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Author: Jacob Glazer
Publisher: World Scientific Publishing Company
ISBN: 9813141336
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 153
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Book Description
This book brings together the authors' joint papers from over a period of more than twenty years. The collection includes seven papers, each of which presents a novel and rigorous model in Economic Theory. All of the models are within the domain of implementation and mechanism design theories. These theories attempt to explain how incentive schemes and organizations can be designed with the goal of inducing agents to behave according to the designer's (principal's) objectives. Most of the literature assumes that agents are fully rational. In contrast, the authors inject into each model an element which conflicts with the standard notion of full rationality, demonstrating how such elements can dramatically change the mechanism design problem. Although all of the models presented in this volume touch on mechanism design issues, it is the formal modeling of bounded rationality that the authors are most interested in. A model of bounded rationality signifies a model that contains a procedural element of reasoning that is not consistent with full rationality. Rather than looking for a canonical model of bounded rationality, the articles introduce a variety of modeling devices that will capture procedural elements not previously considered, and which alter the analysis of the model. The book is a journey into the modeling of bounded rationality. It is a collection of modeling ideas rather than a general alternative theory of implementation.
Author: Jacob Glazer
Publisher: World Scientific Publishing Company
ISBN: 9813141336
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 153
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book brings together the authors' joint papers from over a period of more than twenty years. The collection includes seven papers, each of which presents a novel and rigorous model in Economic Theory. All of the models are within the domain of implementation and mechanism design theories. These theories attempt to explain how incentive schemes and organizations can be designed with the goal of inducing agents to behave according to the designer's (principal's) objectives. Most of the literature assumes that agents are fully rational. In contrast, the authors inject into each model an element which conflicts with the standard notion of full rationality, demonstrating how such elements can dramatically change the mechanism design problem. Although all of the models presented in this volume touch on mechanism design issues, it is the formal modeling of bounded rationality that the authors are most interested in. A model of bounded rationality signifies a model that contains a procedural element of reasoning that is not consistent with full rationality. Rather than looking for a canonical model of bounded rationality, the articles introduce a variety of modeling devices that will capture procedural elements not previously considered, and which alter the analysis of the model. The book is a journey into the modeling of bounded rationality. It is a collection of modeling ideas rather than a general alternative theory of implementation.
Author: Ariel Rubinstein
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262681001
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 226
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Book Description
The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in the 1950s by Herbert Simon; only recently has it influenced mainstream economics. In this book, Ariel Rubinstein defines models of bounded rationality as those in which elements of the process of choice are explicitly embedded. The book focuses on the challenges of modeling bounded rationality, rather than on substantial economic implications. In the first part of the book, the author considers the modeling of choice. After discussing some psychological findings, he proceeds to the modeling of procedural rationality, knowledge, memory, the choice of what to know, and group decisions.In the second part, he discusses the fundamental difficulties of modeling bounded rationality in games. He begins with the modeling of a game with procedural rational players and then surveys repeated games with complexity considerations. He ends with a discussion of computability constraints in games. The final chapter includes a critique by Herbert Simon of the author's methodology and the author's response. The Zeuthen Lecture Book series is sponsored by the Institute of Economics at the University of Copenhagen.
Author: Gerd Gigerenzer
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262571647
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 404
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Book Description
In a complex and uncertain world, humans and animals make decisions under the constraints of limited knowledge, resources, and time. Yet models of rational decision making in economics, cognitive science, biology, and other fields largely ignore these real constraints and instead assume agents with perfect information and unlimited time. About forty years ago, Herbert Simon challenged this view with his notion of "bounded rationality." Today, bounded rationality has become a fashionable term used for disparate views of reasoning. This book promotes bounded rationality as the key to understanding how real people make decisions. Using the concept of an "adaptive toolbox," a repertoire of fast and frugal rules for decision making under uncertainty, it attempts to impose more order and coherence on the idea of bounded rationality. The contributors view bounded rationality neither as optimization under constraints nor as the study of people's reasoning fallacies. The strategies in the adaptive toolbox dispense with optimization and, for the most part, with calculations of probabilities and utilities. The book extends the concept of bounded rationality from cognitive tools to emotions; it analyzes social norms, imitation, and other cultural tools as rational strategies; and it shows how smart heuristics can exploit the structure of environments.
