Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions PDF Download
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Author: Leandro Arozamena
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 56
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Book Description
Author: Leandro Arozamena
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 56
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Book Description
Author: Parente, Diane H.
Publisher: IGI Global
ISBN: 1599046385
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 402
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Book Description
Offers a systematic approach to the examination of online procurement auctions. Growth in online auctions reinforces the need for understanding the factors important in auctions and the caveats that both researchers and practitioners need to know in order to effectively study and use the auction tool.
Author: Maria Monica Wihardja
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 57
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Book Description
We provide a positive analysis of the equilibrium bidding and bribing strategies with and without corruption in a first-price, sealed-bid, procurement auction with two-dimensional-type bidders. With corruption, we assume that the quality of the bidders are unobservable and non-contractible ex-post. We show examples of equilibrium bids and bribes of N two-dimensional-type bidders in an incomplete information game where the type space is discrete and strategy space is infinite. The equilibrium bid and bribe decrease in the number of bidders. Moreover, we show that in this auction with corruption, quality is randomly chosen, constraining efficiency. In fact, no mechanism can be efficient in this auction. The empirical study suggests that increasing the number of bidders increases the percentage cost efficiency at a decreasing rate and it starts to decrease the percentage cost efficiency after it reaches a certain number of bidders.
Author: Michael H. Riordan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 49
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Author: Keith Waehrer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 28
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Book Description
Here we analyze how, in an open procurement auction, cost reductions among suppliers bidding to sell to a buyer affect the payoffs to the buyer and suppliers. When a single supplier enjoys a reduction in cost, its increase in expected payoff is equal to the expected increase in total surplus from the cost reduction. The buyer benefits not by capturing a portion of the increase in surplus but instead gains at the expense of the suppliers who do not enjoy the cost decrease. The buyer's benefit from a cost decrease, increases in the concentration among the suppliers who do not enjoy the cost decrease. These results have implications for vertical integration and merger analysis. Increases in concentration increase the incentive of buyers who are integrated upstream to make cost reducing investments in the supply of the good while the investment incentives of non-integrated suppliers remain unchanged. In terms of merger analysis these results suggest that pass through of merger specific cost savings will be higher if the non-merging firms in the market are more concentrated. In addition, mergers increase the incentives for vertically integrated sellers to make cost reducing investments, which may serve to mitigate the anticompetitive effects of a merger.
Author: Hidenori Takahashi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Jörg Budde
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This paper analyzes the impact of capacity costs on bidding strategies of firms participating in procurement auctions. More efficient firms will invest in advance due to their high probability of winning the auction while less efficient bidders prefer to wait with their investments until the outcome of the auction is known. However, in equilibrium both types of firms include a coverage for their investment costs into their bids and therefore adopt a full cost pricing policy.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Author: Jim Leitzel
Publisher: Westview Press
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 184
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Book Description
Offers an account of the problems - such as high cost and low quality - that can plague weapons systems procurement. Employing the economic theory of agency as their analytical framework, contributors assess the incentives that arise, for both buyers and sellers, in different contractual settings.
