Maneuver Warfare and the US Navy's New Strategic Concept PDF Download
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Author: Peter G. Galluch
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781423581321
Category : Maneuver warfare
Languages : en
Pages : 115
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Book Description
This thesis examines the extent to which modern maneuver warfare theory is relevant to naval warfare and the US Navy's new strategic concept. This question is important because Naval Doctrine Command, established to translate the strategic vision of'.. From The Sea' into doctrinal reality, seized upon the concept of maneuver warfare in Naval Warfare (Naval Doctrine Publication One) as the most appropriate war fighting style for the naval services. Modern maneuver warfare theory was developed from land warfare experience to solve specific problems of that warfare medium. The current body of literature treating the adoption of maneuver warfare by the naval services does not address the question of its relevance at sea or in the littoral. This thesis develops a framework for determining the relevance of maneuver warfare to the naval services by defining the concept and describing its essential elements. It then examines why the US Army and Marine Corps adopted maneuver warfare in the nineteen-eighties. The thesis concludes that the littoral arena makes the adoption of maneuver warfare for the naval services relevant and necessary.
Author: Peter G. Galluch
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781423581321
Category : Maneuver warfare
Languages : en
Pages : 115
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Book Description
This thesis examines the extent to which modern maneuver warfare theory is relevant to naval warfare and the US Navy's new strategic concept. This question is important because Naval Doctrine Command, established to translate the strategic vision of'.. From The Sea' into doctrinal reality, seized upon the concept of maneuver warfare in Naval Warfare (Naval Doctrine Publication One) as the most appropriate war fighting style for the naval services. Modern maneuver warfare theory was developed from land warfare experience to solve specific problems of that warfare medium. The current body of literature treating the adoption of maneuver warfare by the naval services does not address the question of its relevance at sea or in the littoral. This thesis develops a framework for determining the relevance of maneuver warfare to the naval services by defining the concept and describing its essential elements. It then examines why the US Army and Marine Corps adopted maneuver warfare in the nineteen-eighties. The thesis concludes that the littoral arena makes the adoption of maneuver warfare for the naval services relevant and necessary.
Author: Department of the Navy
Publisher: Vigeo Press
ISBN: 9781948648394
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 84
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Book Description
The manual describes the general strategy for the U.S. Marines but it is beneficial for not only every Marine to read but concepts on leadership can be gathered to lead a business to a family. If you want to see what make Marines so effective this book is a good place to start.
Author: Steven Wills
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 168247674X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 194
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Book Description
As U.S. strategy shifts (once again) to focus on great power competition, Strategy Shelved provides a valuable, analytic look back to the Cold War era by examining the rise and eventual fall of the U.S. Navy’s naval strategy system from the post–World War II era to 1994. Steven T. Wills draws some important conclusions that have relevance to the ongoing strategic debates of today. His analysis focuses on the 1970s and 1980s as a period when U.S. Navy strategic thought was rebuilt after a period of stagnation during the Vietnam conflict and its high water mark in the form of the 1980s’maritime strategy and its attendant six hundred –ship navy force structure. He traces the collapse of this earlier system by identifying several contributing factors: the provisions of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986, the aftermath of the First Gulf War of 1991, the early 1990s revolution in military affairs, and the changes to the Chief of Naval Operations staff in 1992 following the end of the Cold War. All of these conditions served to undermine the existing naval strategy system. The Goldwater Nichols Act subordinated the Navy to joint control with disastrous effects on the long-serving cohort of uniformed naval strategists. The first Gulf War validated Army and Air Force warfare concepts developed in the Cold War but not those of the Navy’s maritime strategy. The Navy executed its own revolution in military affairs during the Cold War through systems like AEGIS but did not get credit for those efforts. Finally, the changes in the Navy (OPNAV) staff in 1992 served to empower the budget arm of OPNAV at the expense of its strategists. These measures laid the groundwork for a thirty-year “strategy of means” where service budgets, a desire to preserve existing force structure, and lack of strategic vision hobbled not only the Navy, but also the Joint Force’s ability to create meaningful strategy to counter a rising China and a revanchist Russian threat. Wills concludes his analysis with an assessment of the return of naval strategy documents in 2007 and 2015 and speculates on the potential for success of current Navy strategies including the latest tri-service maritime strategy. His research makes extensive use of primary sources, oral histories, and navy documents to tell the story of how the U.S. Navy created both successful strategies and how a dedicated group of naval officers were intimately involved in their creation. It also explains how the Navy’s ability to create strategy, and even the process for training strategy writers, was seriously damaged in the post–Cold War era.
