemporary discussions in the judgment and decision making and moral judgment literatures, offering several useful methodological and theoretical critiques. Ditto, Pizarro, and Tannenbaum argue that some forms of moral judgment that appear objective and absolute on the surface are, at bottom, more about motivated reasoning in service of some desired conclusion. Finally, Bauman and Skitka argue that moral relevance is in the eye of the perceiver and emphasize an empirical approach to identifying whether people perceive a given judgment as moral or non-moral. They describe a number of behavioral implications of people's reported perception that a judgment or choice is a moral one, and in doing so, they suggest that the way in which researchers carve out the moral domain a priori might be dubious.
