Author: Hanno Sauer
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262546701
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 327
Book Description
An argument that moral reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment through episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Rationalists about the psychology of moral judgment argue that moral cognition has a rational foundation. Recent challenges to this account, based on findings in the empirical psychology of moral judgment, contend that moral thinking has no rational basis. In this book, Hanno Sauer argues that moral reasoning does play a role in moral judgment—but not, as is commonly supposed, because conscious reasoning produces moral judgments directly. Moral reasoning figures in the acquisition, formation, maintenance, and reflective correction of moral intuitions. Sauer proposes that when we make moral judgments we draw on a stable repertoire of intuitions about what is morally acceptable, which we have acquired over the course of our moral education—episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Moral judgments are educated and rationally amenable moral intuitions. Sauer engages extensively with the empirical evidence on the psychology of moral judgment and argues that it can be shown empirically that reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment. He offers detailed counterarguments to the anti-rationalist challenge (the claim that reason and reasoning play no significant part in morality and moral judgment) and the emotionist challenge (the argument for the emotional basis of moral judgment). Finally, he uses Joshua Greene's Dual Process model of moral cognition to test the empirical viability and normative persuasiveness of his account of educated intuitions. Sauer shows that moral judgments can be automatic, emotional, intuitive, and rational at the same time.
Moral Judgments as Educated Intuitions
Author: Hanno Sauer
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262546701
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 327
Book Description
An argument that moral reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment through episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Rationalists about the psychology of moral judgment argue that moral cognition has a rational foundation. Recent challenges to this account, based on findings in the empirical psychology of moral judgment, contend that moral thinking has no rational basis. In this book, Hanno Sauer argues that moral reasoning does play a role in moral judgment—but not, as is commonly supposed, because conscious reasoning produces moral judgments directly. Moral reasoning figures in the acquisition, formation, maintenance, and reflective correction of moral intuitions. Sauer proposes that when we make moral judgments we draw on a stable repertoire of intuitions about what is morally acceptable, which we have acquired over the course of our moral education—episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Moral judgments are educated and rationally amenable moral intuitions. Sauer engages extensively with the empirical evidence on the psychology of moral judgment and argues that it can be shown empirically that reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment. He offers detailed counterarguments to the anti-rationalist challenge (the claim that reason and reasoning play no significant part in morality and moral judgment) and the emotionist challenge (the argument for the emotional basis of moral judgment). Finally, he uses Joshua Greene's Dual Process model of moral cognition to test the empirical viability and normative persuasiveness of his account of educated intuitions. Sauer shows that moral judgments can be automatic, emotional, intuitive, and rational at the same time.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262546701
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 327
Book Description
An argument that moral reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment through episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Rationalists about the psychology of moral judgment argue that moral cognition has a rational foundation. Recent challenges to this account, based on findings in the empirical psychology of moral judgment, contend that moral thinking has no rational basis. In this book, Hanno Sauer argues that moral reasoning does play a role in moral judgment—but not, as is commonly supposed, because conscious reasoning produces moral judgments directly. Moral reasoning figures in the acquisition, formation, maintenance, and reflective correction of moral intuitions. Sauer proposes that when we make moral judgments we draw on a stable repertoire of intuitions about what is morally acceptable, which we have acquired over the course of our moral education—episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Moral judgments are educated and rationally amenable moral intuitions. Sauer engages extensively with the empirical evidence on the psychology of moral judgment and argues that it can be shown empirically that reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment. He offers detailed counterarguments to the anti-rationalist challenge (the claim that reason and reasoning play no significant part in morality and moral judgment) and the emotionist challenge (the argument for the emotional basis of moral judgment). Finally, he uses Joshua Greene's Dual Process model of moral cognition to test the empirical viability and normative persuasiveness of his account of educated intuitions. Sauer shows that moral judgments can be automatic, emotional, intuitive, and rational at the same time.