Author: Patrick A. Piercey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Amphibious warfare
Languages : en
Pages : 113
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Book Description
Author: Patrick A. Piercey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Amphibious warfare
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This study investigates the historical basis of maneuver warfare at sea to answer the question: Does the adoption of maneuver warfare by the U.S. Navy improve its ability to carry out its roles and functions in support of the national military strategy? The fundamental maneuver warfare concept examined is that maneuver warfare seeks the psychological defeat of the enemy by destroying his cohesion and will to resist through disruption of his decision cycle by presenting cascading and unexpected threatening situations by assailing his center of gravity at a tempo at which he cannot respond. Two historical case studies are examined at the operational level: the Trafalgar Campaign of 1805 and the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982. Analysis of both reveals evidence of the application of maneuver warfare concepts. The study concludes that maneuver warfare has a foundation in naval history. Maneuver warfare on both land and sea seek the psychological defeat of the enemy, primarily that of the commander. As such, maneuver warfare is a viable doctrine for the U.S. Navy. --Abstract.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 121
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Book Description
Maneuver in land warfare has been the subject of much study in modern times. The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps in particular have devoted considerable emphasis to the examination of maneuver, as evidenced by the volumes of material produced on the subject. As a result, both of these services, as well as the U.S. Air Force, have incorporated maneuver in their respective warfighting doctrines. However, the U.S. Navy has only relatively recently began to develop a formal doctrine. Although the U.S. Navy has always used a doctrine, it has mainly existed in an informal, unwritten form. With recent efforts to formalize its doctrine, the U.S. Navy must, among other things, articulate warfighting concepts. A critical concept that requires exploration is blue-water naval maneuver. This thesis used two case studies to examine the use of blue-water naval maneuver at the strategic and operational levels, in combat and noncombat environments. This thesis showed that naval maneuver is an effective technique in modern naval warfare and should be emphasized as a viable method of warfare in emerging U.S. Navy doctrine.
Author: Jack D Kern Editor
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781727846430
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 266
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Book Description
Volume 5, Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations, presents eleven case studies from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on deep maneuver in terms of time, space and purpose. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet carry an element of risk of overextension - especially in light of the independent factors of geography and weather that are ever-present. As a result, the case studies address not only successes, but also failure and shortfalls that result when conducting deep operations. The final two chapters address these considerations for future Deep Maneuver.
Author: Naval Studies Board
Publisher: National Academies Press
ISBN: 0309553237
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 244
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Book Description
Deterrence as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War. During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at preventing aggression against the United States and its close allies by the hostile Communist power centers--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China and North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China. Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of war among the major powers has subsided to the lowest point in modern history. Still, the changing nature of the threats to American and allied security interests has stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept. Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence examines the meaning of deterrence in this new environment and identifies key elements of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and the critical issues in devising such a strategy. It further examines the significance of these findings for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about the potential success or failure of deterrence are identified. Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to meet the deterrence objectives. The capabilities of U.S. naval forces that especially bear on the deterrence objectives also are examined. Finally, the book examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations in which deterrence must be used and in improving the potential success of deterrence actions.
Author: Martin van Creveld
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781478361008
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 284
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Book Description
An essential part of the Air War College curriculum consists of the study of military history and specific campaigns. Part 1 of this manuscript presents an attempt to clarify the relationship between air power and maneuver warfare since 1939, a subject that derives its importance from the fact that maneuver warfare has been the U.S. Army's official doctrine since the early eighties and remains so to the present day. Part 2 contains the collective wisdom of the military doctrine analysis of the Air University on the same subjects, as well as the way in which we have presented them.
Author: William S Lind
Publisher: Westview Press
ISBN: 086531862X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 148
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Book Description
This book develops and explains the theory of maneuver warfare and offers specific tactical, operational, and organizational recommendations for improving ground combat forces.
