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Author: Josephine De Jaegere
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781780686943
Category : Courts
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Focusing on the Constitutional Court of Belgium, the approach of this book is to combine normative ideas on how the Court should act with an empirical case law analysis. It explores the extent to which the Court performs as a deliberative institution, while operating within a consensual political system.
Author: Josephine De Jaegere
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781780686943
Category : Courts
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Focusing on the Constitutional Court of Belgium, the approach of this book is to combine normative ideas on how the Court should act with an empirical case law analysis. It explores the extent to which the Court performs as a deliberative institution, while operating within a consensual political system.
Author: Lee Epstein
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1009058738
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 101
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Book Description
The past decade has witnessed a worldwide explosion of work aimed at illuminating judicial-behavior: the choices judges make and the consequences of their choices. We focus on strategic accounts of judicial-behavior. As in other approaches to judging, preferences and institutions play a central role but strategic accounts are unique in one important respect: They draw attention to the interdependent - i.e., the strategic - nature of judicial decisions. On strategic accounts, judges do not make decisions in a vacuum, but rather attend to the preferences and likely actions of other actors, including their colleagues, superiors, politicians, and the public. We survey the major methodological approaches for conducting strategic analysis and consider how scholars have used them to provide insight into the effect of internal and external actors on the judges' choices. As far as these studies have traveled in illuminating judicial-behavior, many opportunities for forward movement remain. We flag four in the conclusion.
Author: Thomas H. Hammond
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 9780804751469
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 330
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Book Description
This book presents the first comprehensive model of policymaking by strategically-rational justices who pursue their own policy preferences in the Supreme Court's multi-stage decision-making process.
Author: Ryan James Owens
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 232
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Book Description
Author: U. Sommer
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1137398647
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 280
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Book Description
Much research is devoted to the decision-making power and precedent set by the Supreme Court. Less attention, however, is given to the strategic behavior during case selection. This book argues that case selection is done strategically, and by means of various criteria - influencing its constitutional position and importance.
Author: American Bar Association. House of Delegates
Publisher: American Bar Association
ISBN: 9781590318737
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 216
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Book Description
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.
Author: Lee Epstein
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019957989X
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 625
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Book Description
The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Judicial Behavior offers readers a comprehensive introduction and analysis of research regarding decision making by judges serving on federal and state courts in the U.S. Featuring contributions from leading scholars in the field, the Handbook describes and explains how the courts' political and social context, formal institutional structures, and informal norms affect judicial decision making. The Handbook also explores the impact of judges' personal attributes and preferences, as well as prevailing legal doctrine, influence, and shape case outcomes in state and federal courts. The volume also proposes avenues for future research in the various topics addressed throughout the book. Consultant Editor for The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics George C. Edwards III.
Author: Robert M. Howard
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317430387
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 518
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Book Description
Interest in social science and empirical analyses of law, courts and specifically the politics of judges has never been higher or more salient. Consequently, there is a strong need for theoretical work on the research that focuses on courts, judges and the judicial process. The Routledge Handbook of Judicial Behavior provides the most up to date examination of scholarship across the entire spectrum of judicial politics and behavior, written by a combination of currently prominent scholars and the emergent next generation of researchers. Unlike almost all other volumes, this Handbook examines judicial behavior from both an American and Comparative perspective. Part 1 provides a broad overview of the dominant Theoretical and Methodological perspectives used to examine and understand judicial behavior, Part 2 offers an in-depth analysis of the various current scholarly areas examining the U.S. Supreme Court, Part 3 moves from the Supreme Court to examining other U.S. federal and state courts, and Part 4 presents a comprehensive overview of Comparative Judicial Politics and Transnational Courts. Each author in this volume provides perspectives on the most current methodological and substantive approaches in their respective areas, along with suggestions for future research. The chapters contained within will generate additional scholarly and public interest by focusing on topics most salient to the academic, legal and policy communities.
Author: Jeffrey K. Staton
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521195217
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 237
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Book Description
Although they are not directly accountable to voters, constitutional court judges communicate with the general public through the media. In Judicial Power and Strategic Communication in Mexico, Jeffrey K. Staton argues that constitutional courts develop public relations strategies in order to increase the transparency of judicial behavior and promote judicial legitimacy. Yet, in some political contexts there can be a tension between transparency and legitimacy, and for this reason, courts cannot necessarily advance both conditions simultaneously. The argument is tested via an analysis of the Mexican Supreme Court during Mexico's recent transition to democracy, and also through a cross-national analysis of public perceptions of judicial legitimacy. The results demonstrate that judges can be active participants in the construction of their own power. More broadly, the study develops a positive political theory of institutions, which highlights the connections between democratization and the rule of law.
Author: Robert D. Cooter
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691214506
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 435
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Book Description
Making, amending, and interpreting constitutions is a political game that can yield widespread suffering or secure a nation's liberty and prosperity. Given these high stakes, Robert Cooter argues that constitutional theory should trouble itself less with literary analysis and arguments over founders' intentions and focus much more on the real-world consequences of various constitutional provisions and choices. Pooling the best available theories from economics and political science, particularly those developed from game theory, Cooter's economic analysis of constitutions fundamentally recasts a field of growing interest and dramatic international importance. By uncovering the constitutional incentives that influence citizens, politicians, administrators, and judges, Cooter exposes fault lines in alternative forms of democracy: unitary versus federal states, deep administration versus many elections, parliamentary versus presidential systems, unicameral versus bicameral legislatures, common versus civil law, and liberty versus equality rights. Cooter applies an efficiency test to these alternatives, asking how far they satisfy the preferences of citizens for laws and public goods. To answer Cooter contrasts two types of democracy, which he defines as competitive government. The center of the political spectrum defeats the extremes in "median democracy," whereas representatives of all the citizens bargain over laws and public goods in "bargain democracy." Bargaining can realize all the gains from political trades, or bargaining can collapse into an unstable contest of redistribution. States plagued by instability and contests over redistribution should move towards median democracy by increasing transaction costs and reducing the power of the extremes. Specifically, promoting median versus bargain democracy involves promoting winner-take-all elections versus proportional representation, two parties versus multiple parties, referenda versus representative democracy, and special governments versus comprehensive governments. This innovative theory will have ramifications felt across national and disciplinary borders, and will be debated by a large audience, including the growing pool of economists interested in how law and politics shape economic policy, political scientists using game theory or specializing in constitutional law, and academic lawyers. The approach will also garner attention from students of political science, law, and economics, as well as policy makers working in and with new democracies where constitutions are being written and refined.