Author: Riccardo Viale
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 131733079X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 844
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Book Description
Herbert Simon’s renowned theory of bounded rationality is principally interested in cognitive constraints and environmental factors and influences which prevent people from thinking or behaving according to formal rationality. Simon’s theory has been expanded in numerous directions and taken up by various disciplines with an interest in how humans think and behave. This includes philosophy, psychology, neurocognitive sciences, economics, political science, sociology, management, and organization studies. The Routledge Handbook of Bounded Rationality draws together an international team of leading experts to survey the recent literature and the latest developments in these related fields. The chapters feature entries on key behavioural phenomena, including reasoning, judgement, decision making, uncertainty, risk, heuristics and biases, and fast and frugal heuristics. The text also examines current ideas such as fast and slow thinking, nudge, ecological rationality, evolutionary psychology, embodied cognition, and neurophilosophy. Overall, the volume serves to provide the most complete state-of-the-art collection on bounded rationality available. This book is essential reading for students and scholars of economics, psychology, neurocognitive sciences, political sciences, and philosophy.
Author: Richard Michael 1921- Cyert
Publisher: Hassell Street Press
ISBN: 9781015087965
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 360
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Book Description
This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Author: Suren Basov
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 9811010412
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 181
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Book Description
This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation. Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design. This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.
Author: Tshilidzi Marwala
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0443239835
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 314
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Book Description
Recent advances in AI and Mechanism Design provide a vital tool for solving collective action problems, common in international relations. By using AI to optimize mechanisms for cooperation and coordination, we can better address issues such as climate change, trade, and security. Mechanism Design, Behavioral Science and Artificial Intelligence in International Relations shows readers how the intersection of Mechanism Design and Artificial Intelligence is revolutionizing the way we approach international relations. By using AI to optimize mechanisms, we can design better institutions, policies, and agreements that are more effective and efficient. Dr. Tshilidzi Marwala, United Nations University Rector and UN Under-Secretary General, presents the essential technologies used in Game Theory, Mechanism Design and AI and applies these to significant global issues such as interstate conflict, cybersecurity, and energy. International relations are a complex field, with many different actors and interests in play. By incorporating AI into our analysis and decision-making processes, we can better understand and predict the behavior of multiple actors and design mechanisms that take these behaviors into account, thereby producing more desirable and creative interdisciplinary approaches. The book presents real-world applications of these rapidly evolving technologies in crucial research fields such as Interstate Conflict, International Trade, Climate Change, Water management, Energy, cybersecurity, and global finance. - Provides insights for computer scientists, researchers, practitioners, and policymakers on how to develop practical tools to solve many complex problems in international relations, such as climate change, cybersecurity, and interstate conflict - Presents the necessary computer science, mathematical methods, and techniques in AI, game theory, mechanism design, and algorithm development - Includes real-world applications of AI and mechanism design in a wide variety of research topics, such as international conflict, international trade, climate change, water management, energy management, cybersecurity, and global finance
Author: Kagan Tumer
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1441989099
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 329
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Book Description
Many complex systems found in nature can be viewed as function optimizers. In particular, they can be viewed as such optimizers of functions in extremely high dimensional spaces. Given the difficulty of performing such high-dimensional op timization with modern computers, there has been a lot of exploration of computa tional algorithms that try to emulate those naturally-occurring function optimizers. Examples include simulated annealing (SA [15,18]), genetic algorithms (GAs) and evolutionary computation [2,3,9,11,20-22,24,28]. The ultimate goal of this work is an algorithm that can, for any provided high-dimensional function, come close to extremizing that function. Particularly desirable would be such an algorithm that works in an adaptive and robust manner, without any explicit knowledge of the form of the function being optimized. In particular, such an algorithm could be used for distributed adaptive control---one of the most important tasks engineers will face in the future, when the systems they design will be massively distributed and horribly messy congeries ofcomputational systems.
Author: Vernon L. Smith
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107199379
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 237
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Book Description
Articulates Adam Smith's model of human sociality, illustrated in experimental economic games that relate easily to business and everyday life. Shows how to re-humanize the study of economics in the twenty-first century by integrating Adam Smith's two great books into contemporary empirical analysis.
Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 981437458X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 471
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Book Description
Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
