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Author: Cornell Horn
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781593301255
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 60
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Book Description
Many people, to include those in government, believe that what they deem is ethical is based on natural or physical facts. Any greater power may assume justifiability when making moral judgements against another on the presumption that the opposing other missed observing natural facts. Since moral disagreement is far more obvious, real, and apparently a natural aspect of the world, the nature of moral discourse and moral facts had to be examined against ethical naturalism. I only hope that I have shed some light for why dialectical reasoning and ridding chauvinism is so important. - Cornell Horn
Author: Cornell Horn
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781593301255
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 60
Get Book Here
Book Description
Many people, to include those in government, believe that what they deem is ethical is based on natural or physical facts. Any greater power may assume justifiability when making moral judgements against another on the presumption that the opposing other missed observing natural facts. Since moral disagreement is far more obvious, real, and apparently a natural aspect of the world, the nature of moral discourse and moral facts had to be examined against ethical naturalism. I only hope that I have shed some light for why dialectical reasoning and ridding chauvinism is so important. - Cornell Horn
Author: Stephen L. Darwall
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 9780195107494
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 422
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Book Description
What are ethical judgments about? And what is their relation to practice? How can ethical judgment aspire to objectivity? The past two decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest in metaethics, placing questions such as these about the nature and status of ethical judgment at the very center of contemporary moral philosophy.Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches is a unique anthology which collects important recent work, much of which is not easily available elsewhere, on core metaethical issues. Naturalist moral realism, once devastated by the charge of "naturalistic fallacy," has been reinvigorated, as have versions of moral realism that insist on the discontinuity between ethics and science. Irrealist, expressivist programs have also developed with great subtlety, encouraging the thought that a noncognivist account may actually be able to explain ethical judgments' aspirations to objectivity. Neo-Kantian constructivist theories have flourished as well, offering hope that morality can be grounded in a plausible conception of reasonable conduct. Together, the positions advanced in the essays collected here address these recent developments, constituting a rich array of approaches to contemporary moral philosophy's most fundamental debates. An extensive introduction by Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton is also included, making this volume the most comprehensive and up-to-date work of its kind. Moral Discourse is ideally suited for use in courses in contemporary ethics, ethical theory, and metaethics.
Author: Mark Timmons
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0195176545
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 280
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Book Description
Timmons defends an original metaethical view that exploits certain contextualist themes in philosophy of language and epistemology. He advances a view that employs semantic contextualism when engaging in moral discourse.
Author: Terence Cuneo
Publisher: Clarendon Press
ISBN: 0191614815
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 272
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Book Description
Antirealist views about morality claim that moral facts or truths do not exist. Do these views imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic ones, do not exist? The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Terence Cuneo argues that the similarities between moral and epistemic facts provide excellent reason to believe that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. But epistemic facts, it is argued, do exist: to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological skepticism. Therefore, Cuneo concludes, moral facts exist. And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true. In so arguing, Cuneo provides not simply a defense of moral realism, but a positive argument for it. Moreover, this argument engages with a wide range of antirealist positions in epistemology such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons. If the central argument of The Normative Web is correct, antirealist positions of these varieties come at a very high cost. Given their cost, Cuneo contends, we should find realism about both epistemic and moral facts highly attractive.
Author: James Gordon Finlayson
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0192840959
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 185
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Book Description
This book provides a clear and readable overview of the works of today's most influential German philosopher. It analyses the theoretical underpinnings of Habermas's social theory, and its applications in ethics, politics, and law. Finally, it examines how his social and political theory informs his writing on contemporary, political, and social problems.
Author: Jonas Olson
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0198701934
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 226
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Book Description
Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.
Author: Institute of Medicine
Publisher: National Academies Press
ISBN: 0309051320
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 560
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Book Description
Breakthroughs in biomedicine often lead to new life-giving treatments but may also raise troubling, even life-and-death, quandaries. Society's Choices discusses ways for people to handle today's bioethics issues in the context of America's unique history and cultureâ€"and from the perspectives of various interest groups. The book explores how Americans have grappled with specific aspects of bioethics through commission deliberations, programs by organizations, and other mechanisms and identifies criteria for evaluating the outcomes of these efforts. The committee offers recommendations on the role of government and professional societies, the function of commissions and institutional review boards, and bioethics in health professional education and research. The volume includes a series of 12 superb background papers on public moral discourse, mechanisms for handling social and ethical dilemmas, and other specific areas of controversy by well-known experts Ronald Bayer, Martin Benjamin, Dan W. Brock, Baruch A. Brody, H. Alta Charo, Lawrence Gostin, Bradford H. Gray, Kathi E. Hanna, Elizabeth Heitman, Thomas Nagel, Steven Shapin, and Charles M. Swezey.
Author: Justin Tosi
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0190900156
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 249
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Book Description
We are all guilty of it. We call people terrible names in conversation or online. We vilify those with whom we disagree, and make bolder claims than we could defend. We want to be seen as taking the moral high ground not just to make a point, or move a debate forward, but to look a certain way--incensed, or compassionate, or committed to a cause. We exaggerate. In other words, we grandstand. Nowhere is this more evident than in public discourse today, and especially as it plays out across the internet. To philosophers Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke, who have written extensively about moral grandstanding, such one-upmanship is not just annoying, but dangerous. As politics gets more and more polarized, people on both sides of the spectrum move further and further apart when they let grandstanding get in the way of engaging one another. The pollution of our most urgent conversations with self-interest damages the very causes they are meant to forward. Drawing from work in psychology, economics, and political science, and along with contemporary examples spanning the political spectrum, the authors dive deeply into why and how we grandstand. Using the analytic tools of psychology and moral philosophy, they explain what drives us to behave in this way, and what we stand to lose by taking it too far. Most importantly, they show how, by avoiding grandstanding, we can re-build a public square worth participating in.
Author: Ellen Frankel Paul
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521006033
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 382
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Book Description
This volume discusses the nature of moral knowledge and whether it exists.
Author: Christopher B. Kulp
Publisher: Lexington Books
ISBN: 1498547036
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 187
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Book Description
This is a book on metaethics and moral epistemology. It asks two fundamental questions: (i) Is there any such thing as (non-relative) moral truth?; and (ii) If there is such truth, how do we come into epistemic contact with it? Roughly the first half of the book is aimed at answering the first question. Its animating idea is that we should take our ordinary, tutored moral judgments seriously—judgments typified by our conviction that it is clearly true that some acts, policies, social norms et al. are morally right or wrong, permissible or impermissible, praiseworthy or condemnable, etc., no matter when, where, or by whom they are performed. In order to provide a firm conceptual basis for such judgments, the book develops a theory of moral truth, based on a theory of moral facts. The account of moral truth and moral facts is further grounded on a theory of moral properties. In short, the book develops a theory of moral realism, roughly, the view that there are indeed non-relative, first-order moral truths. The second half of the book is aimed at answering the second question above. Building squarely on the metaethical theories developed earlier, the book argues for a non-empiricist theory of justified moral belief and knowledge. Pivotal to this project is a careful analysis of various forms of moral skepticism, by which I mean any conception of morality substantially at odds with the general contours of our ordinary moral thinking. All such skepticisms are rejected, and in their place a broadly intuitionist, epistemically fallibilist theory of moral knowledge is advanced. The conclusion reached is that we have very strong reason to believe that our ordinary moral thinking, although certainly liable to error, is fundamentally sound. Moral knowledge is ubiquitous.
