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Author: Major Kerry K. Pierce
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1782895809
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 78
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Book Description
This monograph examines the practice of operational art from the perspective of the Kursk Campaign of July-Oct., 1943. The study begins by presenting the German and Russian campaign plans as examples of two different methods of achieving a desired end state. Each plan’s vision of the future was heavily influenced by the nature of the strategic situation and the personalities of the two principal artists: Adolf Hitler and Marshal Georgii Zhukov. These two leaders had vastly different understandings of strategic possibilities, time-space dimensions of the battlefield, and the means required to achieve their desired end states. The success of Zhukov’s campaign plan was directly related to his linkage of appropriate means and methods toward a desired end state, while Hitler’s failure represented a failure to do likewise. The monograph also uses Kursk to examine several theoretical concepts of war. These include the relative strength of offense and defense, culminating points, the art of combinations, use of reserves, and the center of gravity. The Russian decision to defend first against an expected German offensive is an excellent example of the use of operational art. Acting on the information of the LUCY espionage network, Zhukov constructed his campaign around an unprecedented tactical defensive system in an effort to destroy the German armored formations as they attacked toward Kursk. He intended to initiate his counteroffensive at the point where the German panzer corps had been so attrited that they would not be able to prevent a Russian onslaught which would expel all German forces from the Donetz Basin. German operational flexibility, which had been the hallmark of their previous campaigns, was eliminated by Hitler’s centrally devised and executed plan, reducing commanders such as Manstein and Model to mere tactical actors. In the end the Russian victory was a complete one: tactical, operational and strategic.
Author: Major Kerry K. Pierce
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1782895809
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 78
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Book Description
This monograph examines the practice of operational art from the perspective of the Kursk Campaign of July-Oct., 1943. The study begins by presenting the German and Russian campaign plans as examples of two different methods of achieving a desired end state. Each plan’s vision of the future was heavily influenced by the nature of the strategic situation and the personalities of the two principal artists: Adolf Hitler and Marshal Georgii Zhukov. These two leaders had vastly different understandings of strategic possibilities, time-space dimensions of the battlefield, and the means required to achieve their desired end states. The success of Zhukov’s campaign plan was directly related to his linkage of appropriate means and methods toward a desired end state, while Hitler’s failure represented a failure to do likewise. The monograph also uses Kursk to examine several theoretical concepts of war. These include the relative strength of offense and defense, culminating points, the art of combinations, use of reserves, and the center of gravity. The Russian decision to defend first against an expected German offensive is an excellent example of the use of operational art. Acting on the information of the LUCY espionage network, Zhukov constructed his campaign around an unprecedented tactical defensive system in an effort to destroy the German armored formations as they attacked toward Kursk. He intended to initiate his counteroffensive at the point where the German panzer corps had been so attrited that they would not be able to prevent a Russian onslaught which would expel all German forces from the Donetz Basin. German operational flexibility, which had been the hallmark of their previous campaigns, was eliminated by Hitler’s centrally devised and executed plan, reducing commanders such as Manstein and Model to mere tactical actors. In the end the Russian victory was a complete one: tactical, operational and strategic.
Author: Colonel David M Glantz
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786250438
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 84
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Book Description
In his classic work, On War, Carl von Clausewitz wrote, “As we shall show, defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack.” A generation of nineteenth century officers, nurtured on the study of the experiences of Napoleon and conditioned by the wars of German unification, had little reason to accept that view. The offensive spirit swept through European armies and manifested itself in the regulations, plans, and mentality of those armiehe events of 1939, 1940, and 1941 in Poland, France, and Russia respectively again challenged Clausewitz’ claim of the superiority of the defense and prompted armies worldwide to frantically field large armored forces and develop doctrines for their use. While blitzkrieg concepts ruled supreme, it fell to that nation victimized most by those concepts to develop techniques to counter the German juggernaut. The Soviets had to temper a generation of offensive tradition in order to marshal forces and develop techniques to counter blitzkrieg. In essence, the Soviet struggle for survival against blitzkrieg proved also to be a partial test of Clausewitz’ dictum. In July 1943, after arduous months of developing defensive techniques, often at a high cost in terms of men and material, the Soviets met blitzkrieg head-on and proved that defense against it was feasible. The titanic, grinding Kursk operation validated, in part, Clausewitz’ views. But it also demonstrated that careful study of force organization and employment and application of the fruits of that study can produce either offensive or defensive victory. While on the surface the events of Kursk seemed to validate Clausewitz’ view, it is often forgotten that, at Kursk, the Soviets integrated the concept of counteroffensive into their grand defensive designs. Thus the defense itself was meaningless unless viewed against the backdrop of the renewed offensive efforts and vice versa. What Kursk did prove was that strategic, operational, and tactical defenses could counter blitzkrieg.
Author: David M. Glantz
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1135233179
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 372
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Book Description
This volume offers detailed information about the Red Army's preparation for and conduct of the Battle of Kursk, the nature of the war on the German Eastern Front, and on the range of horrors that have characterized warfare in the 20th century.
Author: Major James E. Elder
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 178625039X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 63
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Book Description
This monograph analyzes the use of deception by the Germans and Soviets in the battle of Kursk. It uses a paradigm consisting of: commander’s aim, intelligence, centralized control, synchronization and operations security to determine why Soviet deception succeeded and German deception failed. The analysis provides insights into the use of operational deception on the modern battlefield. The conclusions of this monograph suggest that: operational deception is not a separate deception activity; that it can be used in the offense or defense; that it can be a viable combat multiplier today and that deception is an acquired Skill. The study monograph shows that operational deception must organize and control the deception efforts at the tactical level and that simple battlefield deception techniques can produce an operational effect. The monograph shows the critical role commanders have in establishing an appropriate course of action that sets the stage for deception. The selected course of action must provide a picture of duplicity to the enemy commander by presenting two possible objectives. This concept of alternative objectives allows the deception activity to flow naturally from the COA and confuse the enemy. The monograph recommends incorporation of deception into the officer corps professional development through professional reading programs in schools and practical application at the National Training Center. Combat Maneuver Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center and the Battle Command Training Program. It also recommends that the Army develop and field sufficient communications and non-communications’ devices to allow Army Groups to simulate a U.S. Corps.
