Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion

Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion PDF Author: Mark Balaguer
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019263884X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 404

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Book Description
Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion does two things. First, it introduces a novel kind of non-factualist view, and argues that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a wide class of metaphysical questions, most notably, the abstract-object question and the composite-object question. (More specifically, Mark Balaguer argues that there's no fact of the matter whether there are any such things as abstract objects or composite objects--or material objects of any other kind.) Second, Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion explains how these non-factualist views fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism, and explains how we could argue that neo-positivism is true. Neo-positivism is the view that every metaphysical question decomposes into some subquestions--call them Q1, Q2, Q3, etc.--such that, for each of these subquestions, one of the following three anti-metaphysical views is true of it: non-factualism, or scientism, or metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism. These three views can be defined (very roughly) as follows: non-factualism about a question Q is the view that there's no fact of the matter about the answer to Q. Scientism about Q is the view that Q is an ordinary empirical-scientific question about some contingent aspect of physical reality, and Q can't be settled with an a priori philosophical argument. And metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism about Q is the view that Q asks about the truth value of a modal sentence that's metaphysically innocent in the sense that it doesn't say anything about reality and, if it's true, isn't made true by reality

Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion

Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion PDF Author: Mark Balaguer
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019263884X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 404

Get Book Here

Book Description
Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion does two things. First, it introduces a novel kind of non-factualist view, and argues that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a wide class of metaphysical questions, most notably, the abstract-object question and the composite-object question. (More specifically, Mark Balaguer argues that there's no fact of the matter whether there are any such things as abstract objects or composite objects--or material objects of any other kind.) Second, Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion explains how these non-factualist views fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism, and explains how we could argue that neo-positivism is true. Neo-positivism is the view that every metaphysical question decomposes into some subquestions--call them Q1, Q2, Q3, etc.--such that, for each of these subquestions, one of the following three anti-metaphysical views is true of it: non-factualism, or scientism, or metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism. These three views can be defined (very roughly) as follows: non-factualism about a question Q is the view that there's no fact of the matter about the answer to Q. Scientism about Q is the view that Q is an ordinary empirical-scientific question about some contingent aspect of physical reality, and Q can't be settled with an a priori philosophical argument. And metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism about Q is the view that Q asks about the truth value of a modal sentence that's metaphysically innocent in the sense that it doesn't say anything about reality and, if it's true, isn't made true by reality

Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion

Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion PDF Author: Mark Balaguer
Publisher:
ISBN: 0198868367
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 321

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Book Description
Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion introduces a novel kind of non-factualist view, and argues that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a wide class of metaphysical questions. It also explains how these non-factualist views fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism.

David Hume’s Humanity

David Hume’s Humanity PDF Author: S. Yenor
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1137539593
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 253

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Book Description
Scott Yenor argues that David Hume's reputation as a skeptic is greatly exaggerated and that Hume's skepticism is a moment leading Hume to defend common life philosophy and the humane commercial republic. Gentle, humane virtues reflect the proper reaction to the complex mixture of human faculties that define the human condition.

Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics

Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics PDF Author: Mark Balaguer
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780195143980
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 234

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Book Description
In this book, Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism. He does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible. (Philosophy)

Empty Ideas

Empty Ideas PDF Author: Peter Unger
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019069601X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 273

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Book Description
During the middle of the twentieth century, philosophers generally agreed that, by contrast with science, philosophy should offer no substantial thoughts about the general nature of concrete reality. Instead, philosophers offered conceptual truths. It is widely assumed that, since 1970, things have changed greatly. This book argues that's an illusion that prevails because of the failure to differentiate between "concretely substantial" and "concretely empty" ideas.

Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem

Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem PDF Author: Mark Balaguer
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262266156
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 213

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Book Description
An argument that the problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events. In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events. In the course of his argument, Balaguer provides a naturalistic defense of the libertarian view of free will. The metaphysical component of the problem of free will, Balaguer argues, essentially boils down to the question of whether humans possess libertarian free will. Furthermore, he argues that, contrary to the traditional wisdom, the libertarian question reduces to a question about indeterminacy—in particular, to a straightforward empirical question about whether certain neural events in our heads are causally undetermined in a certain specific way; in other words, Balaguer argues that the right kind of indeterminacy would bring with it all of the other requirements for libertarian free will. Finally, he argues that because there is no good evidence as to whether or not the relevant neural events are undetermined in the way that's required, the question of whether human beings possess libertarian free will is a wide-open empirical question.

The Problem of Universals in Early Modern Philosophy

The Problem of Universals in Early Modern Philosophy PDF Author: Stefano Di Bella
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190608048
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 369

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Book Description
This is a collection of essays from an international group of scholars that explore the ways in which the ancient problem of universals was transformed in modern philosophy. Essays consider the various forms of "Platonism," "conceptualism" and "nominalism" in the writings of a broad range of modern thinkers.

The Metaphysics Within Physics

The Metaphysics Within Physics PDF Author: Tim Maudlin
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199218218
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 208

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Book Description
What does physics tell us about metaphysics? Tim Maudlin's philosophical examination of the fundamental structure of the world as presented by physics challenges the most widely accepted philosophical accounts of laws of nature, universals, the direction of time and causation.

The External World and Our Knowledge of it

The External World and Our Knowledge of it PDF Author: Fred Wilson
Publisher: University of Toronto Press
ISBN: 0802097642
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 825

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Book Description
David Hume is often considered to have been a sceptic, particularly in his conception of the individual's knowledge of the external world. However, a closer examination of his works gives a much different impression of this aspect of Hume's philosophy, one that is due for a thorough scholarly analysis. This study argues that Hume was, in fact, a critical realist in the early twentieth-century sense, a period in which the term was used to describe the epistemological and ontological theories of such philosophers as Roy Wood Sellars and Bertrand Russell. Carefully situating Hume in his historical context, that is, relative to Aristotelian and rationalist traditions, Fred Wilson makes important and unique insights into Humean philosophy. Analyzing key sections of the Treatise, the Enquiry, and the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Wilson offers a deeper understanding of Hume by taking into account the philosopher's theories of the external world. Such a reading, the author explains, is not only more faithful to the texts, but also reinforces the view of Hume as a critical realist in light of twentieth-century discussions between externalism and internalism, and between coherentists and foundationalists. Complete with original observations and ideas, this study is sure to generate debates about Humean philosophy, critical realism, and the limits of perceptual knowledge.

Aquinas on Being

Aquinas on Being PDF Author: Anthony Kenny
Publisher: Clarendon Press
ISBN: 9780191543975
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 228

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Book Description
Anthony Kenny offers a critical examination of a central metaphysical doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, the greatest of the medieval philosophers. Aquinas's account of being is famous and influential: but Kenny argues that it in fact suffers from systematic confusion. Because of the centrality of the doctrine, this has implications for other parts of Aquinas's philosophical system: in particular, Kenny shows that the idea that God is pure being is a hindrance, not a help, to Aquinas's natural theology. Kenny's clear and incisive study, drawing on the scholastic as well as the analytic tradition, dispels the confusion and offers philosophers and theologians a guide through the labyrinth of Aquinas's ontology.