Moral Thinking, Fast and Slow
Author: Hanno Sauer
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 131546747X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 153
Book Description
In recent research, dual-process theories of cognition have been the primary model for explaining moral judgment and reasoning. These theories understand moral thinking in terms of two separate domains: one deliberate and analytic, the other quick and instinctive. This book presents a new theory of the philosophy and cognitive science of moral judgment. Hanno Sauer develops and defends an account of "triple-process" moral psychology, arguing that moral thinking and reasoning are only insufficiently understood when described in terms of a quick but intuitive and a slow but rational type of cognition. This approach severely underestimates the importance and impact of dispositions to initiate and engage in critical thinking – the cognitive resource in charge of counteracting my-side bias, closed-mindedness, dogmatism, and breakdowns of self-control. Moral cognition is based, not on emotion and reason, but on an integrated network of intuitive, algorithmic and reflective thinking. Moral Thinking, Fast and Slow will be of great interest to philosophers and students of ethics, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 131546747X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 153
Book Description
In recent research, dual-process theories of cognition have been the primary model for explaining moral judgment and reasoning. These theories understand moral thinking in terms of two separate domains: one deliberate and analytic, the other quick and instinctive. This book presents a new theory of the philosophy and cognitive science of moral judgment. Hanno Sauer develops and defends an account of "triple-process" moral psychology, arguing that moral thinking and reasoning are only insufficiently understood when described in terms of a quick but intuitive and a slow but rational type of cognition. This approach severely underestimates the importance and impact of dispositions to initiate and engage in critical thinking – the cognitive resource in charge of counteracting my-side bias, closed-mindedness, dogmatism, and breakdowns of self-control. Moral cognition is based, not on emotion and reason, but on an integrated network of intuitive, algorithmic and reflective thinking. Moral Thinking, Fast and Slow will be of great interest to philosophers and students of ethics, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science.
Judgment Misguided
Author: Jonathan Baron
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0195111087
Category : Policy sciences
Languages : en
Pages : 238
Book Description
People often follow intuitive principles of decision making, ranging from group loyalty to the belief that nature is benign. But instead of using these principles as rules of thumb, we often treat them as absolutes and ignore the consequences of following them blindly. In Judgment Misguided, Jonathan Baron explores our well-meant and deeply felt personal intuitions about what is right and wrong, and how they affect the public domain. Baron argues that when these intuitions are valued in their own right, rather than as a means to another end, they often prevent us from achieving the results we want. Focusing on cases where our intuitive principles take over public decision making, the book examines some of our most common intuitions and the ways they can be misused. According to Baron, we can avoid these problems by paying more attention to the effects of our decisions. Written in a accessible style, the book is filled with compelling case studies, such as abortion, nuclear power, immigration, and the decline of the Atlantic fishery, among others, which illustrate a range of intuitions and how they impede the public's best interests. Judgment Misguided will be important reading for those involved in public decision making, and researchers and students in psychology and the social sciences, as well as everyone looking for insight into the decisions that affect us all.
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0195111087
Category : Policy sciences
Languages : en
Pages : 238
Book Description
People often follow intuitive principles of decision making, ranging from group loyalty to the belief that nature is benign. But instead of using these principles as rules of thumb, we often treat them as absolutes and ignore the consequences of following them blindly. In Judgment Misguided, Jonathan Baron explores our well-meant and deeply felt personal intuitions about what is right and wrong, and how they affect the public domain. Baron argues that when these intuitions are valued in their own right, rather than as a means to another end, they often prevent us from achieving the results we want. Focusing on cases where our intuitive principles take over public decision making, the book examines some of our most common intuitions and the ways they can be misused. According to Baron, we can avoid these problems by paying more attention to the effects of our decisions. Written in a accessible style, the book is filled with compelling case studies, such as abortion, nuclear power, immigration, and the decline of the Atlantic fishery, among others, which illustrate a range of intuitions and how they impede the public's best interests. Judgment Misguided will be important reading for those involved in public decision making, and researchers and students in psychology and the social sciences, as well as everyone looking for insight into the decisions that affect us all.
Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind
Author: Joshua May
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192539604
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 281
Book Description
The burgeoning science of ethics has produced a trend toward pessimism. Ordinary moral thought and action, we're told, are profoundly influenced by arbitrary factors and ultimately driven by unreasoned feelings. This book counters the current orthodoxy on its own terms by carefully engaging with the empirical literature. The resulting view, optimistic rationalism, shows the pervasive role played by reason our moral minds, and ultimately defuses sweeping debunking arguments in ethics. The science does suggest that moral knowledge and virtue don't come easily. However, despite the heavy influence of automatic and unconscious processes that have been shaped by evolutionary pressures, we needn't reject ordinary moral psychology as fundamentally flawed or in need of serious repair. Reason can be corrupted in ethics just as in other domains, but a special pessimism about morality in particular is unwarranted. Moral judgment and motivation are fundamentally rational enterprises not beholden to the passions.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192539604
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 281
Book Description
The burgeoning science of ethics has produced a trend toward pessimism. Ordinary moral thought and action, we're told, are profoundly influenced by arbitrary factors and ultimately driven by unreasoned feelings. This book counters the current orthodoxy on its own terms by carefully engaging with the empirical literature. The resulting view, optimistic rationalism, shows the pervasive role played by reason our moral minds, and ultimately defuses sweeping debunking arguments in ethics. The science does suggest that moral knowledge and virtue don't come easily. However, despite the heavy influence of automatic and unconscious processes that have been shaped by evolutionary pressures, we needn't reject ordinary moral psychology as fundamentally flawed or in need of serious repair. Reason can be corrupted in ethics just as in other domains, but a special pessimism about morality in particular is unwarranted. Moral judgment and motivation are fundamentally rational enterprises not beholden to the passions.
Ethnic Ethics
Author: Anthony J. Cortese
Publisher: State University of New York Press
ISBN: 0791499863
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 218
Book Description
This book explains and offers insights into the humanizing effects of the ethnic and cultural sources of moral values. The author provides an alternative to the concept of moral development formulated by Lawrence Kohlberg, arguing that morality is socially constructed, not based on rational principles of individuals. Cortese offers critical analyses of ethnicity and moral judgment, combining two controversial and central areas: morality and race relations. Critiquing the cognitive-developmental model, Cortese examines social class, gender, and ethnic differences in moral judgment and concludes that moral judgment reflects the structure of social relations, not the structure of human cognition. He carefully situates his own argument in relation to both Kolbergian theory and the feminist critique thereof.
Publisher: State University of New York Press
ISBN: 0791499863
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 218
Book Description
This book explains and offers insights into the humanizing effects of the ethnic and cultural sources of moral values. The author provides an alternative to the concept of moral development formulated by Lawrence Kohlberg, arguing that morality is socially constructed, not based on rational principles of individuals. Cortese offers critical analyses of ethnicity and moral judgment, combining two controversial and central areas: morality and race relations. Critiquing the cognitive-developmental model, Cortese examines social class, gender, and ethnic differences in moral judgment and concludes that moral judgment reflects the structure of social relations, not the structure of human cognition. He carefully situates his own argument in relation to both Kolbergian theory and the feminist critique thereof.
Relative Justice
Author: Tamler Sommers
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691139938
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 248
Book Description
Drawing on research in anthropology, psychology, and a host of other disciplines, this book argues that cross-cultural variation raises serious problems for theories that propose universally applicable conditions for moral responsibility. It develops a way of thinking about responsibility that takes cultural diversity into account.
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691139938
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 248
Book Description
Drawing on research in anthropology, psychology, and a host of other disciplines, this book argues that cross-cultural variation raises serious problems for theories that propose universally applicable conditions for moral responsibility. It develops a way of thinking about responsibility that takes cultural diversity into account.
Motivational Internalism
Author: Gunnar Björnsson
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199367957
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 321
Book Description
In thirteen new essays and an introduction, Motivational Internalism collects a structured overview of current debates about motivational internalism and examines the nature of and evidence for forms of internalism, internalism's relevance for moral psychology and moral semantics, and ways of bridging the gap between internalist and externalist positions.
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199367957
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 321
Book Description
In thirteen new essays and an introduction, Motivational Internalism collects a structured overview of current debates about motivational internalism and examines the nature of and evidence for forms of internalism, internalism's relevance for moral psychology and moral semantics, and ways of bridging the gap between internalist and externalist positions.
Debunking Arguments in Ethics
Author: Hanno Sauer
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108423698
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 257
Book Description
Offers the first book-length discussion of debunking arguments in ethics and the reliability of moral judgment.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108423698
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 257
Book Description
Offers the first book-length discussion of debunking arguments in ethics and the reliability of moral judgment.