Author: Christopher A. Lawrence
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 0811768120
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 657
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Book Description
The Battle of Kursk was one of the defining moments of World War II. In July 1943, German forces under Erich von Manstein--one of Germany’s best generals--launched a massive attack in an offensive code-named Citadel. A week later, the Soviets counterattacked, sparking a huge clash of tanks at Prokhorovka, the largest armor battle in history, pitting more than 600 Soviet tanks against some 300 German panzers. Though the Germans gained a tactical victory, destroying huge numbers of Soviet tanks, they failed to achieve their objectives, and in the end the battle marked a turning point on the Eastern Front. The Red Army gained the strategic initiative and would not lose it.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Book Description
This monograph examines the practice of operational art from the perspective of the Kursk Campaign of July-October, 1943. The study begins by presenting the German and Russian campaign plans as examples of two different methods of achieving a desired end state. Each plan's vision of the future was heavily influenced by the nature of the strategic situation and the personalities of the two principal artists: Adolph Hitler and Marshal Georgii Zhukov. These two leaders had vastly different understandings of strategic possibilities, time-space dimensions of the battlefield, and the means required to achieve their desired end states. The success of Zhukov's campaign plan was directly related to his linkage of appropriate means and methods toward a desired end state, while Hitler's failure represented a failure to do likewise. The monograph also uses Kursk to examine several theoretical concepts of war. These include the relative strength of offense and defense, culminating points, the art of combinations, use of reserves, and the center of gravity.
Author: Valeriy Zamulin
Publisher: Helion and Company
ISBN: 191311807X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 418
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Book Description
In this book, noted historian of the Battle of Kursk Valeriy Zamulin, the author of multiple Russian-language books on the Battle of Kursk and Destroying the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative takes a fresh look at several controversial and neglected topics regarding the battle and its run-up. He starts with a detailed look at the Soviet and Russian historiography on the battle, showing how initially promising research was swamped by Party dogma and censorship during the Brezhnev area, before being resumed with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Zamulin then transitions to discussions of how the southern shoulder of the Kursk bulge was formed, preparations for the battle on both sides, and the size and composition of Model’s Ninth Army. He then examines such controversial topics as whether or not the II SS Panzer Corps was aware of the pending Soviet counterattack at Prokhorovka, and the effectiveness of the Soviet preemptive barrage that struck the German troops that were poised to attack. Zamulin also discusses whether or not General Vatutin, the Commander-in-Chief of Voronezh Front, erred when arranging his defenses. Zamulin also takes a look at how the myth of 1,500 tanks colliding on a narrow strip of farm fields became perpetuated in Soviet and foreign history books, when in fact it was impossible for the 5th Guards Tank Army’s tanks to attack in massive wave after wave due to the constrictions of the terrain. Zamulin also reveals incidents of the battle that were long kept “behind the curtain” by Soviet censorship. For example, the 183rd Rifle Division defending the Prokhorovka axis was repeatedly struck by friendly aircraft, and a Soviet tank counterattack overran the positions of one of its battalions. Zamulin discusses other cases of fratricide in the Voronezh Front, including the death of one of the 1st Tank Army’s foremost tank commanders in a friendly fire incident. In the process, he reveals that a wave of suicides swept through the junior command staff of the 5th Guards Tank Army immediately prior to the famous counteroffensive on 12 July 1943. All in all, Valeriy Zamulin with this collection of essays and articles, two of which have been reprinted from the Journal of Slavic Military History, makes a new contribution to our knowledge and understanding of this pivotal, epochal battle of the Second World War.
Author: Jonathan Mallory House
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428915834
Category : Armies
Languages : en
Pages : 235
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Book Description
Author: Jack D Kern Editor
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781727846430
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 266
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Book Description
Volume 5, Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations, presents eleven case studies from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on deep maneuver in terms of time, space and purpose. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet carry an element of risk of overextension - especially in light of the independent factors of geography and weather that are ever-present. As a result, the case studies address not only successes, but also failure and shortfalls that result when conducting deep operations. The final two chapters address these considerations for future Deep Maneuver.
Author: John Andreas Olsen
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199599483
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 288
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Book Description
Broadly defined as the grey area between strategy and tactics, operational art spans the theory and practice of planning and conducting campaigns and major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives in a given theatre of operations. An intermediate link between strategy and tactics has always existed, but a distinct concept that encompasses a systematic and deliberate plan of campaign for major operations is a mere two hundred years old. Based on country specific case-studies, this book describes how the concepts that underpin operational art originated, how they received practical expression in various campaigns, and how they developed over time. The point of departure is the campaigns of 'the God of War', Napoleon Bonaparte. The book then proceeds with chapters on the evolution of operational art in Prussia / Germany, the Soviet Union / Russia, the United Kingdom, United States, Israel, and China. The final chapter deals with the future of operational art in irregular warfare. Theory is critical to refining and improving existing methods of applying operational warfare, and its importance cannot be overstated; however, to be useful, theory and its accompanying vocabulary must be combined with a proper examination of historical trends and practical experience. The present volume attempts to achieve that combination. This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War.