Taking Life
Author: Torbjörn Tännsjö
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0190225580
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 329
Book Description
When is it right to kill? Three ethical theories are examined, deontology, a moral rights theory, and utilitarianism. The implications of each theory are worked out for different kinds of killing. In the final analysis, utilitarianism can best account for our considered intuitions about these kinds of killing.
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0190225580
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 329
Book Description
When is it right to kill? Three ethical theories are examined, deontology, a moral rights theory, and utilitarianism. The implications of each theory are worked out for different kinds of killing. In the final analysis, utilitarianism can best account for our considered intuitions about these kinds of killing.
The End of Morality
Author: Richard Joyce
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351122142
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 247
Book Description
According to the moral error theorist, all moral judgments are mistaken. The world just doesn’t contain the properties and relations necessary for these judgments to be true. But what should we actually do if we decided that we are in this radical and unsettling predicament—that morality is just a widespread and heartfelt illusion? One suggestion is to eliminate all talk and thought of morality (abolitionism). Another is to carry on believing it anyway (conservationism). And yet another is to treat morality as a kind of convenient fiction (fictionalism). We tend to think of moral thinking as valuable and useful (e.g., for motivating cooperative behavior), but we can also recognize that it can be harmful (e.g., hindering compromise) and even disastrous (e.g., inspiring support for militaristic propaganda). Would we be better off or worse off if we stopped basing decisions on moral considerations? This is a collection of twelve brand new chapters focused on a critical examination of the options available to the moral error theorist. After a general introduction outlining the topic, explaining key terminology, and offering suggestions for further reading, the chapters address questions like: • Is it true that the more that people are motivated by moral concerns, the more likely it is that society will be elitist, authoritarian, and dishonest? • Is an appeal to moral values a useful tool for helping resolve conflicts, or does it actually exacerbate conflicts? • Would it even be possible to abolish morality from our thinking? • If we were to accept a moral error theory, would it be feasible to carry on believing in morality in everyday contexts? • Might moral discourse be usefully modeled on familiar metaphorical language, where we can convey useful and important truths by uttering falsehoods? • Does moral thinking support or undermine a commitment to feminist goals? • What role do moral judgments play in addressing important decisions affecting climate change? The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously is the first book to thoroughly address these and other questions, systematically investigating the harms and benefits of moral thought, and considering what the world might be like without morality.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351122142
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 247
Book Description
According to the moral error theorist, all moral judgments are mistaken. The world just doesn’t contain the properties and relations necessary for these judgments to be true. But what should we actually do if we decided that we are in this radical and unsettling predicament—that morality is just a widespread and heartfelt illusion? One suggestion is to eliminate all talk and thought of morality (abolitionism). Another is to carry on believing it anyway (conservationism). And yet another is to treat morality as a kind of convenient fiction (fictionalism). We tend to think of moral thinking as valuable and useful (e.g., for motivating cooperative behavior), but we can also recognize that it can be harmful (e.g., hindering compromise) and even disastrous (e.g., inspiring support for militaristic propaganda). Would we be better off or worse off if we stopped basing decisions on moral considerations? This is a collection of twelve brand new chapters focused on a critical examination of the options available to the moral error theorist. After a general introduction outlining the topic, explaining key terminology, and offering suggestions for further reading, the chapters address questions like: • Is it true that the more that people are motivated by moral concerns, the more likely it is that society will be elitist, authoritarian, and dishonest? • Is an appeal to moral values a useful tool for helping resolve conflicts, or does it actually exacerbate conflicts? • Would it even be possible to abolish morality from our thinking? • If we were to accept a moral error theory, would it be feasible to carry on believing in morality in everyday contexts? • Might moral discourse be usefully modeled on familiar metaphorical language, where we can convey useful and important truths by uttering falsehoods? • Does moral thinking support or undermine a commitment to feminist goals? • What role do moral judgments play in addressing important decisions affecting climate change? The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously is the first book to thoroughly address these and other questions, systematically investigating the harms and benefits of moral thought, and considering what the world might be like without morality.